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ABSTRACT 
 
  The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between ideological 
beliefs and individual self-reported health in America between the years 1993 and 
2004.  A distinction between particular ideologies and ruling ideology is made.  
Particular ideologies are created by social interaction as a product of history and are 
used as tools for categorizing and structuring observations, experiences, ideas, and 
action.  Individuals need the structures provided by particular ideologies both to 
understand and to act upon their world.  A ruling ideology develops when those in 
power knit together multiple particular ideologies to create a unified system of thought 
that presents an easily accepted and internalized set of normative behaviors, thought-
patterns, and ideals, in order to protect their social position.   
  Preliminary data analysis revealed that the majority of Americans believe they 
have good health.  These results aided in the development of several research 
questions.  If ideology is as pervasive as suggested by the literature, then is there 
anything about the current ideologies that precipitate widespread belief by individuals 
that they have good health?  Could ideology give a cohesive worldview to individuals, 
thus reducing their stress of being outside the norm?  Or, could ideology provide 
individuals with normative prescriptions for behaviors that are good for their health, 
such as reducing smoking and binge-drinking?  Do the benefits of a cohesive 
worldview or of behavioral health norms outweigh the consequences of the possible 
false consciousness that may result simultaneously? 
  Four propositions suggesting connections between ideology and self-reported 
health are evaluated using binary logistic regression analyses and data from 1993 
through 2004 contained in the General Social Survey.  I predicted that respondents  
who had internalized the dominant particular ideologies or ruling ideology of the era 
would have better health than those who adhered to a different paradigm.  Health is 
measured as poor or good perceptions of self-health.    
  The findings of the analyses show moderate support for three out of four of my 
propositions.  Economic and social ideological beliefs have a significant relationship 
with self-reported health net of demographic controls and material indicators.  Using a 
composite scale to give more breadth to the measurement, religious ideology is also 
seen as a predictor of self-reported health.  The fourth proposition concerning ruling 
ideology found little support using this dataset.  Despite the support garnered for 
psychosocial theory through the significance of the variables indicating particular 
ideology, support for neo-materialist theory was also revealed.  In fact, the material 
indicators showed the strongest and most robust relationships with health status.  In 
many cases, they overwhelmed the other variables.   However, in contradiction to 
epidemiological research, health behaviors do not contribute to explaining to self-
reported health.  The limitations of the study and the implications of the results in light 
of the research questions are discussed at length in the conclusion.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
DEFINING IDEOLOGY 
 
  "Early to bed, and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise," 
Benjamin Franklin’s main character “Father Abraham” advised the local townspeople 
in a 1757 publication.  This essay, entitled “The Way to Wealth,” concluded 
Franklin’s twenty-five years of publication of Poor Richard’s Almanac, a pamphlet 
issuing moral advice about economics, employment, personal life, and social contracts 
in the form of memorable maxims.  Combining quasi-religious admonitions with 
capitalist ideals, Franklin promoted an adherence to a puritanical frugality as the way 
to prosper.   The character-name Franklin chose for his last essay exemplified his 
ability to use religious undertones to add authority to his proverbs without actually 
quoting religious works.  In this way, he facilitated the religion of secular capitalism.  
In sociological circles, Franklin is perhaps best known from Max Weber’s 19
th century 
discussion of him as a purveyor of secularized Protestant virtues used to uphold and 
justify the merciless efficiency of modern western capitalism.  
  Though written in an earlier era, Franklin’s adages have continued relevance 
today, beyond the humor they invoke.  The following chapters will provide evidence 
that suggests that religious undertones are still being used to justify and bolster the 
current economic system and to influence society at large.  Contemporary society has 
seen a marriage of the religious conservatism, economic liberalism, and social 
traditionalism that were in their nascent state in the 18
th century.  More important than 
the simple presence of similar systems is the understanding of the how these 
ideologies affect the health of Americans.  By following them are Americans 
becoming healthy, wealthy, and wise?  
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  In sum, this study will explore various components alluded to in Franklin’s 
1757 maxim in order to better understand the link between health behaviors, wealth, 
ideology, and health.  In particular, I will examine the relations between ascribing to 
certain behaviors deemed healthy, having high socioeconomic status, or subscribing to 
the dominant thought patterns commonly understood as wisdom and common sense, 
and a person’s perceptions of his own health.  To begin, however, we need to reflect 
on what is meant by ideology and on how, theoretically, it is understood to influence 
the lives of individuals in contemporary society. 
 
THEORETICAL VIEWS OF IDEOLOGY 
  Ideology is commonly conceptualized as either a pluralistic way of viewing 
society or as a singular totalizing understanding of the world.  Particular ideologies, 
functioning in a social setting, can affect the worldviews and actions of individuals in 
society, and when molded into a unified paradigm employed by those in power, can be 
used to elicit certain desired social behaviors and conditions.  This study seeks to 
ascertain that critical function.  But before this can be done, we need a clearer 
understanding of the distinction between particular ideologies and ruling ideology. 
 
Particular Ideologies 
  Multiple ideologies exist in any given epoch as tools for categorizing and 
structuring observations, experiences, ideas, and action.  Individuals need the 
structures provided by particular ideologies both to understand and to act upon their 
world.  Particular ideologies are a type of structural paradigm and are not synonymous 
with individual perceptions.  Indeed, for individual thought to be meaningful, it must 
be placed into socially created categories.  Since particular ideologies are created by 
social interaction as a product of history, they are dynamic features of the social  
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environment.  Frequent social interaction forces new information in front of 
individuals, which must either be placed within existing categories, slightly distorted 
to fit, or evolved into a new paradigm.  Contrary to the common perception that 
ideologies are necessarily coercive and created under malicious intent, particular 
ideologies can be treated as instruments necessarily used by social groups to 
understand and act upon the many dimensions of their society.  By simplifying and 
categorizing reality into coherent instrumental ideologies, social groups can organize 
into meaningful structures a multitude of experiences that would not otherwise have 
meaning.  Meaning thus arises when ideas, experiences, and observations are placed 
into certain categories of knowledge.   
   Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains how particular ideologies are less 
of coercive ideas forced on the masses by the ruling elite and more of a heuristic 
device used by social groups to explain the world around them. He describes 
ideologies as consisting of “broad mental and moral frameworks or ‘grids’ that social 
groups use to make sense of the world, to decide what is right or wrong, true or false, 
important or unimportant” (Bonilla-Silva 2001:62).  Implicit in this characterization is 
a value-judgment.  Ideologies are not value-neutral but contain moral imperatives for 
normative behavior.  Although particular ideologies are generally considered good 
because they are necessary for human understanding and knowledge consumption, 
ideologies can be used in deleterious ways.  Ordinary citizens feel pressure to conform 
to the ideals presented as “natural” or normative, creating actions and thought-patterns 
that may subjugate certain groups.    
  A good example of the transition from particular ideologies to ruling ideology 
is found in Max Weber’s seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (2002), which documents the role Protestantism played in the rise of the 
“spirit” of modern capitalism.  Weber uses the term “spirit” to highlight the ideas and  
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normative beliefs (as opposed to strictly the material relations) that developed as part 
of the capitalist paradigm.  These beliefs became internalized by members of society, 
thereby aiding the acceptance of modern capitalism into American culture.  This form 
of capitalism is only one of several particular economic ideologies.  The transition to 
ruling ideology happened in the 18
th century when Protestantism became secularized 
and combined with capitalism to form an overarching understanding of the world 
portrayed as common-sense. The resulting ideology has components of secularized 
religious ideals, such as hard work, individualism, and frugality, which can be used to 
justify the disturbing products (rising inequality, poverty and unemployment) of the 
capitalist paradigm.  Once these ideas were merged with political theories and used by 
the elites to maintain their social position, these components formed an ideational 
system that became dominant in mainstream America.  Thus, the conglomeration of 
several different particular ideologies about various spheres of influence formed a 
ruling ideology.   
 
Ruling Ideology 
  Ideologies can become coercive and dangerous when those in power knit 
together multiple particular ideologies to create a unified system of thought that 
presents an easily accepted and internalized set of normative behaviors, thought-
patterns, and ideals, in order to protect their social position.  A ruling ideology 
becomes particularly problematic when it is presented as benefiting all (through 
ideological discourse on the way the world “ought” to be) although it may only 
contribute to the social reproduction and preservation of the group that created it.  
   In  The German Ideology,  Marx and Engels proposed that “The ruling ideas 
are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the 
dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the  
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one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance" (1976:67).  By virtue of 
controlling the means of production, these owners also have the power to set a ruling 
system of ideas that will best serve their interests, especially that of maintaining 
control over the means of production.  By conflating how the world ought to be with 
how the world is, the dominant ideology appears as neutral and can be accepted 
without question by members of society.  Marx and Engels (1976:34) also viewed 
ruling ideology as a distorted concept of or abstraction from the history of human-kind 
that is unique to the epoch.  Political scientist Michael Freeden builds on this idea, 
stating that, “Ultimately, ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of 
political concepts. … In concrete terms, an ideology will link together a particular 
conception of human nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of 
liberty, of authority, etc. ‘This is what liberty means, and that is what justice means’ it 
asserts” (quoted in Hoover 2003:3,4).  In this way, ideologies can settle contests over 
meanings of the role of government or economics, because their rhetoric on the 
“natural” state of being informs citizens that the world is this way and not that way.  
C. Wright Mills expands on Marx’s understanding of ruling ideology by explaining 
how the current ruling ideology in America has come to prevail and dominate society.   
  
Once the basic structure of the American political economy was built, 
and for so long as it could be tacitly supposed that markets would 
expand indefinitely, the harmony of interests could and did serve well 
as the ideology of dominant groups, by making their interests appear 
identical with the interests of the community as a whole.  So long as 
this doctrine prevails, any lower group that begins to struggle can be 
made to appear inharmonious, disturbing the common interest. 'The 
doctrine of the harmony of interests', E.H. Carr has remarked, 'thus 
serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by 
privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant 
position’” (1959a:248).  
  
6 
The Marxist/neo-Marxist view of ruling ideology relies on the notion that this system 
of ideas is created and espoused by the powerful for the specific purpose of directing 
policies and controlling political and economic structures and practices.   
  Mills also reveals the identities of the owners of production by connecting 
powerful players in multiple spheres of influence.  The powerful are not just the 
wealthy capitalists and corporate CEOs but also include the upper echelon of political 
and military elites.  It is breadth of influence and strength of vertical power 
relationships within multiple spheres that makes a ruling ideology so pervasive and 
powerful in society (Mills 1959a).  By appearing to serve the interests of all, ruling 
ideology can create a “false consciousness” for social classes, in particular for the 
lower class.  As a result, lower classes may have a false perception of their own 
interests and role in society that may encourage them to adhere to a ruling ideology 
that does not actually benefit them.  This false consciousness is perpetuated through a 
discourse that makes truth claims.  Although the language is ideological in form, 
substantively it uses decontested images to advance its cause.  The ideational rhetoric 
sets up false dichotomies forcing citizens choose between obvious patriotism or lack 
there of.  As exemplified in the following chapter, the discourse of the current ruling 
ideology has co-opted ideals such as “freedom” and “liberty,” creating decontested 
terms in the sense that everyone desires these ideals, even if their manifestations under 
this ideology do not benefit them (Freeden 2000:321).    
  At the same time, the reach of ruling ideology is not absolute and ideologies 
develop in opposition to the dominant ideology.   Although ruling ideology, once 
internalized as normative and accepted as “common sense,” has a strong influence on 
society, the thoughts and actions of subordinate groups are not always determined by 
this ideology.  Such groups challenge the status quo with new oppositional ideologies 
(Bonilla-Silva 2006:10).      
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  In light of the sociological literature on particular ideologies and ruling 
ideology, particular ideologies are defined as socially-created structures of ideas that 
govern an individual’s or group’s beliefs and actions.  Alternatively, ruling ideology is 
conceptualized as a unified system of ideologies, knit together by those in power, that 
is widely internalized as common knowledge within a society and which implicitly or 
explicitly affects an individual’s or group’s practices and worldview.  George Ritzer 
argues that ruling ideology is “institutionalized as public knowledge and disseminated 
throughout society so effectively that it becomes taken-for-granted knowledge for all 
social groups” (2004:1)  This suggests that the ruling ideology is not floating 
independently but is attached and disseminated through different structures and 
superstructures (Freeden 2000; Mills 1959a).  Since the ideas espoused by a ruling 
elite will change with power shifts and global influences, a ruling ideology is specific 
to a certain historical context and time period. 
  Although this recognition of elite volition in the creation of ruling ideology 
resembles the Marxist approach, I do however reject the necessity of a materialist base 
for ideology.  Alternatively, ruling ideology is conceptualized as more than just a 
reflection of material relationships.  Evidence, such as Weyrich and Dobson’s 
discussion of the corrupting allure of prestige (see Martin, 1997:Chap. 9), suggests 
that the creation of ideologies may also be based on the desire for power, prestige, and 
maintenance of status.  In addition, while ruling ideologies are understood as created 
by the ruling elite, elite class consciousness does not necessarily include the intent to 
disempower other classes.  Certainly, some elites believe quite earnestly in the 
widespread economic, political, and social benefits of their ideals and not that these 
ideals and the resultant policies are just ways to “dupe” unsuspecting members of the 
public into maintaining the status quo.  Mills stated that despite the class awareness 
that he witnessed as most cohesive and prevalent at the elite level, “the view that all of  
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history is due to the conspiracy of an easily located set of villains, or of heroes, is also 
a hurried projection from the difficult effort to understand how shifts in the structure 
of society open opportunities to various elites and how various elites take advantage or 
fail to take advantage of them" (Mills 1959:27, 30, 283). Often elites sincerely believe 
their policies will help the public and reduce poverty while simultaneously protecting 
their class interests and ideals.  Yet, despite the lack of intentional injury to non-elite 
classes via a ruling ideology proposed by elites, false consciousness and 
disempowerment through a distortion of reality may still occur. 
 
OVERVIEW 
  The following chapter will explore three contemporary particular ideologies by 
reviewing their historical trajectory, the social interactions that formed them, their 
current acceptance in mainstream America, and how they came together to form a 
unified system of ideologies called a ruling ideology.  Furthermore, the effect of 
ideological beliefs on the health and well-being of individuals in America will be 
explored.  The above definition suggests that ruling ideology may affect individual 
health through multiple mechanisms, such as by guiding their health choices and 
behaviors or by influencing their worldview.  Preliminary data analysis revealed that 
the majority of Americans believe they have good health.  If the ruling ideology is as 
pervasive as suggested by the literature, then what is there about the current ruling 
ideology that precipitates widespread belief in individuals that they have good health?  
Could it be that contemporary ideology gives a cohesive worldview to individuals, 
thus reducing their stress of being outside the norm? Or, could ideology provide 
individuals with normative prescriptions for behaviors that are good for their health, 
such as reducing smoking, over-eating, and drug-use?  Do the benefits of a cohesive  
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worldview or of health behavioral norms outweigh the consequences of the possible 
false consciousness that may result simultaneously? 
  This study purports to explore the mechanisms of transmission and the effects 
of ideological beliefs on individual perception of health. The first chapter of this study 
discussed current sociological theories of ideology in an attempt to root this work in 
sociological literature.  Building on the various conceptualizations of ideology, a 
working definition of particular and ruling ideology has been uniquely created for this 
thesis.  Chapter Two will orient the reader toward important contemporary ideologies 
and propose a measure of ruling ideology.  This contemporary ruling ideology of 
America is understood as a product of the interaction of economic, religious, social, 
and political spheres of influence since the 1960s.  Four propositions are formed after 
tracing the historical development of the three components of contemporary ruling 
ideology:  economic libertarianism, and religious conservatism, and social 
traditionalism.  In Chapter Three psychological, psychosocial, physiological, material, 
and organizational pathways of transmission will be explored through a review of 
sociological and epidemiological literature.  This literature suggests that the current 
ideology of free-market capitalism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism 
has increased inequality and class divisions in America.    This inequality is seen to be 
closely linked in a causal way to a health gradient.   This study will see if similar 
connections can be made between the current ruling ideology and perceptions of the 
government, economy, society, religion, and health using data from the General Social 
Survey from 1993 to 2004.  The link between macro and micro scale analyses is 
addressed by applying C. Wright Mills’ concept of “sociological imagination.”  
  The effects of ideology on health will be tested in Chapter Four via data from 
the General Social Survey.  Of great importance is the discussion about the dependent 
variable and the empirically-tested link between individual perceptions of health and  
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medical observations of health.  This section takes the analysis from connecting 
perceptions of society and its components to biological responses.  The methods used, 
limitations of the data-set, a justification of the variables included in the analysis, and 
my theoretical conceptualizations of the measurements are also explored.  The 
findings of this study are revealed in Chapter Five.  These will be discussed first in 
light of their bivariate properties and then through the lens of logistic regression.  The 
four propositions outlined in Chapter Two will be revisited in Chapter Six and paired 
with implications from the findings from Chapter Five.  The importance of the 
connection between ruling ideology and perceptions of health will be evaluated and 
the results will be used to reassess the validity of existing theory.  This section will 
conclude the study by noting important limitations and offering suggestions for future 
research directions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDEOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 
 
  Robert C. Merton cautions researchers to be careful in their attempt to knit a 
complete understanding of society into one all-encompassing theory.  Instead he posits 
that many smaller theories can help us better grasp diverse milieus.  Ultimately, 
although middle-range theories need not be derived from one grand theory, they may 
contribute to development and consistency of overarching theories of society.  Merton 
defines middle-range theories as "theories that lie between the minor but necessary 
working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-
inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the 
observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change" 
(Calhoun, 2002:386). 
  This chapter looks at the mid-range theories behind three components of the 
ideology that was dominant in America during the period 1993-2004: economic 
libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism.  After locating the 
social processes that gave rise to each theory and highlighting the influence of each in 
recent American history, I will form propositions in order to better understand what 
factors might affect Americans’ perceptions of their own health.  Additionally, since 
the three components overlap, some attention will be paid to a composite measure of 
ideology.  This measure of ideology is included for theoretical reasons although in the 
data analysis itself it may be insignificant due to some unreliability with the 
measurements of its components. Thus, although it will be included in empirical 
models and data analysis, this measure in its current form is not assumed to be a 
reliable indicator of the ruling ideology and is meant for refinement in future research.   
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Overall, this work may lend itself to augmenting Marx’s concept of a ruling ideology 
and its influence on mass society, but this is not the purpose or scope of the project.   
 
THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTARIANISM ON POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
  This study traces the rise of the current ruling ideology from the 1960s.  Yet, 
not all parts of this ideology developed simultaneously, and instead its advancement 
can be seen as a dynamic process.  Although economic libertarianism was certainly 
present in America before the 1960s, these ideals did not become accepted as 
mainstream until after the 1960s, thus, this study will begin with Barry Goldwater’s 
1964 presidential bid.  Although the dominant economic ideology of the 1950s 
through the 1970s was that of the interventionist economics of John Maynard Keynes, 
Goldwater and his supporters began to subscribe to free-market ideas of Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman that have come to dominate that later part of the century 
(Hoover 2003:207).   
  Events during the Great Depression and the Second World War greatly colored 
Keynes’ economic theories.  Due to the significant decline of market reliability in the 
1920s and 1930s, the government was expected by the public to have increased 
responsibility to care for its citizens.  Thus, Keynes supported an interventionist 
government that would regulate the economy and thereby maintain a reasonable level 
of employment, economic growth and stability, and a decent standard of living for its 
citizens.  His economic models became increasingly important during the 
development of the 1944 Bretton-Woods Agreements, which regulated the financial 
and economic world order by managing exchange rates, setting guidelines for 
Europe’s post-war reconstruction, and creating international regulatory bodies such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   Although these  
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agreements supported an open system of trade, they also made provisions for 
government intervention (Hoover 2003:3). 
  In the decades following, government involvement in international economic 
issues allowed the public and private sector alike to attribute failures such as the oil 
crisis of 1973 and the ceding of the Panama Canal to government intervention.  More 
and more Americans were also using the welfare system and were feeling economic 
pressure from rising inflation and an economic recession in the 1970s.  At the same 
time, Nixon was giving tax breaks to the wealthy and creating controls for wages and 
prices.  The Watergate scandal may have been the final straw as more and more 
Americans were increasingly disenchanted with the corruption and irresponsible 
management of international affairs.  Policies such as “tax breaks, subsidies, and 
provisions for the "undeserving” … and the compromising character of political 
leadership in a mass democracy led to a feeling that the government had lost its moral 
legitimacy" (Hoover 2003:201). With the memories of the failed market during the 
Great Depression receding into history and the contemporary struggles the 
international system faced after the Second World War at the fore, the libertarian 
economic theories of a community of renowned economists forming the Chicago 
School of Economics took center stage.  
 
Chicago School of Economics 
  In the 1950s, proponents of laissez-faire economics and monetarism drifted 
towards the University of Chicago.  A number of these scholars became professors in 
the Department of Economics, and under the organization of Milton Friedman, began 
meeting on a regular basis.  This close-knit group of like-minded scholars soon 
became known as the Chicago School of Economics and gained notoriety when some 
of them, including Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, won Nobel Prizes in Economics.   
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Although trained in Keynesian economics, these professors increasingly found 
Keynes’s theories to be unreliable and inconsistent with the current economic 
trajectory.  Formulating theories around the desirability of a free and unhindered 
market, such theorists rejected classical Keynesianism and developed a modern take 
on monetarism.  
  Friedman in particular revived the monetarist view by arguing that since 
government intervention and increasing the money supply are responsible for 
inflation, this trend could be mitigated by maintaining price stability through keeping 
the supply and demand for money balanced.  Friedman was deeply concerned with the 
Federal Reserve System and the role of the government in economic affairs. Although 
the intent of setting up the Federal Reserve was to restrict political influence on 
national monetary policy, the discretionary power given to the Board of Governors 
and the oversight by Congress allowed for political cooption and influence (The 
Federal Reserve Board 2006, Bernanke 2003).  Government intervention (beyond its 
role in setting monetary policy for the country) was less efficient than allowing the 
market to be regulated by private competition (Noble 2006).  From his analysis of the 
causes of the Great Depression, Friedman argued for limitations to be placed on the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve so that they would have fewer 
discretionary powers to influence the supply of money.  In particular, he advocated a 
fixed rate of increase of the national money supply independent of economic 
fluctuations, a policy “which would have the advantages of simplicity, predictability, 
and credibility, and it would help insulate monetary policy from outside political 
pressures and what Friedman saw as an inherent tendency toward excessive policy 
activism” (Bernanke 2003:2).  Although this strict rule has never been implemented, 
many in government have acknowledged the role the discretionary powers of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve played in causing the Great Depression  
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and have expressed a desire to limit (but not eliminate) these powers. 
       Friedman also established a body of theories related to monitoring and 
preventing accelerating inflation rates.  In particular, his theories advocated control 
over the money supply via a central banking system.  This would keep the money 
supply stable and thus stabilize prices and wages (Noble 2006).  Friedman was also 
known for criticizing the government’s domestic and international economic policies 
and arguing that a free-market was fundamental for political freedom.  His work on 
welfare and the idea that some unemployment was inherent and beneficial in the 
capitalist system (natural rate of unemployment) were popular with political and social 
conservatives and consequently a rhetoric stressing personal freedoms and individual 
responsibility quickly developed around laissez-faire economics.   
  Another extremely important figure in the Chicago School of Economics was 
Friedrich Hayek, who joined the Department of Social and Moral Science at the 
University of Chicago in the 1950s.  Although Austrian born and never allowed to 
teach in the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, Hayek was 
nonetheless an influential member of the Chicago School of Economics; his work 
complemented the political economy of Milton Friedman.  In 1974 he was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics, two years before Friedman received his.  
  Hayek espoused the laissez-faire economics common to the Chicago School 
Economists, arguing that the role of government in economic matters should be 
restricted to the maintenance of peace so as to facilitate the groundwork for a 
functioning market.  He ardently opposed communism, socialism, and most types of 
collective organization.  Additionally, “Hayek supplied a critique of social justice 
claims and a defense of common law morality, which legitimized a retreat from 
government regulation and welfare provision while relieving capitalist consciences” 
(Hoover 2003:201).  
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Influence of Chicago School of Economics 
  Although not fully formed or accepted, by the mid 1960s the ideas of the 
Chicago School of Economics were already influencing politics and the public alike.  
Citizens, including Barry Goldwater and his supporters resonated with Friedman and 
Hayek's economic philosophy.  Indeed, Friedman even served as Goldwater’s major 
economic advisor during the campaign (Rayack 1987:6). Despite Goldwater’s defeat 
in the 1964 bid for presidency, his small group of like-minded supporters pushed 
forward in their struggle to elect a conservative president.  It is widely acknowledged 
that the loosely-formed religious right was too weak to accomplish much at this time, 
thus, "the political necessity for the revival of the right was that conservative 
traditionalists form an alliance with advocates of free markets and individual liberty. 
... Hayek was embraced as both a free market advocate and the defender of moral 
traditions" (Hoover 2003).  Here, the rise of the New Christian Right and their focus 
on traditionalist social values joined with the economic libertarians who support 
limited government power to protect the freedom of the market.   
  Free-market economic ideas were not only spreading across the country via 
social and religious circles but also were infiltrating the government.  In some ways, 
Friedman was fortunate that his work focused on inflation as America faced quickly 
rising inflation and plummeting employment after the Vietnam War and during the oil 
shocks induced by OPEC.  President Jimmy Carter quickly realized that Keynesian 
economics were failing and appointed Paul Volcker, a known monetarist, to the head 
of the Federal Reserve.  Volcker appealed to the well-respected Chicago School of 
Economics (including Friedman and Hayek) for advice and then implemented its 
monetarist suggestions of steadily increasing the money supply in the Federal Reserve 
System.   Although America then experienced a huge recession, the inflation rates did 
fall substantially.  Reagan’s administration continued to implement monetarist policies  
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and follow the advice of the Chicago School economists for Federal Reserve policy.  
Indeed, in his 1981 inauguration speech Reagan stated, “Government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Reagan 1981).  After Reagan’s 
election the inflation rate continued to fall from 18 percent in 1979 to four percent in 
1983, plunging the country further into an economic recession.  Volcker and Reagan 
revised their monetarist strategy and the economy recovered by 1984.  Despite the 
partial failure of monetarist strategy, Reagan still relied on Friedman’s economic 
advice and ability to reach the public with free-market, neo-liberal ideology. 
  Liberty and free markets became the rallying cry for Reagan and his 
supporters, and these two ideas eventually merged into full-fledged pursuit of 
“freedom” as the heart of the ideological discourse.  Work by Friedman (including two 
books and many articles with “free” in the title) fed the rhetoric by aligning laissez-
faire economics with personal and political freedom.  Government intervention was 
seen to invalidate individual freedom because 1) it forced society to literally pay the 
price for “irresponsible” individuals through taxes supporting the welfare system, 2) it 
led to an increase in crime and racial unrest, which hindered the ability for all 
Americans to lead a safe and free life, 3) it weakened the social fabric of America by 
leading to family breakdown and 4) concentrated power in a government that could 
then restrict the rights of individual citizens (Rayack 1987:9,78-100, 104).  Thus, to 
set policy to limit government intervention, a rhetoric of protecting individual 
freedoms was emphasized.   
  Reagan’s reliance on the ideas of Friedman and Hayek was not a secret.  The 
President openly admitted he was a disciple of Hayek and that he relied on Hayek’s 
ground-breaking book “The Road to Serfdom” and Friedman’s theories for advice on 
his economic policies.  Indeed, many passages of his Economic Reports were almost 
direct restatements of Friedman’s popular economic writings (Rayack 1987:172,198).   
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Upon Friedman’s death his colleagues commented that rarely “did anyone have such 
impact on his own profession and on government [as did Friedman]. Though he never 
served officially in the halls of power, he was around them, as an adviser and theorist" 
(Noble 2006).  Much later Reagan acknowledged his intellectual debt to Hayek by 
honoring his 87th birthday with this statement, "We are all indebted to you for this 
advice and I think it is clear that your wise counsel is being heeded" (Hoover 
2003:215).   
  Hayek and Friedman’s intellectual legacy continued to be important to political 
and economic policies as evidenced by President George H.W. Bush's presentation of 
the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Hayek in 1991, honoring how his "work 
contributed so signally to the rebirth of freedom in central and eastern Europe and to 
the revival of ideas of economic liberty throughout the world."  Some also credited 
Friedman in providing the economic impetus behind the Republican Revolution of 
1994 as he has “remained the guiding light to American conservatives” (Jacob Viner 
in Noble 2006:1). 
  Friedman, the creator and co-leader of the Chicago School of Economics 
community, is often lauded as one of the most influential economists of the 20
th 
century (Noble 2006).  Publishing both popular and scholarly articles, he was able to 
reach a wide audience both in America and internationally.  Upon Friedman’s death, 
Alan Greenspan commented, "From a longer-term point of view, it's his academic 
achievements which will have lasting import. But I would not dismiss the profound 
impact he has already had on the American public's view" (quoted in Noble 2006:1).  
Above and beyond Friedman’s direct influence in the political realm, his accessibility 
in writing created a broad readership basis that further facilitated the spread of 
economic libertarian ideals to all levels of society.     
19 
  Although not as highly visible as Friedman, perhaps because of his Austrian 
citizenship, Hayek also left his mark on American society.  In particular, he changed 
the political landscape of America significantly by the legacy of institutions that grew 
up around his economic ideas and that subsequently espoused these theories long after 
Hayek returned to his native Austria.  These institutions include but are not limited to: 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, 
Foundation for Economic Education, American Enterprise Institute, Cato Foundation, 
Heritage Foundation, Mt. Pelerin Society, Atlas Foundation, and the Volker 
Foundation (Hoover 2003).  Through these and other institutions, a network of 
conservative think-tanks transported free-market theories to both the public and 
private realm. 
 
Implications for Health 
  The libertarian economic theories and calls for social freedom of Hayek and 
Friedman were quickly adopted as support for the political and social rhetoric of the 
Republican administrations and of the Republican Contract with America that 
structured the Congressional agenda in the 1990s.  This rhetoric also influenced public 
opinion about the relationship between health and the economy.  Although this 
rhetoric may have concrete links to policies that directly affect the health of 
individuals in America, I will focus primarily on how the rhetoric of economic 
ideology in the 1990s influences individual perceptions of health. Indeed, one of the 
reasons that Friedman’s economic theories were so influential in America in the 1980s 
and 1990s is because "he was preaching a gospel of capitalism that fit neatly into 
American self-perceptions" (Noble 2006:1).  The connection between perceptions of 
health and physical health will be assumed for this section but will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four.    
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  A central tenet of Friedman’s popular economic theories was that we cannot 
have political and thereby individual freedom without economic freedom (Rayack 
1987:108). In addition, free market capitalism creates more opportunities for 
entrepreneurship through competition and without competition there is no incentive to 
be productive and to work hard to succeed economically.  Thus, the term “healthy 
competition” is often employed in contemporary rhetoric.  Whether or not this saying 
holds true medically, health is a widely perceived benefit of hard work and 
competition.  
  Tied closely with the idea of choice is the concept of freedom.  Through 
conservative rhetoric, “freedom” has come to be seen as a dichotomy as either we are 
free or we are coerced.  Therefore, the prevailing ideology supported by laissez-faire 
economics states that freedom is good because it leads to choices (or the perception of 
such) which enable individuals to be healthier and happier.  Implicit in the economic 
libertarian rhetoric is that choice, in and of itself, is good because it leads to a stronger 
feeling of control over one’s life and thus to healthier and happier individuals.  Free-
market capitalism augments good health because it gives individuals choices (or the 
perception of having choices).  Indeed, Friedman specifically argues that “only under 
competitive capitalism are people free to choose” (Rayack 1987:108). 
    Also, free-market capitalism promotes social conservatism that is perceived as 
protecting family values and retarding the skyrocketing trend of the breakdown of 
families that destroys personal and family health.  Friedman argues that it is healthier 
for individuals to live in neighborhoods devoid of crime, delinquency, and racism, 
features that, in his opinion, are fostered by the welfare state where government 
handouts creates dependence.  By removing governmental supports and encouraging 
personal accountability, individuals will regain control over their lives, will feel the 
positive effects of the responsibility of working, will not engage in drug use and crime  
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because they have gainful employment and thus will be healthier members of society.  
In addition, positive neighborhood effects will encourage social cohesion and 
integration.  Émile Durkheim’s seminal work on suicide highlights the importance of 
integration into a community for personal health (Durkheim 1951).  Drawing from the 
conclusions of Durkheim and Friedman, one can argue that free-market capitalism 
adds to social cohesion in a community thus improving the health of residents. 
  Finally, one last conclusion from the above discussion suggests that there may 
be actual physical benefits as well as the accompanying psychosocial benefits 
resulting from the implementation of laissez-faire economic policies.  Free-market 
capitalism takes away government restrictions so one can choose what to do with 
one’s money.  Friedman argues that since most people will use their money 
beneficially, all of society will reap the rewards of economically prosperous 
individuals.  Charitable giving is encouraged as an admirable and necessary human 
trait but government intervention restricts such good-will by forcing individuals to 
give to a particular source.  Removing this coercion will actually augment the percent 
of charitable giving because people will give to organizations they personally support 
or feel connected with.  Thus, free-market policies will actually improve the health 
and well-being of individuals because of the trickle-down effect.   
  Using data from the General Social Survey, I will analyze the relationship 
between the economic ideology explained above and individual perceptions of health.  
Through preliminary bivariate data analysis I have noticed that the majority of 
Americans report “excellent” or “good” health on a four category scale from “poor” to 
“excellent.”  Since the majority of Americans believe they have good health, I will try 
to find out who are the people who perceive themselves to have poor health and what 
are their economic beliefs.  Based on the evidence of a particular economic ideology  
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prevalent during the time the data was collected (1993-2004), the following 
proposition will be suggested: 
Proposition 1: Respondents who believe in an economic system other than economic 
libertarianism will have poorer self-reported health than those who believe in a neo-
liberal, free-market system. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS CONSERVATISM ON POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
  Despite the intent to separate religion and politics in the U.S. Constitution 
(Article VI), religion continues to play an important role in public and private arenas 
in America today.  In 1905, Max Weber published his influential book, “The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” which traced the role of ascetic 
Protestantism in the rise of rationalization and the “spirit” of capitalism.   As Weber 
explored modern capitalism in America, he saw the same guiding social ethic as 
Protestantism in Europe but observed that it was free of explicit religious doctrines.  
The resultant secularized religious norms impacted Americans’ perceptions of their 
relationship to economic and political spheres.  Weber used Ben Franklin’s Poor 
Richard’s Almanac, published between 1732 and 1757, as an example of the influence 
of these secularized Protestant norms.   Weber states, “One has only to re-read the 
passage from Franklin, quoted at the beginning of this essay, in order to see that the 
essential elements of the attitude which was there called the spirit of capitalism are the 
same as what we have just shown to be the content of the Puritan worldly asceticism, 
only without the religious basis, which by Franklin’s time had died away” (Calhoun 
2002:204). Franklin’s axioms cajoled readers to work hard, be thrifty, and adhere to 
the merciless efficiency of capitalism, because doing so was an “expression of virtue 
and proficiency in a calling” (Calhoun 2002:194).  The question remains as to whether  
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the same secularized Protestant ideology is dominant today or if a new ideology has 
arisen.  Indeed, some similarities still remain since the 1700s, such as the lasting 
importance of religious values that underlie and justify economic and political 
policies, but the type of religious influence has changed dramatically.  The following 
section will trace the rise in influence of religious conservatives, both on the political 
arena and on the American public, and highlight the ruling ideology that was operative 
when the dataset under analysis was collected (1993-2004).  
 
The New Christian Right 
  In 1964 a small band of determined ultra-conservative Republicans felt that the 
issues they cared about most were not being represented in American politics.  
Organizing around a viewpoint that stressed a good versus evil bifurcation of the 
world these conservatives favored a strong national defense, non-accomodationist 
foreign policies in the face of communist ideals, and social traditionalism.  This group 
of ultra-conservatives called themselves the New Right and campaigned heavily for 
Barry Goldwater (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983).  Goldwater also drew support from 
more moderate conservatives including Ronald Reagan, who assisted supporters by 
furnishing them tickets to the 1964 Republican National Convention in San Francisco.  
Nelson Rockefeller’s speech was heavily booed by this contingent, signaling a 
rejection that paved the way for Goldwater’s nomination as the Republican Party 
candidate.  Although many expected the New Right to fade after Lyndon B. Johnson 
won the election, the leaders were not ready to give up.  They quickly joined a team of 
Goldwater supporters and nascent politicians and helped to form the American 
Conservative Union to maintain the progress made through campaign connections and 
organization.  As Morton Blackwell, a young delegate of Goldwater's 1964 
presidential campaign put it, "After 1964, conservatives got tired of losing and decided  
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that perhaps being 'right' in the sense of being correct was not sufficient to win.  
Conservatives came to the understanding that we owe it to our philosophy to study 
how to win; that we had to be active in party structures” (Martin 1996:89).  Although 
for a time, the New Right receded into the background, gains in financial assets, 
mobilization of a united front on policy matters, and an aggressive dissemination of its 
message through media outlets such as the Christian Broadcasting Network, greatly 
increased membership over the next several decades.   
  Discouraged with Nixon’s failure in Vietnam, the moral deficiency exposed in 
the Watergate Scandal, Gerald Ford’s pardon of Nixon, and the ceding of the Panama 
Canal, ultra-conservative Republicans shied away from giving Ford their full-fledged 
support in the 1976 presidential race.  Most supported Reagan who had gained some 
exposure and respect from an 11
th hour campaign speech for Goldwater and had since 
impressed conservatives with his unabashed endorsement of the conservative agenda 
on moral issues, the right to bear arms, and welfare reform.  In a later bid for Governor 
of California he won more conservatives by emphasizing his similar character, "I am 
not a politician.  I am an ordinary citizen with a deep-seated belief that much of what 
troubles us has been brought about by politicians...if we ordinary citizens don't run 
government, the government is going to run us" (Ronald Reagan 1966, quoted in 
Martin 1996:91).  Although Reagan won several primaries, he dropped out of the race 
early forcing conservatives to make a tough decision between Ford, a Republican 
whom they did not trust, and Jimmy Carter, a religious Democrat.  The tide swung 
towards Jimmy Carter, an intensely religious man whose moral standards many 
religious Americans admired.  Yet, not long after he won the presidency, such regard 
for Carter among conservatives waned because he clearly maintained a separation of 
religion and politics, supported more liberal policy reforms, and failed to staunch 
rising inflation (See Martin 1996:168-190).  
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  In the 1970s, the New Right linked up with the Christian Right, a group of 
preacher-politician-activists who sought to base the party’s policy initiatives on 
“Biblical” standards (Utter and Storey 2001).  In addition, they opposed abortion, 
homosexuality, feminism, and affirmative action.   Leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Pat 
Buchanan, and Tim LaHaye and organizations such as the Moral Majority, the 
Christian Voice, and the Religious Roundtable became outspoken and powerful forces 
in the New Christian Right Movement.  These organizations were direct and open 
when stating their purpose.  The sincere attempt to link religion and politics is seen in 
the slogan and policies of the Christian Voice which issued "Biblical Scorecards" that 
gave legislators a mark based on their support of conservative issues in order to form a 
"Christian majority in a Christian Democracy" (Martin 1996:199).  
  In addition, the 1970s saw a tremendous rise in the number of conservative 
foundations with religious roots, some which still hold tremendous influence and 
power today.  In 1971, Paul Weyrich founded an organization to analyze policy and 
provide some intellectual support for an "alternative approach" (i.e., conservative 
ideals) to members of Congress who did not agree with Nixon's more liberal policies.  
In 1973, this low-profile organization became the Heritage Foundation (Martin 1996).  
Even today, the Heritage Foundation continues to generate research to affect public 
policy on foreign and domestic issues.  In particular, it supports economic libertarian 
polices to limit government intervention, lower taxes, and support private enterprise as 
a means to maintain social traditionalist values for families and communities 
(http://www.heritage.org, n.d.).   
  The Heritage Foundation established itself as an important conservative 
institution during the textbook wars in Kanawha County, West Virginia when it 
became involved at a grassroots level.  Indeed, the 1970s saw a flurry of local level 
mobilization of conservative community leaders and other congregation members to  
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form social movements in protest of new liberal policies and organizations.  This 
grassroots mobilization around conservative causes quickly became institutionalized 
into formal organizations and foundations such as The Heritage Foundation.  The 
issues religious conservatives were most active about in the 1970s revolved around 
what came to be known as “family values.”  Religious conservatives believed that 
society was being continually liberalized and that they must protest these policies to 
retain control over their own lives and those of their children.  Conservative outrage at 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), gay rights, abortion, school textbooks, sex 
education in schools, banning of prayer in school, and revocation of tax exempt status 
for private schools spawned an era of grassroots political activism.  Many leaders of 
the New Christian Right credit the textbook struggles of 1974-1975 in West Virginia 
and the 1978 IRS vs. Christian day schools conflict with lighting the fire under the 
religious conservative movement and uniting the political right with the religious right 
(Martin 1996:173).   These two events in particular mobilized individuals, churches, 
and foundations to come together for the religious conservative cause 
  In summary, foundations in the 1970s provided the New Christian Right with 
numerous position papers to support the conservative agenda and aid leaders such as 
Falwell, Buchanan, and Pat Robertson in creating huge databases of supporters.  These 
lists would become invaluable during Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign.  Finally, 
the liaison between the religious conservatives such as Falwell and secular 
conservatives such as Weyrich (of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, 
founded in 1974, and the Free Congress Foundation) who coined the phrase “moral 
majority” (Utter and Storey 2001), became a powerful force for building support in 
elite economic, social, and political spheres. 
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The Reagan Era 
  In the 1980 presidential elections, the religious right heavily supported Ronald 
Reagan because he stated outright that he was "born again," espoused Judeo-Christian 
values, was against abortions, and argued that evolution was being discredited by 
scientists and should be replaced with creationism in school textbooks.  His long 
history of support from the ultra-religious conservatives meshed with his superior 
communication skills to help him take 44 states and 91 percent of the Electoral 
College votes (Martin 1996:219).  Although it is likely Reagan would have won even 
without the support of the ultra-conservative segment, the religious right felt they had 
made a difference.   
  The influence the massive conservative foundations and religious conservative 
leaders had (or believed they had) on political policy was a culmination of the 
grassroots mobilizing and political lobbying efforts that had initially created these 
institutions.  During Reagan’s presidency the religious right grew from political 
lobbyists to an ideological powerhouse.  Although religious conservatives received 
few appointments directly in the Reagan administration (in a large part due to the lack 
of political experience of members of the religious right), several key leaders still felt 
that they had access to the White House and the ear of the President himself.  Indeed, 
in a meeting soon after taking office, President Reagan assured Jerry Falwell of this 
relationship by stating ‘Feel free [to come see me]. That door is open” (Martin 
1996:223).  For the first time, the religious right felt like they were on the inside 
instead of being a marginalized and discounted minority.  Some members of the 
religious right believed that the desire to maintain this influence and power politically 
forced them to compromise on previously staunchly defended issues.  Ed Dobson, a 
close aide of Falwell, recounts, “I remember the first time I went to the White House 
with Jerry Falwell and ate at the mess hall with two key people in the President’s inner  
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circle and I’m thinking, ‘Wow I am sitting here at the White House’ … This was 
heady stuff for people who, one or two years earlier, had been unnoticed and unheard 
of, and nobody had cared about us. … [We got] caught up in the euphoria and fail[ed] 
to ask, ‘What’s the next step?’  We were carried along and seduced by success and 
never asked the tough questions” (Martin 1996:225-226).   
  The hope felt by many religious conservatives with the election of President 
Reagan and the inside position religious right leaders believed they gained, faltered as 
very little of the conservative agenda was realized in the 1980s.   Reagan focused 
primarily on economic and international issues and seemed to have little interest 
fulfilling the pledges of the social agenda on which many presumed he was elected.  
Pat Robertson, the widely known televangelist, Southern Baptist minister (at the time), 
and founder of the Christian Coalition, decided to run for president in 1988, hoping to 
finally bring a realization of the ultra-conservative agenda to America.  Robertson 
stated,  
 
The theme of my campaign was restoring the greatness of America 
through moral strength.  I sensed in 1986, '87, '88, what has come to 
full flower today: a moral decline in our nation, the break-up of the 
American family, the rise of crime and drug addiction and abortion.  . 
... I was also talking about a return to faith in God and individual self-
reliance.  I thought we had depended too much on big government, on 
government programs, for the solution, and needed to go back to that 
sense of pioneering spirit that America had been known for. ... Many 
of the programs in the Contract with America were things I was 
enunciating in those days. So out of the seeming defeat of my 
campaign and the demise of what had been called the Moral Majority 
came an extremely effective force which I believe is the wave of the 
future, and which is toppling historic liberalism and will bring about a 
conservative era in the United States (quoted in Martin 1996:298).   
Although religious conservatives put up a tough and guerilla-like fight for Robertson’s 
nomination at the Republican National Convention, he only won a handful of 
primaries and conceded the race to George H. W. Bush in 1988.   
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  Nearly three decades of focusing solely on influencing the presidency and the 
upper echelon had produced few victories for the religious right.  Disappointed with 
Reagan’s weak stance on abortion (via the Helms-Hyde bill), the nomination of 
Sandra Day O’Connor to Supreme Court Justice, the lack of endorsement for the 
Family Protection Act, and the failure of Robertson to get the Republican Party 
nomination, religious conservatives realized they needed a new strategy for 
influencing American society (Martin 1996).   
 
The New Strategy 
  Scandals, hints of corruption, and volatile remarks decreased Falwell 
popularity and the Moral Majority collapsed in 1989.  This decline, rising 
disillusionment with successive presidencies that ran on the support of conservatives 
but then failed to push the conservative agenda once elected, and frustrations with 
Congressional policies led the religious right to change their strategy for influencing 
politics and society.  Over the next decade, the religious right shifted their focus from 
cajoling support from politicians to encouraging local political involvement (Utter and 
Storey 2001).  The leaders at the time, Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed, Billy McCormack, 
Pat Buchanan and others, decided to move the focus of the religious conservative 
movement out of Washington D.C. and into local communities by designing a training 
manual for grassroots organizing and by encouraging supporters to run for positions 
on school boards, city councils, hospital boards, and county commissions.  
   By organizing activists in every political precinct in America, the religious 
right began to infiltrate local school-boards, city councils, state legislatures, and 
eventually was able to use this strong base to start winning seats in Congress.  New 
campaign skills were taught and community members with little to no previous 
political experience were able to take important local political seats.  The conservative  
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agenda began to be pushed through at the local level, perhaps most notably in school 
reforms.  Paul Weyrich reviews the importance of these tactical changes, "As a result, 
we have lots of friends now on city councils and county boards and school boards and 
in state legislatures - something we never had before.  This is why we can seriously 
talk now about fundamental changes in Washington, because you've got governors and 
legislators and mayors who are speaking up and advocating [conservative] positions" 
(quoted in Martin 1996:308). 
 
The Republican Revolution 
  In 1993, the religious right capitalized on the local level support they had built.  
Republican politicians rallied around a set of Congressional commitments that were 
heavily ideological.  The Contract with America, developed primarily by Newt 
Gingrich and Dick Armey, suggested to Americans what a Republican controlled 
Congress could accomplish (Sinclair 1999).  "The Contract with America was itself an 
elaborate effort to disseminate a bundle of messages about the Republican party: 
policy messages, but also the message that, unlike the majority Democrats, the party 
was dedicated to cleaning up the "corrupt" Congress and prepared to stake its future 
on fulfilling its promises” (Sinclair 1999:431).  Gingrich pushed his ideas into 
mainstream society through C-SPAN, granting many interviews, designing media kits, 
and creating a Republican discourse/dialect.  "[I]mmense effort went into attempts to 
shape public perceptions of Republicans' policy proposals.  … On Medicare, 
Republicans mounted a massive campaign, involving 'polls, focus groups, corporate 
coalitions, imagemakers, lobbyists, radio talk shows'” (Maraniss and Weisskopf 
1996:128, quoted in Sinclair 1999:432).  Even the language of the Contract was 
heavily infused with ideological images and euphemisms.  For example, welfare 
reform was labeled “Personal Responsibility Act,” while cutting capital gains taxes  
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and weakening environmental protections was called “Job Creation and Wage 
Enhancement Act.”  These names were actually pre-tested through focus groups in 
order to maximize receptivity (Sinclair 1999).  The welfare reform bill 
unapologetically rested on conservative normative social and family values such as 
heterosexual marriage and committed parenting.  In the early 1990s, the Contract with 
America became the primary mechanism to disseminate the Republican ideology to 
the American public, which was effectively managed through media relations.   
  Signed just prior to the 1994 midterm elections, the Contract with America 
faulted the Democratically-controlled Congress for past failures and presented a united 
view on political, economic, and social issues.  The Contract resonated with voters, 
and for the first time in 50 years the Republican Party took control of both the Senate 
and House of Representatives in 1994.  "When the GOP gained fifty-two House seats, 
eight Senate seats, eleven governorships, and 472 seats in state legislatures in the 
November 1994 elections, the Religious Right [was] flush with the knowledge that 
114 members of the new House and 26 Senators had either received a perfect rating on 
the Christian Coalition Congressional Scorecard or were freshmen elected with the 
group's strong approval.  An additional fifty-eight members of the 104th Congress 
voted for the Christian Coalition positions more than eighty-five percent of the time" 
(Martin 1996:340).  For the first time, the religious right felt that it had influence at 
both the local level and national level and had an agenda that was both conservative 
and widely supported.  By turning to the local level to garner support, the religious 
right had influenced both politics and society.  From their perspective, the only 
remaining barrier was the President.     
  The “Republican Revolution” and subsequent transfer of power away from the 
Democrats greatly affected Bill Clinton’s presidency.  Campaigning and winning in 
1992 on a moderate, centrist, social democrat ticket, Clinton promised to “end welfare  
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as we know it” and reduce the budget deficit (Zylan and Soule 2000).  In practice, 
these two goals seemed to be simultaneously impossible as Clinton's welfare reform 
plan of improving social services such as job training, child care, education, and 
government guaranteed jobs were increasingly costly (O'Connor 2002).  To combat 
the rising expected costs, Clinton proposed a slow phase-in stage, which angered both 
Democrats and Republicans.  In addition, Clinton first wanted to implement health 
care reform so as to open access to health services for all poor people (Sinclair 1999).  
He hoped this safety-net would make the looming welfare reform more attractive and 
tolerable for low-income families and especially their children.  Then, welfare reform 
would focus on transitioning the poor into employment, a task Clinton felt was 
challenging enough without the additional concern about the lack of health care 
benefits in such low-pay jobs (O'Connor 2002).  Thus, the universal health care 
system would eliminate the incentive to remain jobless so as to retain Medicare 
benefits.   
  The Democrats failed to push the legislation through Congress and the 
Republicans filibustered as the 1994 elections neared.   This resulted in the popular 
image that the 103rd Democrat Congress was impotent and Clinton’s “health and then 
welfare reform” was the wrong strategy, thereby paving the way for the advancement 
of the Republican representatives (O'Connor 2002).  Clinton’s welfare reform plan 
was scuttled after the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” where the new leadership argued 
that since the U.S. was experiencing a welfare crisis and not a health care crisis, the 
former should be the main focus of immediate policy measures (O'Connor 2002).  
With the failure of Clinton's health care reform plan, his welfare reform plan also lost 
credibility and was quickly reworked into a more Republican-favored version (seen in 
the Contract with America).  Some saw the changes as harsh, especially the stipulation 
that minor mothers or mothers on welfare who have more children should not receive  
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benefits, and that all welfare-losers would have a life-time cap of two years on benefits 
received (Zuckerman 2000), but others felt this was the only way to encourage 
responsibility and employment.  The Republican plan also gave power to the state 
government to decide on restrictions and time-limits, freeing Congress from any 
negative press associated with such measures. 
  Republicans felt pressure to enact the policies they had agreed upon in the 
Contract because they had committed to make changes in three months (Sinclair 
1999).  Thus, with this pressure and the ideological homogeneity built by unanimity 
on signing the Contract in the first place, Republicans were more assertive than they 
had been previously (Utter and Storey 2001). Many Republican Congressional 
members felt they had a mandate to carry out the terms of the Contract and that the 
future of the party depended on their success at this task.  During this time, a rise in 
ideological homogeneity could be seen by the increasing voting partisanship.  Until 
the 1982 election, less than half of votes were along party lines.  The next decade saw 
a continuous rise in ideological polarization until over two-thirds of the votes pitted a 
majority of Democrats against a majority of Republicans in the 104th Congress 
(Sinclair 1999).   The unity of the Republican Congress also allowed Gingrich, as the 
new Speaker of the House, to have more power in setting the agenda and pushing the 
President towards this agenda.  Gingrich’s aim was to "transform how Americans 
think and talk about politics, and thereby 'transform the political alignments, 
institutions, and governing policies of the nation'” (Blatz and Brownstein 1996:144; 
Stid 1996:1 in Sinclair 1999:422).  By disseminating the ruling ideology and involving 
Republicans at the local political level Gingrich, with the help of religious 
conservatives such as Buchanan and Robertson, built support for the Republican Party 
from the bottom up.    
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  In 1999, the Christian Coalition broke into two organizations to counter tax 
evasion and political party affiliation problems of which it had been charged.  
Americans became disillusioned with the religious right and support began to wane as 
most of the promises in the Contract with America never made it through the Senate.   
Many leaders in the religious right, such as Paul Weyrich, believed it was time to 
return to evangelism and private life reforms.  Sensing this disillusionment, Governor 
George W. Bush was less outspoken and showed less affiliation with the religious 
right in the early days of campaigning than was expected of the Republican 
presidential nominee.   Yet, after his defeat in the New Hampshire primary, Bush 
changed strategies and aligned himself with the religious right (Utter and Storey 
2001).  His presidency has seen the maintenance of the ideological discourse presented 
in the Contract with America, particularly its fundamental beliefs on nuclear families 
and the power of the individual.    
 
Implications for Health 
  Although this overview has traced the rise of the conservative right from the 
Goldwater era, arguably the New Right’s most influential decade was during the years 
the data for this analysis were collected (1993-2004).  In essence, the religious 
changed its focus from seeking a President who would push for conservative family 
values, such as restricting abortion and protecting organized religion in public schools, 
to waging a stealthy type of grassroots war to change such policies at a local level.  
Through early disappointments with supporting conservative Presidents through 
elections only to have their agenda toned down and pushed aside, the religious right 
realized that the way to change America was to change their local communities.  By 
winning seats on school-boards, hospital boards, and local government seats, religious 
conservatives saw their agendas realized.  This tactic more than any other, allowed the  
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ideals of the New Right to affect Americans (Martin 1996).  As the religious right 
gained more influence at the local level, they were able to move up the ladder to 
controlling more strategic and powerful positions.  For example, in 2000, religious 
conservatives capitalized on an opportunity to gain influence in the Presidency, but 
this time built upon a more solid base in local politics. 
  It is clear that an ideological shift has occurred in America over the past 25 
years.  Saunders and Abramowitz (2004:285) suggest that “as a result of an 
ideological realignment led by conservative Republican leaders such as Ronald 
Reagan and Newt Gingrich, by the mid-1990s, ideology had become a much more 
important motivation for participation among Republicans than among Democrats.”  
By merging religious conservative and economic libertarian rhetoric, the religious 
right promoted free-market fundamentalism.  They did this by presenting evidence, 
through research commissioned by corporations, that free-market policies were 
essential to guarantee American freedoms (including the freedom for school choice) 
and for the well-being of families and communities (i.e. they decrease crime and 
delinquency).  By promoting laissez-faire economics, the religious right also 
supported the notion that economic competition is an important motivation and those 
who work hard will be rewarded by the market (Harvey 2005).  Yet, how has the 
ascendancy of the religious right and its accompanying political ideology that focuses 
on personal responsibilities and traditional family values affected the health and well-
being of Americans?   
  Over time the ruling ideology becomes internalized in citizens, setting the 
standards for normative behavior (Marx 1976).  It affects what people believe, how 
they act, and how they view their place in the world.  As the ruling ideology becomes 
entrenched, individuals begin to conflate their ideal and material interests.  Thus, 
voters may support a political party because of the influence of the ruling ideology,  
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despite the lack of personal benefit from the proposed policies under that party (Frank 
2004).  The rise in free-market fundamentalism in America since the 1970s, 
paralleling (and supported by) the rise in the New Right, has increased inequality and 
class divisions in America (Banks et al. 2006, Harvey 2005).  A new line of research 
has emerged over the past ten years that has investigated how such worldviews affect 
individual and societal health and well-being.  Researchers from a variety of fields, 
including sociology, epidemiology, psychology, nutritional science, policy, and 
political science, have sought to tease out how human self-perceptions affect bodily 
processes.   Their findings suggest that not only does absolute material well-being 
matter but also that relative social standing affects health outcomes (Marmot 2004, 
Kawachi et al. 1997, Wilkinson 2006).  Although much research has been conducted 
on how social integration, community cohesiveness, and relative socioeconomic status 
affect health, few studies discuss the implications of ideology on health. 
  The conservative religious movement in America has organized around key 
ideological themes that implicitly (or explicitly) relate to perceptions of health.  For 
example, religious conservatives uphold values (labeled “family values” in the 
conservative rhetoric) that they believe are essential to a healthy family.  Explicit in 
conservative rhetoric is the idea that two parent families consisting of a father and 
mother are healthier for a child’s development.  Another common theme is sexual 
purity and a separation from “immoral” acts with “unsaved” people.  By restricting 
their behavior and acquaintances, members of the religious right may perceive 
themselves to be healthier than people outside the conservative religious community.  
The rhetoric persists that people engaging in immoral acts are unhappy because of 
their rebellion against God, and were they in a “right” relationship with God, they 
would realize the unbounded happiness of such position.  Thus, not only do religiously 
conservative people believe they are physically healthier because of their distance  
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from contagious diseases (such as STDs and AIDS) that affect humans, but also that 
they are mentally healthier because of their spiritual health via a relationship with 
God.  Finally, the social safety net, social support, and cohesive world-view provided 
by a community of “believers” or a congregation may be interpreted as having a 
positive effect on heath that “non-believers” would not be able to obtain. 
  Based on the historical development of religious ideology in America and the 
current manifestation of that ideology, the following proposition will be suggested in 
this study: 
Proposition 2: Respondents who do not espouse religious conservative beliefs and/or 
accompanying normative behaviors will have poorer self-reported health than those 
who do. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM ON POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
  The rhetoric of economic libertarianism and religious conservatism on social 
issues has often been labeled social traditionalism (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983:16).  
This perspective is characterized by traditional and conservative views regarding 
family structure, school policy, sanctity of life and marriage, and sexual mores.  
Previous sections of this study have documented a number of ways social 
traditionalists and economic libertarians have affected government through influential 
people close to the President.  The public has also learned of these particular 
ideologies through popular books and magazines, radio programming, and mailings.  
This section will analyze another key mechanism economic libertarians and religious 
conservatives used to create and publicize the social traditionalist ideology.  
  Interspersed through the recent history of the rise of economic libertarianism 
and religious conservatism documented above were brief mentions of foundations and  
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organizations developed to lend financial or research support to certain conservative 
causes.  These institutions played an essential role in commissioning and 
disseminating information about the conservative position on specific issues to the 
general public and to policy-makers alike.  Hoover states, “A generation of 
conservative politicians ... have (sic) acknowledged the critical role of these 
institutions in shaping their views and making conservatism politically acceptable” 
(2003:204).  Although not all of the conservative institutions influencing public 
opinion and policy today began in the 1970s-1990s, many of them did.  Others, such 
as the Hoover Institute and the American Enterprise Institute, founded in 1917 and 
1943 respectively, have close ties with key economic libertarians such as Milton 
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.  It is clear from their mission statements that their 
current policy trajectory is consistent with the libertarian and conservative ideologies 
that dominated the 1970s-1990s.  This section will discuss the agenda of some of the 
most influential conservative think tanks and how they influence the public and 
private sectors. 
  Despite the generic label “conservative think tanks,” the target groups, 
agendas, and means of communication of these organizations are by no means 
homogenous.  The overarching connection between these institutions is their use of 
conservative rhetoric, bolstered by either economic libertarian or religious 
conservative perspectives (or in some cases both).  For example, the Family Research 
Council states, “Believing that God is the author of life, liberty, and the family, FRC 
promotes the Judeo-Christian worldview as the basis for a just, free, and stable 
society” (http://www.frc.org, n.d., emphasis mine).  Ideas of “preserving the natural 
order of life” and “preserving man’s natural right to freedom and liberty” through 
conservative policies are prevalent.  Conservative organizations seek to influence 
public policy as well as the public.  Although some groups are focused only on  
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affecting one or the other, most work at both the policy and grass-roots levels.  The 
following sections will discuss their different tactics for infiltrating both the 
government and mainstream America.  
  
Targeting Policy 
  Conservative think tanks collect and produce an enormous amount of research 
about current policy debates.  These briefs and articles are intended to provide policy-
makers with empirical evidence and carefully framed arguments for or against certain 
issues important to the conservative agenda.  For example, one influential 
organization’s mission statement reads: “Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is 
a research and educational institute – a think tank – whose mission is to formulate and 
promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited 
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national 
defense” (http://www.heritage.org, n.d.).  Other organizations, such as The National 
Center for Policy Research, have similar goals.  Its website states, “In 1982, we started 
The National Center to provide the conservative movement with a versatile and 
energetic organization capable of responding quickly and decisively to fast-breaking 
issues. Today, we continue to fill this critical niche through a top-flight research and 
communications operation driven by results and the bottom line” 
(http://www.nationalcenter.org, n.d., n.d.).  These and other organizations provide 
good examples of the intent of think tanks to provide documentation and empirical 
evidence to support the conservative cause in political matters.    
  The most prevalent policy issues identified in the mission statements of 
conservative think tanks include limiting government intervention, encouraging 
private enterprise, advancing individual liberty, promoting individual 
responsibility/individualism, lowering taxes, protecting traditional values, and  
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maintaining a strong national defense.  Often organizations will state their underlying 
social agenda and or foundational beliefs, such as maintaining the integrity of the 
traditional heterosexual family, and then state economic libertarian policy goals such 
as restricting government power and supporting free-market ideas.   For example, the 
Family Research Council (FRC) upholds traditional values such as the sanctity of life 
and heterosexual marriage, but its research and policy agenda is focused on “lower 
taxes, less wasteful spending, and the principles of rational and limited government” 
(http://www.frc.org, n.d.).  Thus, it seems that the FRC works on economic libertarian 
policy issues to preserve social traditionalist ideals couched in the rhetoric of “life, 
liberty, and the family.”  Other agencies also seek to influence policy-makers on 
economic issues in order to protect traditional social values.  Founded in 1976, the 
Ethics and Public Policy Center focuses on limited government intervention on 
economic policies such as tax breaks, health care, and retirement funds, so as to 
guarantee conservative ideals (often termed “freedoms” in the rhetoric) for the family 
“as the central social institution of American civilization” (http://www.eppc.org, n.d., 
n.d.).    Similarly, the Free Market Foundation, founded in 1972, seeks to “strengthen 
and protect the individual and the family by supporting principles that promote 
responsible citizenship, limited government, free enterprise, private property 
ownership, limited taxation, and Judeo-Christian values” (http://www.freemarket.org, 
n.d.).  The general trend for conservative organizations is to target economic and 
political policies that will ultimately guarantee social traditionalist values. 
  Conservative think tanks influence policy-makers by meeting with local 
legislators, meeting with and sending information to state representatives, taking legal 
action, and lobbying.  The Free Market Foundation notes its influence on its website, 
“During the Texas legislative session, Free Market consults regularly with state 
government leaders to encourage and support their efforts to protect the important  
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issues that face our families” (http://www.freemarket.org, n.d.). Organizations such as 
the Alliance Defense Fund “provides case funding, strategy and coordination, attorney 
training, and litigation,” for cases against traditional heterosexual marriage, religious 
freedom, the sanctity of life, or other conservative family values 
(http://www.alliancedefensefund.org, n.d.).   There is little doubt to the influence of 
such conservative think tanks.  At the Conservative Century Dinner held in 
Washington DC on May 26, 1999, the keynote speaker William F. Buckley declared 
“what is good for the ACU [American Conservative Union] is good for America” 
(http://www.conservative.org, n.d.).    Conservative think tanks, such as the Free 
Market Foundation, the Alliance Defense Fund, and the ACU, have without a doubt 
greatly impacted public policy decisions over the last 40 years. 
  These organizations have played important roles in furthering the conservative 
agenda.  Previously, I discussed the role the Heritage Foundation played in the school 
text book debates of Kanawha County West Virginia in 1974-1975, but the influence 
of conservative think-tanks did not stop here.  As the National Center for Public 
Policy Research states, “In the 1980s, The National Center helped change public 
opinion through vocal national campaigns aimed at supporting Reagan administration 
initiatives concerning the USSR, arms control, Central America and human rights” 
(http://www.nationalcenter.org, n.d.).  In the 1980s, a prominent libertarian business 
man who had been the Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon issued a call for "a 
massive corporate subsidy to 'non-egalitarian scholars and writers,' including the 
economic libertarian Friedrich Hayek, 'who could carry the message in books 
subsidized by conservative foundations’" (Diamond quoted in Hoover 215).  A good 
example of Marx’s (1976:67) theory that those who control the means of production 
also control the intellectual means of production, this subsidy assured that economic  
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libertarianism and conservative ideals quickly spread into the government and the 
mainstream.  
 
Targeting Public Opinion 
  The influence of conservative organizations has not been limited to only 
politicians and public policy.  Economic libertarianism and religious conservatism 
have also influenced the worldviews of mainstream America.  In particular, these 
institutions have promoted their ideas via 30-second public service announcements, 
popular books, radio spots, websites, mailing lists, and even TV shows.  The Ethics 
and Public Policy Center states that beyond working closely with government leaders, 
they also “write books that are widely read, publish articles in the popular press and in 
scholarly journals, and appear frequently on television and radio” 
(http://www.eppc.org, n.d.).  By utilizing every main source of popular media, these 
organizations have been able to spread their ideas across America.  But merely 
receiving information is not enough.  These organizations have invested in 
encouraging individuals to get involved in these causes whether with local, grass-roots 
movements or with political lobbying in Washington D.C.  For example, the Christian 
Coalition of America calls for people of faith “to be actively involved in shaping their 
government” (http://www.cc.org, n.d.), while the Cato Institute seeks for “greater 
involvement of the intelligent, concerned lay public in questions of policy and the 
proper role of government” (http://www.cato.org, n.d.).   Other think tanks played 
major roles in influencing public opinion.  For example, in the early 1990s the 
American Conservative Union played an important role in swaying public opinion on 
Clinton’s national health care plan by publishing critiques,  outlining other more 
“conservative-friendly” options, and staging a huge bus tour through the Northeast and 
Midwest called the National Health Care Truth Tour.  This initiative created rallies  
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and press-conference and presented important speakers on the issue 
(http://www.conservative.org, n.d.). 
  
Implications for Health 
  Conservative institutions have addressed the concern over the outcomes of a 
declining civil society and meaningful engagement with politics.  Indeed, the 
Independent Women’s Forum states that its “mission is to rebuild civil society by 
advancing economic liberty, personal responsibility, and political freedom” by 
pushing the conservative agenda of economic libertarianism and social traditionalism 
(http://www.iwf.org, n.d.).  As societies increase in complexity, it is argued that the 
government is less able to manage it and its welfare should be left to market and social 
forces (Reagan 1981).  Poverty that is not alleviated by economic opportunities will be 
cared for by concerned and active citizens.  These citizens are birthed by communities 
with a healthy civil society, which in conservative circles is seen as generated by 
strong families.  To complete the circle, “a healthy civil society protects the individual 
from overwhelming state power” (Freeden 2000:42).  Social traditionalists uphold the 
importance of a traditional family structure and values for the well-being of the 
children, family members, and ultimately the community.   
  The Heritage Foundation presents a large number of studies whose conclusions 
lend support to the conservative value of marriage and traditional family roles.  
Married women were reported to have greater psychological well-being and less intra-
household conflict, than single or cohabiting women.  In addition, women who had 
social traditionalist views on gender roles within the family were more satisfied with 
their husbands and less likely to divorce than women who had more liberal views and 
worked outside the home.  They reported that the health of infants with mothers 
working outside the home was also significantly worse than infants of non-working  
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mothers.  And they concluded that fathers who were theologically conservative were 
more loving to their children, more likely to maintain a consistent bedtime for their 
children, more likely to limit television watching, yelled less at their children, and had 
conservative values that contributed to happier wives, than fathers with other religious 
beliefs.   In addition, studies posted on their website claim other health benefits of 
maintaining a traditional family structure, “Intact families are more likely to provide a 
safe home for children. … Married mothers tend to create a better home environment 
for their infants. … Married fathers tend to have better psychological well-being. … 
Children raised in intact families have, on average, higher academic achievement, 
better emotional health, and fewer behavioral problems” (http://www.heritage.org, 
n.d., see also Wilcox 2004).  Complementing the Heritage Foundation’s extensive 
literature about the health benefits of maintaining traditional family structures and 
values, other conservative organizations also have noted the relationship between the 
two.  The Alliance Defense Fund legally fights for traditional family values based on 
research that suggests “weakening the family harms individuals, and (sic) especially 
children” (http://www.alliancedefensefund.org, n.d.).  Research on the relationship of 
health and family structure has been a powerful tool for the conservative agenda. 
  Conservative research suggests that family structures other than those espoused 
by social traditionalists are not only bad for personal and family health, but they are 
also bad for the health of the community.  For example, the Heritage Foundation 
reports that, “an increase in the proportion of female-headed households in the 
community was associated with high rates of violent crime and drug trafficking, 
welfare dependency, infant mortality, high-school dropouts, and unemployment 
among young adults” (http://www.heritage.org, n.d.).  The Alliance Defense Fund 
finds that “weakening the family and undermining the values that support it will 
ultimately destroy our society and dramatically impact religious civil liberties”  
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(http://www.alliancedefensefund.org, n.d.).  The connection between traditional social 
values, individual health, family health, and community health has grown stronger in 
recent years with the research of many conservative think tanks.  Concern for families 
and communities has encouraged conservatives to latch on to the popularized concept 
of “social capital.” 
  Although the term “social capital” has existed for decades, sociologist Robert 
Putnam introduced the term to the mainstream in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating 
with his lauded book, “Bowling Alone” (2000).  He builds off of Durkheim’s thesis 
that community integration offers protective benefits for individual health and Mills’ 
predictions of the decline of engagement in voluntary associations (Mills 1959:306).  
Testing these theories through years of empirical research in Italy and America, 
Putnam concludes that community involvement in the social, political, and economic 
issues of the surrounding area increases community and individual health. He suggests 
there are three main reasons why social capital may improve health.  
 
First, social networks furnish tangible assistance, such as 
money, convalescent care, and transportation, which reduces 
psychic and physical stress and provides a safety net. … 
Second, social networks also may reinforce healthy norms - 
socially isolated people are more likely to smoke, drink, 
overeat, and engage in other health-damaging behaviors. 
And socially cohesive communities are best able to organize 
politically to ensure first-rate medical services. … 
Finally ... social capital might actually serve as a 
physiological triggering mechanism, stimulating people's 
immune systems to fight disease and buffer stress (Putnam 
2000:327). 
Although Putnam did not intend for these ideas to bolster the conservative cause, 
certain organizations and think tanks have found his theories, often in simplified and 
distorted form, consistent with their agendas.  Extrapolating from Putnam’s argument 
that individuals joining civic organizations will benefit the health of the community,  
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conservative think tanks have asserted that strong family values will make strong 
families, which will lead to more civic participation, and thus better community 
health.  Using this slight alteration to Putnam’s social capital idea, conservative 
organizations have encouraged Americans and policy-makers to implement social 
traditionalist policies that will maintain traditional family structures.  According to 
research commissioned by conservative organizations, traditional families will impede 
crime and delinquency while improving community health and cohesion.  An increase 
in the number of families using materials from the conservative agendas will not only 
help to create more intact families but will also encourage families to become 
politically active in voluntary organizations.  This activity will strengthen the 
community and improve the health of all.  The social traditionalist ideology prevalent 
in contemporary society suggests that residents of cohesive communities, created 
through social traditionalist norms, are healthier than residents in non-politically 
active communities (assumed to have non-traditionalist family values).  Thus, this 
study will examine the following related proposition: 
Proposition 3: Respondents who do not have a positive perception of community 
cohesion will have poorer self-reported health than those who do.   
 
A COMBINED MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY 
  Marx (1976) hypothesized that there was a ruling ideology for each epoch.  
This ideology is created and sustained by the powerful, who Marx conceptualized as 
those who controlled the means of production.  He convincingly states, "The ideas of 
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling 
material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (Marx 1976: 
67).  We can see evidence of this hypothesis in the corporate subsidization of think 
tanks to create knowledge supporting the agenda of the corporate sector.    
47 
Mills (1959) contemporizes Marx’s theory by suggesting that the powerful consist of 
the elite in the economic, political, and military spheres.  In the history of the rise of 
the current ruling ideology, influential members of the economic and political spheres 
(the military sphere is not analyzed in this study) often worked together to put forward 
a unified and mutually beneficial agenda with a highly ideological discourse.  A good 
example of this unified system of thought and the use of ideological images can be 
seen in the rhetoric of the Republican Contract for America.  Chapter Two has shown 
that membership in the power elite in contemporary society is not limited to economic 
and political circles.   Clearly, powerful members of religious and/or social circles 
have sought alliances with other elites in order to guarantee that their interests are 
included in the ideology.  Religious elites such as Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell 
were able to obtain the ear of several Presidents.  The upper echelon of all these 
spheres of influence has the power to create a ruling ideology because of its 
connections to other members of the power elite.   These members of society not only 
control the means of production but also either already control media outlets or can 
co-opt them for disseminating their ideological discourse.  One such means of 
widespread dissemination is through organizations, such as think tanks, which create 
and legitimize knowledge that bolsters a certain ideology. 
  Independently, these spheres of influence can only develop and present 
particular ideologies.  Even with empirical evidence supporting these ideas, when 
issued alone, these ideas they will have little influence.  The ideas of the ruling class 
emerge as an ideology only when they are combined into a comprehensive worldview 
and made to seem normative and beneficial for all members of society.  Marx states, 
"For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, 
merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest 
of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas  
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the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones" 
(1976:68).  The conservative rhetoric that only by adhering to the policies of economic 
libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism will we have “the 
freedom to choose” and be protecting the moral fabric of America lends weight to the 
argument that the ideas presented above are indeed a cohesive ruling ideology.  
Conservatives lauded adhering to the ruling ideology as patriotic and upholding the 
“natural” rights of Americans delineated by the founding fathers.  Although this 
ideology was strong and pervasive from the 1970s to 2005, there seems to be growing 
dissatisfaction with it, perhaps due to the protracted war in Iraq and to apparent misuse 
of this ideology for personal and political gain by those in power, both inside and 
outside of government.  The Democratic take-over of Congress in 2007 suggests that 
change may be underway.  Sociological theory might also help us understand this part 
of the process, although diverse theories offer differing explanations.  Marx (1976) 
argues that the current ruling ideology will persevere as long as it serves the interests 
of the ruling elite, while Kuhn (1996) suggests that when it becomes so full of holes a 
new paradigm will arise.   
  Sociological theory supports the inclusion of a metric of ruling ideology.  
Unfortunately, significant disagreement exists over how this variable should be 
measured.  This study will create a ruling ideology variable by forming a composite of 
existing measures of economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social 
traditionalism.   Although this way of measuring ruling ideology has limitations, it 
may capture some of the complex nature of the concept.  Chapter Two presented 
evidence that economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social 
traditionalism are independent predictors of health but could not recount the history of 
each without noting the clear overlay of ideas, movements, and the social trajectory of  
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the current ideologies.  These three ideologies did not arise in a social vacuum but 
developed in response to and in support of each other.    
  This wedding of ideas was not mere coincidence.  Leaders of all movements 
realized that their ideals would be more influential if they were included in the rhetoric 
of other elites.  Paul Weyrich, founder of the Heritage Foundation and a key religious 
conservative leader in the 1970s and 1980s, perhaps states it best, “"We decided that 
the social conservatives and the economic conservatives, who were social libertarians, 
had to find a way to agree more than they disagreed.  They had to work together on 
things that united them ... [Economic conservatives] supported a tax cut because they 
were against big government and for lower taxes.  [Social conservatives] supported it 
because we were pro-family.  ... The Heritage Foundation got on board ... and 
Gingrich made it a part of the official House Republican budget" (Martin 1996:330).  
Although the groups had different motivations, they were able to find a common 
ground on policy suggestions, thereby presenting a strong united front to the 
government and public alike.   The merging of ideologies did not just occur between 
economic libertarians and religious conservatives.  Economic libertarians also spoke 
of preserving traditional values, "Not only does [big government] threaten our 
economic and political freedom, big government has slowed economic growth and 
depressed productivity, stimulated a rise in criminality and violence, weakened the 
family, generated racial unrest, lowered the quality of our schools, and increased 
poverty” (Rayack 1987:78).  Sociological theory and historical evidence suggest the 
presence of a ruling ideology in America and that it has strains of economic 
libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism.  Thus, a final 
proposition will be examined:    
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Proposition 4:  Respondents whose responses do not reflect the ruling ideology 
measured as a composite of economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and 
social traditionalism, will have poorer self-reported health than those who do. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HEALTH AND SOCIETY 
 
  The relationship between morbidity and social class made headline news 
recently when the Journal of the American Medical Association published an article 
comparing the incidence of severe illness between Americans and the British (CNN 
5/3/06).  Banks et al. (2006) found that Americans’ self-reported higher rates of severe 
health problems than the British of the same social class, despite the fact that the U.S. 
spends more money on health care per capita than Britain.  In light of this alarming 
finding and its implications for societal inequality, this study attempts to tease out 
previously unstudied social predictors of poor health. 
  A gradient of morbidity and mortality between all socioeconomic levels and 
even within social groups has been widely observed.  Research suggests that people 
with slightly higher socioeconomic status have lower rates of morbidity and mortality 
than people slightly below them (Marmot 2004, Wilkinson 1986).  Thus, health 
inequality cannot be viewed as a dichotomy between the “rich” and the “poor” but 
instead must be studied as a gradated pattern of inequality.  This socioeconomic 
gradient has also been observed in almost all illnesses (except certain types of cancers) 
and disease risk factors (Schnittker 2004, Adler and Ostrove 1999).  The interaction 
between socioeconomic status and health matters not only for the physical well-being 
of humanity but also because this gradient can serve as an indicator of the health of the 
political, social, and economic environments within society.  Extensive research has 
been conducted on the connection between health and social factors such as poverty, 
inequality, social class, gender and race.  Researchers have pointed to links with health 
behaviors, unequal access to health care, environmental risk factors, genetic and 
demographic dispositions, material deprivation, social cohesion, relative social  
52 
position, social inequality, and mental health.   This chapter will serve as an 
introduction to and overview of the key areas of research on the relation of health and 
society. 
  When analyzing health status across a population, there are several competing 
theoretical models that are used explain the associations found in contemporary 
empirical research.  Before launching into an exploration of these theories of health, a 
brief discussion of the unit of analysis may be useful.  The greatest debate between 
relevant theories is whether research should focus on macro-scale societal-wide 
variables that suggest embedded causes of poor health or on the mechanisms of 
transmission from the macro-scale social factors to individual health outcomes.  The 
route the researcher chooses will affect his methodology, conclusions, and whether his 
policy suggestions will target individuals or society.  This research attempts to connect 
large scale socio-economic processes to individual health via the line of research 
initiated by Mills’ 1959 book “The Sociological Imagination.” 
  
MILLS’ “SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION” 
  How individuals view society (and their place in society) has important 
consequences for perceptions of individual health.  As we have seen above, the current 
ideology implicitly connects society and health.  Contemporary ruling ideology 
includes the idea that a free and thus healthy economy leads to personal and political 
freedoms that elicit better health for individuals, that upholding Christian conservative 
values is good for an individual’s physical, social and spiritual health, and that local 
participation leads to a “healthy” community. 
  In 1959, C. Wright Mills wrote a treatise encouraging the growth of the 
“sociological imagination.”  In using this term he sought to connect the macro to the 
micro and show that history and large-scale social processes affect personal biography  
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and vise versa.  Indeed, it is as essential for the sociologist to understand the structural 
forces influencing an individual’s place in society as it is to look at his or her personal 
decisions and ascriptive traits.   In Millsian tradition, this study will also seek to place 
contemporary societal and ideological trends in the context of the historical 
development of America.   
  Mills challenges sociologists to ask three questions when conducting their 
research.  They are: “1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole?  
What are its essential components, and how are they related to one another? …2) 
Where does this society stand in human history? …3) What varieties of men and 
women now prevail in this society” (Mills 1959:6,7).  This research has attempted to 
be faithful to Mills call for imaginative awareness at the intersection of the macro and 
micro by seeking answers to these questions.  The first question is addressed in 
Chapters One and Two, which respectively deal with the ideological views within 
U.S. and with the three components of this ruling ideology: economic libertarianism, 
religious conservatism, and social traditionalism.  Chapter Two locates the analyzed 
decade of data in the history of the U.S. and the development of the current ruling 
ideology.  Finally, the remaining chapters will serve to describe the attributes of 
modern Americans, particularly in terms of beliefs, perceptions, class position, and 
health. 
  The idea of the sociological imagination not only guides the way we 
conceptualize the problem but also how we go about suggesting potential remedies.  
Mills distinguishes between “troubles” and “issues” suggesting that the former “occur 
within the character of the individual” (1959:8) and thus need an individual solution 
such as personal behavior modification.  On the other hand, “issues” “transcend these 
local environments” (Mills, 1959:8) and are seen as social ills due to structural 
failings.  These issues can only be addressed by looking at the inadequacies of the  
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broader institutions in society instead of the personal character of affected individuals.  
In short, the unit of analysis for this study is the individual but since there is enough 
evidence that poor health is not just an individual trouble, I will suggest some 
structural level issues that may be leading to poor individual health in America.  This 
level of focus does not negate the importance of studies that focus on an individual’s 
responsibility for lifestyle choices or behaviors that may affect his or her own personal 
health, but suggests that there is more at play than simply personal agency.   
  Finally, Mills’ discussion of self-awareness is relevant to this study on 
ideology.  Following the ideas of Marx on false consciousness, Mills argues that, “The 
sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene 
in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of 
individuals.  It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their 
daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions” (Mills 
1959:5).  This study posits the potential for a false consciousness among 
ideologically-adhering Americans.  Using the tools of the sociological imagination, 
this study will take into consideration the interaction between structural and historical 
processes and individual experience.  
 
THEORIES OF HEALTH AND RELATED FACTORS 
   Most epidemiological research on health has adhered to a biological model 
that focuses on relatively proximate measures such as health behaviors, genetics, and 
self-selection.  Despite S. Leonard Syme’s elucidation that the best research on health 
behaviors of the past fifty years can still only account for forty percent of the variance 
in specific illnesses (such as heart disease), the biological model remains the definitive 
model for epidemiology (Singh-Manoux 2005).  This model has greatly influenced 
policy, resulting in specifically targeted interventions on lifestyle choices and health  
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behaviors.  Yet the increasingly steeper health gradient suggests that macro-level 
social factors may play an important role in the trend of declining health across society 
(Banks et al. 2006).  
  Renowned epidemiologists Michael Marmot, Ichiro Kawachi, and Bruce Link 
have challenged the individual unit of analysis in an attempt to explain why a socio-
economic gradient persists when measuring health and mortality, despite the 
improvement across society of mediating risk factors such as nutrition, cleanliness, 
immunizations, and preventative medicines.  Their main argument is that 
physiological responses to inequality between social classes have an enormous impact 
on the health of humans (Daniels et al. 2000). In support of this focus on macro-level 
variables, sociologists such as Ellen Idler and James House, and, have joined forces 
with epidemiologists, including Syme, Marmot, Kawachi, Link and Richard 
Wilkinson, Peggy McDonough, Bruce P. Kennedy, to create the new field of social-
epidemiology. 
  In their pursuit of merging sociology and epidemiology, these researchers root 
their work in classical sociological theory.  Certainly, the association between macro-
level social processes and well-being is not a novel concept as classical sociologists 
such as Durkheim, Marx, and Veblen all theorized on the matter.  Despite its 
limitations in the field of evolutionary psychology (Marmot 2004:169), Durkheim’s 
research on suicide uncovered some key effects of social organization (integration or 
disintegration) on the health of individuals.  He thought that social factors were an 
irreducible part of mortality and focused his work on why a population had that level 
of illness, not why the individual developed a certain trait (Phelan et al. 2004).  Social 
epidemiologists suggest that although all individuals experience stress and difficulties, 
Durkheim’s work reveals that individuals with stronger social ties weathered these 
challenges better (Marmot 2004:167).  Despite Marx’s bifurcation of social classes  
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and focus on material processes in society, his contributions on ownership, alienation, 
and control over economic and social decision-making processes are relevant to 
health.  One such acknowledgement of the impact of inequality can be found in Wage, 
Labour and Capital, where Marx states, “A house may be large or small; as long as 
the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling.  
But if a palace arises beside the little house, the little house shrinks to a hovel… the 
dweller will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its 
four walls” (quoted in Marmot and Wilkinson 2001:234).  This research can be seen as 
an extension of classical sociological theories and an attempt to test the continued 
relevance of such theories in contemporary society. 
  Thorston Veblen’s “Theory of the Leisure Class” (in Ritzer 2000:323-349), 
where he discusses conspicuous consumption, has become an integral component of 
the argument that relative deprivation and social comparisons matter greatly (Marmot 
2004, Kawachi 1997, Wilkinson 1996, 2000).  The conspicuous consumption and 
display of wealth at the top of the hierarchy provides a painfully obvious separation 
between that rung of the social gradient ladder and even the next step down.  People 
are unhappy because, unless they are literally at the top, there will always be someone 
above them and something more they want to obtain so as to give off the impression 
that they have “made it” (Marmot 2004:86).  Veblen’s idea of conspicuous 
consumption has become a key theoretical underpinning of the social-psychological 
side of the debate.  Studies suggest that individuals do not compare their well-being 
with those at the same socioeconomic level, but naturally compare to those above 
them, perhaps because of the tendency towards conspicuous consumption for higher 
socioeconomic classes (Wilkinson 1997, Davidson et al. 2006). 
  Link and Phelan (1995) produced a formative document for the socio-
psychological model of health, which discussed (what they term) “the fundamental  
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causes of social inequality” in relation to mortality.  They subsequently test the 
hypothesis that socioeconomic status, as a multifaceted variable encompassing 
resources such as money, education, prestige, neighborhood effect, and social ties, will 
be strongly associated with mortality no matter what the mechanism of transmission 
(Phelan et al. 2004).   Finding support for their hypothesis, they conclude that 
socioeconomic status (SES) is a fundamental cause for poor health regardless of 
proximate risk factors.  Going one step further, they suggest that the wealthy remain at 
the top of the health gradient because they have access to and utilize resources that 
mitigate the possibilities of illness.  Many other researchers have retested this thesis or 
added a new component, such as race, and have similarly concluded that SES, not 
health behaviors or life stressors, is the primary factor in explaining the inequality of 
health outcomes (Lantz et al. 1998, Roy 2004, Hayward et al. 2000, Kawachi et al. 
1997, Kaplan et al. 1996).  Wilkinson (1997, 1996) argues that relative social standing 
is a more powerful predictor of health than is material deprivation (above a certain 
basic needs threshold) and ties his own extensive international research on the 
psychosocial model with that of Kawachi et al. (1997), who has produced empirical 
evidence linking SES as a measure of social cohesion to mortality.   
 
ENTERING THE MECHANISM DEBATE 
  Despite the empirical evidence for the relationship between SES and 
morbidity, the question remains, how exactly does inequality in social class standing 
affect physical well-being?  Is there a difference between the way the physical 
environment and the social environment impact morbidity?  Do social constructions 
affect health through biophysical, social, or psychological mechanisms?  In other 
words, is there a direct cause-effect relationship between social factors and disease or 
do proximate risk factors play an intermediate role?  We will examine three prevalent  
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hypotheses that are often seen as independent but with more theoretical examination 
may actually be complementary explanations of transmission (Etner and Grzywacz 
2003, Adler and Ostrove 1999).  The current literature offers three directions: 1) 
socioeconomic position is a correlate of health behavior and lifestyle choices that 
directly impact health; 2) inequality in SES produces the biophysical response of 
anxiety of stress that physically impacts the body; 3) inequality in SES leads to 
differential access to resources and benefits such as diet, health care, and social 
support that affect all aspects (physical, mental, social) of health.  
 
Biological and Behavioral Models 
  Although epidemiologists and behavioral scientists may admit the presence of 
an association between SES and health, it is treated as correlate and not as a causal 
variable (Phelan et al. 2004).  Several mediating pathways are identified that focus 
research on the specific biological or developmental variables that result from material 
deprivation early in life and then continue to manifest themselves in health outcomes 
over the life-course.   If material deprivation persists through adulthood, these 
variables have a “cumulative dose-response relationship with health” (Singh-Manoux 
2005:2277).  Socioeconomic status plays a role in this model only as an indication of 
the life-course path of material deprivation.  The focus remains on the micro-level and 
looks at why individuals with low material well-being exhibit risky health behaviors 
such as smoking, excessive alcohol use, and poor eating habits. 
  Another key focus of epidemiological research is the importance of genetics 
and social selection.  Empirical evidence is used to support the hypothesis that those in 
low socioeconomic positions were genetically predisposed to certain illnesses.  These 
illnesses restrict upward mobility in class status or move individuals into lower classes 
(Dohrenwend 1992).  For example, when analyzing the relationship between smoking  
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and health, it is possible that a selection effect and not a causal effect is being 
measured, because those genetically predisposed to certain illnesses would have died 
before entering the survey year (Zimmer et al. 2000).  Thus, selection processes are 
seen by some to account for the consistent association between SES and health   
 
Physiological Models 
  Physiological responses to environmental, economic, and social conditions are 
beginning to be explored under the new field of social epidemiology.  The 
predominant paradigm is that low control, low social position, and social exclusion 
lead to chronic stress, which wreaks havoc on the human endocrine and autonomic 
nervous system (Roy 2004, Marmot 2004:274). This link between social factors and 
position has been tested through early experiments on paupers in England, which 
revealed greatly enlarged adrenal glands presumably due to chronic stress (Marmot 
2004), current medical research (Hayward et al. 2000, Adler et al. 1999), and through 
analogies to stress reactions in primates (Wilkinson 1996, Sapolsky 1998).  In 
addition, Eisenberger et al. (2004) find that the same section of the brain is activated 
for both physical pain and social exclusion, which suggests there may be similar 
physiologic outcomes (in Marmot 2004:283).  All studies reported that low SES leads 
to the observance of higher quantities of stress-induced hormones in the respondent.  
  Marmot (2004:272-282; 112-116) has a lengthy discussion of the biology of 
stress.  He suggests that the consistent release of epinephrine (adrenaline), 
norepinephrine, and cortisol into the body raises the basal level of hormone secretion 
and creates severe health problems.  For example, increased cortisol levels raise 
blood-sugar and if chronically raised can lead to diabetes and increased allostatic load.  
Feedback mechanisms are blunted with constant use, dulling responses to short-term 
emergencies and raising blood pressure levels.  The activation of the sympathetic  
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nervous system also raises blood pressure, dampens the immune system, and if 
activated long-enough, can increase one’s risk for a heart attack or stroke (see also 
Roy 2004, Phelan et al. 2004).    
 
Social Model 
  Another perspective on the causal chain of social causes leading to health 
outcomes is rooted in the social capital literature.  Although this concept has become 
tautological in its popularized form, the foundations of the idea (i.e., Bourdieu’s two 
part conceptualization) can be considered theoretically useful as a heuristic tool if not 
an explanatory mechanism (Portes 1998, 2000, Carpiano 2006, Morrow 1999).   
  Bourdieu's theory suggests that the amount of social capital one can possess 
depends on "1) the size of network connections that the individual “can effectively 
mobilize” and 2) the amount and type(s) of capital (e.g., economic, cultural, or 
symbolic) possessed by each of those to whom he or she is related” (Bourdieu 
1986:249 in Carpiano 2006).  Thus “structural antecedents” such as SES (Link and 
Phelan 1995) and its correlates of residency length (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974, 
Sampson 1988), gender (McDonough et al. 1999), and race (Hayward et al. 2000) 
have implications for the form and strength of social networks that can be created.  
Social cohesion (i.e., trust, reciprocity, and shared values) is measured in differing 
degrees and forms because of the “structural antecedents” of neighborhoods and the 
social networks within.  Thus, characteristics of low SES areas such as highly mobile 
residency may limit the social ties that can be built among residents.  Not only does 
individual behavior (i.e., the choice to remain in the neighborhood) affect community 
attachment but the choices of others in the community (i.e., high mobility) will affect 
an individuals’ ability to make social ties (Sampson 1988).  Social capital is formed 
when people engaging in social cohesion take advantage of the resources (i.e., money,  
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power, social support, and protection) these networks provide them.  Key resources 
gained are social support, social leverage, informal social control, and neighborhood 
organization participation.  Thus, social capital (i.e., the collective resources 
emanating from social networks that are actually used for action) is dependent on the 
amount of social cohesion (networks, norms, and values), which ultimately rests on 
“fundamental causes” and the array of resources they encompass (Phelan et al. 2004, 
Carpiano 2006). 
  Bourdieu also theorized that the attainment of capital is an intentional process; 
that is, individuals seek out different kinds of capital with the knowledge that later on 
it will accrue benefits.  Social, economic, and cultural capital are interlinked systems 
essential to human development.  Because of this linkage, social capital (i.e., access to 
resources) relies on the individual's possession of material capital (i.e., money) and 
cultural capital (i.e., education, social ties, family values) (Portes 1998, 2000).  Thus, 
different combinations of cultural (Granovetter's weak and strong ties and values 
transmitted by families) and material capital will produce different types of social 
capital, otherwise referred to as differential resources (job opportunities vs. help 
moving).  In sum, a person's intentionally created networks give rise to the availability 
of resources (social capital), which if taken advantage of, can benefit the individual by 
providing material, ideological, and informational assets (Link and Phelan 1995, 
Phelan et al. 2004, Carpiano 2006). 
  Bourdieu’s “cultural capital” has been explored by other theorists, who suggest 
that the strength and diversity of ties are more important than the number of friends 
and acquaintances (Granovetter 1973, 1983, Morrow 1999, Kasarda and Janowitz 
1974).  Indeed, one limitation of analyzing the impact of social networks seen in the 
sociological literature is that large datasets offer inadequate measures of social ties 
that are based on quantity, not quality (Morrow 1999).  Granovetter (1973)  
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hypothesized that individuals with diverse social ties (meaning low-density, weak and 
bridging ties with "acquaintances") will be better off than individuals with non-diverse 
social ties (meaning high-density, strong ties with "close friends").  Opportunities for 
new resources, ideologies, and information are uniquely available to the individual 
through weak bridging ties because of the diversity and lack of overlap between 
groups.  Within-group communication tends to be insular and friends of friends 
typically share the same resource network, whereas between-group communication 
offers new viewpoints and friends of friends do not overlap, thus opening up new 
resources markets.   
  Contrary to popular discourse, Granovetter (1973, 1983) hypothesizes that 
social systems lacking in weak ties will be characterized by a lack of scientific 
progress, social cohesion, and access to resources.  Building on Durkheim's theory of 
the division of labor, Granovetter suggests weak ties actually reduce alienation and 
anomie on the macro level because they help individuals connect to needed resources.   
On the micro level, diverse social ties allowing for role specialization are integral to 
the social construction of individualism and thus the construction of identity.  
Empirical findings on this theoretical position have important implications for the 
access to resources that ultimately affect health and well-being.  For example, 
Granovetter (1983:204) finds that “the social structure faced by children of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds does not encourage the complex role set that would, in 
turn, facilitate the development of 'intellectual flexibility and self-direction’” (Coser 
1975:258). Low SES populations may have weak ties but often they are within-group 
friends of friends and not bridging acquaintances (Stack 1974). Cohen et al. (1997) 
suggest that numerous weak ties to different groups (i.e., work, family, friends, or 
community groups) are associated with a decrease in illness transmission.   
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Dohrenwend et al. (1992) find SES-based limitations on access to resources increased 
stress which predicted depression, substance abuse, and antisocial personality. 
  The question remains, why do low SES populations have less diverse social 
networks?  Could limits such as time, money, geographic mobility, status group play a 
part?  Why does this shortage seem to affect them more than a high SES population 
with few non-intimate contacts?  Portes (1998) suggests that other resources available 
to high SES populations such as money, status, and education can mitigate the losses 
of certain benefits from a lack of weak ties, so that the loss of social capital in one 
form can be compensated for by other forms although with different outcomes.  
Finally, even Granovetter (1983) concedes that strong ties also have an important but 
different role in well-being.  Research has shown that while weak ties are important 
for expanding knowledge, resources, and social mobility, strong ties are integral to 
having a social support network in times of need (Stack 1974, Portes 1998).   
  Weaknesses still exist in the social cohesion theory.  Future research initiatives 
must analyze the variation in access and resources within a community.  Access to 
resources cannot be assumed to be available in all forms and equal amounts to all 
members of the group, nor can it be assumed to always have a positive effect on each 
member or collectively (Carpiano 2006). Despite popular conceptions of the benefits 
of social capital based on Putnam's work, negative outcomes exist, including 
community closure that excludes outsiders, excess claims on group members, too 
much social control that restricts individual freedoms (see Eckstein 2001), and social 
pressure to maintain the status quo or maladaptive norms (Stack 1974, Bourgois 
1995).   
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Combinations 
  As suggested at the commencement of this section, the above theories are not 
necessarily exclusive (Ettner and Grzywacz 2003, Fremont and Bird 1999).  Space 
should be opened within the current literature to explore connections between health 
and social, biological, and ecological mechanisms.  Future research can start with an 
integrated interpretive probabilistic model where social factors are hypothesized to 
first affect our senses (we feel insulted, shamed, stressed) and then our bio-physical 
system (discrimination, relative social status, chronic stress).  We react on two levels: 
1) feelings and psychological interpretations which may impact our health behaviors 
(binge drinking, social smoking), and 2) biophysical responses of releasing hormones.  
Short and long term health outcomes can be seen from this model because although 
one incident may trigger an immediately deleterious biophysical change (i.e., 
cancerous cell mutation), the probability of maladaptive changes in the body increases 
as social, biological, and environmental insults accumulate. 
 
Gaps in the Research 
  Although a significant body of research on the relationship between self- 
perceptions of social hierarchy and health exists (Marmot 2004, Kawachi et al. 1997, 
Wilkinson 2006), few studies have analyzed how the internalized views of the role of 
government and the market affect health outcomes.  Literature suggests that ideology 
plays an important role in the maintenance and reproduction of social stratification, 
especially at the macro-structural level (Domhoff 2002, Mills 1959).  As discussed at 
the outset of this chapter, macro-social processes intimately affect individual 
biography and world views.  In concordance, this study looks more closely at how 
certain economic, religious, and social paradigms affect perceptions of health.      
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  The following chapters will examine the propositions laid out in Chapter Two 
in order to better understand the relationships between contemporary economic, 
religious, and social ideologies and health outcomes and how they may be mediated 
by demographic and material factors.   These propositions will serve as indicators of 
the future directions health research should explore.  It is my hope also that the way 
these factors are conceptualized and tested will open future doors on refining 
measurements and variable validity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA  
  In this study, the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis et al. 2005) results 
are used to examine the relationship between self-reported health and the particular 
ideologies of economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social 
traditionalism, as well as a measure of ruling ideology, all net of demographic and 
material controls.  This data set was chosen because it is a nationally representative, 
reoccurring cross-sectional sample of the English-speaking, non-institutionalized 
population over 18 years old.  Also, social science research frequently uses the GSS 
because researchers have respect for the integrity of the data collection (Schnittker 
2004). The most recent wave of GSS data (2004) are analyzed and compared to the 
data from 1993-1996.  For 2004, the data were weighted for the over-sample of Blacks 
using the provided weight “wt2004nr,” as recommended in Appendix A of the GSS 
(Davis et al. 2005).  For this particular study, indicators of health insurance, objective 
medical reports, personal assets, and wealth measures would be useful to include, but 
such variables are not available in the GSS data set.  Despite the limitations of the 
array of variables, the GSS does offer a self-reported health measure generally 
regarded as a robust indicator of health status and many other important socio-
demographic controls.  Most importantly, this data set contains identical questions 
repeated over many years, allowing for trend comparison across years. 
 
Unit of Observation 
  The GSS measures responses at an individual level, which allows this study to 
analyze health at the level of an individual’s perception of his or her own health.   
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Sometimes when researchers study social capital variables or any social phenomenon, 
the unit of observation can become confused.   Although popular media would like to 
extrapolate individual health to family and community health, that is not the intent of 
this project.  Thus, the unit of observation for this study is the individual respondent; 
the study examines how individuals perceive the surrounding society and how this 
may be associated with their personal health.  In addition, the unit of analysis for this 
study is ideological power.  I analyze the effect of three particular ideologies and one 
measure of ruling ideology on individual health, to better understand the influence that 
ideology has on Americans today.    
 
VARIABLE SELECTION 
  The variables chosen from the GSS fall into six categories: economic ideals, 
religious beliefs, social perceptions, material position, health behaviors, and socio-
demographics.   Their inclusion in the model rests on suggestions noted in the 
literature as well as social expectations indicated in sociological theory.   Several 
independent variables have been chosen for each particular ideology in order to 
analyze the relative strength of possible predictors.   Not all variables are expected to 
be significant but this study will serve as an indicator of which variables perhaps best 
represent a particular ideology.  All continuous variables (with the exception of Age, 
which was also measured as a quadratic) were organized into quantitative categories in 
order to better explain the nuances of the direction of coefficients within a variable.   
Great care was taken to provide a theoretical base for quantifying continuous variables 
and collapsing categories in multi-level categorical variables.  For example, research 
suggests that there is both an urban and rural bias in health outcomes.  Thus, our 
measure of city size (XNORCSIZ) was collapsed into three categories, urban, rural, 
suburban, with the latter as the reference group.    
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  Self-reported health is used as the dependent variable.  A large body of 
literature exists that highlights the robust nature of self-reported health in 
measurement and outcome.  Subjective measures of personal health have been 
employed as valid indicators of health since the 1970s, but it was not until 1982 that 
quantitative research revealed the association with mortality (Idler and Benyamini 
1997).  Mossey and Shapiro’s (1982) longitudinal analysis on aging showed that 
medical records and self-report of medical illnesses were not as strong of predictors of 
survival as was respondents' self-rated general health.  Researchers explain this 
surprising but consistently reported finding by suggesting that self-reported health 
captures the complex interaction of the personal pain and relative well-being index of 
the respondent and a doctor’s diagnosis (Idler and Benyamini 1997).  Thus, unlike 
many other measures of illness, self-reported health can be seen as measuring the 
progression of disease, not just its incidence.  Most illness measures in large, 
nationally-representative data sets bifurcate responses as “have” or “don’t have” a 
certain affliction but fail to measure the advancement or severity of the illness.  Such 
binary measurements of occurrence of illness are limited predictors of how soon an 
individual will pass away (Idler and Benyamini 1997).   
  Several researchers have attempted to test the reliability of self-reported health 
by using it as a predictor for mortality or specific illness outcomes.  The vast majority 
of these studies find that self-reported health is a robust predictor of survival, 
independent of medical, behavioral and/or psychosocial factors (Idler and Benyamini 
1997, Marmot 2004, Zimmer et al. 2000).  Significant differences in mortality 
between each level of the dependent variable have been reported, so that moving from 
excellent health to poor health increases your risk of mortality 93.5 times (McCallum 
et al. 1994).   In addition to predicting physical health, self-perceived health has been  
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shown to be a strong indicator of social and mental well-being (DeForge et al. 1989). 
Others suggest that self-rated health reflects family history because individuals report 
based on their knowledge of familial risk factors.  For example, if the respondents’ 
father died of a heart-attack at an early age, it is likely the respondent will take that 
into consideration when looking at his own well-being (Idler and Benyamini 1997).   
  Self-reported health has several known limitations, particularly in terms of 
comparison groups and cultural interpretations.  Identifying what group respondents 
use as the base for their evaluation is essential to the interpretation of research 
findings, but consensus on this control level has not been reached.   Idler and 
Benyamini (1997) report that respondents tend to measure themselves against those 
with worse health while Wilkinson (1997) suggests that individuals measure 
themselves against high social classes (which presumably would have better health).  
Relative social class standing does not appear to be a consistently significant variable 
since the elderly measure their well-being against others in their age cohort (Zimmer 
et al. 2000)  For example, an older respondent may report good health which is 
correctly assessed when compared within the cohort but incorrect when compared to 
younger cohorts.  Relative deprivation can confound the findings as 80 year-olds will 
most likely have more health problems than 20 year-olds but may give themselves the 
same rating of "good" as the 20 year-olds because they are comparing themselves to 
other octogenarians.  The degree of variation in the findings suggests that future 
theoretical and empirical health research should examine measurement and control 
groups, with a particular focus on the social categories of age, race, gender, class, 
education level, and household size.  These variables may play an important role in 
interpretation as independently they all carry significantly different mortality risks 
(Zimmer et al. 2000, DeForge et al. 1989).    
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  The paucity of research on the cultural interpretations of self-reported health is 
a second significant limitation for studies including certain sub-populations.  Although 
Idler and Benyamini (1997) found a consistency of outcomes despite differences in 
dialects within the English language, other studies of self-rated health suggest that 
there are significant differences between language groups (Angel and Guarnaccia 
1989, Appels et al. 1996).  For example, an English speaking Hispanic subsection was 
seen to report on this measure differently than non-English speaking Hispanics (Angel 
and Guarnaccia 1989).  Zimmer et al. (2000) report that other studies have shown that 
self-reported health is dependent on many socio-demographic factors, including age, 
sex, and education.  Thus, knowing the normative level of health for a society is 
integral to interpreting the results of studies measuring self-reported health.   
  Third, self-perception of health can also be a causal variable of health.  
Individuals who feel they have poor health may be less likely to take care of 
themselves, which may lead to the self-fulfilling prophecy of even poorer health.  This 
finding has important implications for older age-cohorts who reach an age where lack 
of self-care can result in serious illness or death.  Research has shown that perceptions 
of good health in elderly respondents are a causal variable for positive self-care 
attention, net of chronic illnesses and psychosocial factors (Idler and Benyamini 
1997).   
  Despite these limitations, self-reported health is believed to be a consistent and 
robust measure of respondents’ health that captures small changes in health status 
more accurately than physician exams.  Idler and Benyamini (1997) conclude that "the 
global rating represents an irreplaceable dimension of health status and in fact that an 
individual's health status cannot be assessed without it" (34). This compelling 
statement encourages the continued use of self-reported health but does not limit the 
possibility of additional ways to measure other aspects of well-being.  Current self- 
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Categories 93-96 2004 All Years
Excellent 1715 31.30% 429 32% 2144 31.41%
Good 2695 47.50% 651 48.50% 3346 49.03%
Fair 911 16.60% 218 16.20% 1129 16.54%
Poor 253 4.60% 44 3.30% 297 4.35%
N 5484 100% 1341 100% 6825 100.00%
reported health research provides impetus for further examination of other self-
assessments (i.e., social standing, trust, and sense of community) to determine if they 
are also robust measures.  
  The original question measuring self-reported health in the GSS asked the 
respondent the following, “Would you say your own health, in general, is excellent, 
good, fair, or poor?” (Davis et al. 2005).  The previously documented gradient, where 
mortality decreases with each increment, allowed for the use of ordinal regression in 
order to determine the nuances between the four response categories (McCallum et al. 
1994).  Unfortunately, the paucity of cases reporting poor health did not allow for the 
completion of this technique as the outcome variable must have enough responses in 
each category to provide adequate degrees of freedom for testing.  Thus, the dependent 
variable was dichotomized into “good health” and “poor health,” by combining the 
categories “excellent” and “good” and the categories “fair” and “poor,” and logistic 
regression was used to understand the changes between categories.  The distribution 
before and after this decision are shown in Table 1, Table 2, and Figure 1.  It is 
expected that the incremental relationship will still exist between the two groups so 
that those with good health will have a lower mortality rate when compared with the 
poor health group.   
 
Table 1:  Original Breakdown of Self-Reported Health in the U.S.; 1993-96, 2004, All 
Years 
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Categories 93-96 2004 All Years
Good 4410 78.80% 1080 80.50% 5490 80.44%
Poor 1164 21.20% 262 19.50% 1426 20.89%
N 5484 100% 1341 100% 6825 100.00%
Table 2:  Grouped Self-Reported Health in the U.S.; 1993-96, 2004, All Years 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Distribution of the Original and Grouped Dependent Variable for 1993-
2004 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  Although significant research on the relationship between self perceptions of 
social hierarchy and health exists (Marmot 2004, Kawachi et al. 1997, Wilkinson 
2006), few studies have analyzed how internalized views of the ideological role of 
economics, religion, and social perceptions affect health outcomes.  The following 
section discusses how the measures for these views were created using data from the 
GSS.  How each variable was measured or constructed remains constant for all 
analyses across all years in this study.   
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Economic Libertarianism 
  In order to measure ideological views of economic ideals, this research uses 
two variables Helpnot and Eqwlth.  The variable Helpnot measures peoples’ views on 
the role of the federal government versus the role of individuals and private businesses 
in solving problems in America.   The GSS question reads: “Some people think that 
the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to 
individuals and private businesses.  Others disagree and think that the government 
should do even more to solve our country's problems.  Still others have opinions 
somewhere in between.  Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you 
made up your mind on this?” (Davis et al. 2005). Answers ranged on a five point scale 
from strongly agreeing that the government should do more (1) to strongly agreeing 
that the government is doing too much (5) (See Table 3).  The original range of 
answers was collapsed into a three point scale by combining categories 1 and 2 
(strongly agree and agree) and categories 4 and 5 (disagree and strongly disagree) (See 
Table 4).  Category 3 is understood as having a neutral opinion on the matter and the 
GSS response for this category states, “I agree with both answers.”  Since the outcome 
variable is poor health and the propositions predict that the lack of adherence to the 
ruling ideology is related to poor health, the level within each variable that is most 
likely to match with the ruling ideology will be used as the reference group.  The 
coding of the reference category for the following ideological variables will follow the 
same pattern for all years studied.  Thus, for the variable Helpnot, responses indicating 
a belief that the individuals and private businesses are responsible for solving 
problems in America will be used as the reference group.   
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Frequency Percent
Govt Do More 306 13.5
2 310 13.7
Agree With Both 849 37.5
4 408 18.0
Govt Does Too Much
390 17.2
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
Govt Should Help 616 27.2
No Opinion 849 37.5
Govt Shouldn't Help
798 35.2
Total 2,263 100.0
Table 3: Original Distribution of Helpnot (Should Govt Do More or Less?)  
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4: Recoded Distribution of Helpnot (Should Govt Do More or Less?) 
 
 
 
 
 
  The use of the variable Helpnot to measure economic libertarian ideals is 
appropriate.  Conservative think tanks broadcast their adherence to individualism and 
the importance of limiting government involvement in social issues.  For example, the 
website from the American Conservative Union states, “We believe that it is the 
responsibility of the individual citizen, whenever his inherent rights are threatened 
from within or without, to join together with other individuals to protect these rights, 
or, when they have been temporarily lost, to regain them” 
(http://www.conservative.org, n.d.).  Thus, it is not the role of the government to solve 
problems in America but the responsibility of individual citizens.   
   The second indicator of economic ideology, Eqwlth, measures peoples’ views 
on how much the government should be involved in reducing income differences 
between the rich and the poor.  The actual GSS question states, “Some people think 
that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between 
the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving  
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income assistance to the poor.  Others think that the government should not concern 
itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor.  Here is a 
card with a scale from 1 to 7.  Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government 
ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 
meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income 
differences.  What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?” (Davis 
et al. 2005).  As highlighted in Table 5, respondents’ answers ranged from strongly 
agreeing that the government should do something to reduce the income differences 
between rich and poor (1) to strongly agreeing that the government should not concern 
itself with decreasing income differences (7).  Table 6 reveals how this scale was 
subsequently reduced to three categories where 1 and 2 (strongly disagree and 
disagree) and 6 and 7 (agree and strongly agree) were grouped at the extremes and 3 
through 5 were considered neutral responses.  By grouping these variables in this way, 
the measure captures those respondents with the most extreme or ardent beliefs about 
market practices.  Ideology tends to simplify by dichotomizing world-views and 
adding in non-neutral rhetoric.  Thus, economic libertarian ideology polarizes beliefs 
by suggesting that the respondent is either for free-market policies or against them.  
Following the rationale for using the least ideological level as the reference group, the 
response indicating that the government should be less involved in reducing income 
differences in America was used as the reference level.   
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Frequency Percent
GOVT REDUCE DIFF 386 17.1
2 222 9.8
3 388 17.1
4 452 20.0
5 298 13.2
6 194 8.6
NO GOVT ACTION 324 14.3
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
Govt Should Reduce 608 26.9
Neutral 1,137 50.2
Govt Shoudn't Reduce 518 22.9
Total 2,263 100.0
Table 5: Original Distribution of Eqwlth (Should Govt Reduce Income Differences?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Recoded Distribution of Eqwlth (Should Govt Reduce Income Differences?) 
 
 
 
 
 
  These two economic measures were also combined to create a composite 
variable that serves as an indicator of how strongly the respondent adheres to free 
market ideology.  Free market ideology purports that markets, not government 
intervention, should be the regulating force in society.  Anti-interventionists may 
oppose social welfare policies such as welfare, corporate or wealth taxes, and the 
redistribution of wealth by intrusive government programs, while supporting the 
private sector, supply-side economics, and the idea that “rising tides lift all boats.”  
Responses on the free market scale ranged from 0 (the government should be involved 
in social policy) to 4 (the government should not be involved in social policy/anti-
interventionist) and category 4 was used as the reference group (See Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: Distribution of Economic Summated Scale, All Years 
 
Religious Participation 
  Recent research has suggested that those who attend a religious service at least 
once a week have a 40-46 percent lower risk of dying than those who go less 
frequently (Koenig et al. 1999, that bridge et al. 1997).  Yet, some studies have 
suggested the connection between religion and mortality is spurious and that other 
variables correlated with religion should be analyzed.  For example, religion has been 
seen to exert social control on health behaviors such as smoking and drinking that can 
lead to health problems (Dupre et al. 2006).  Studies have also suggested that church 
attendees tend to be more obese than the surrounding population, particularly in the 
South (Kim et al. 2003).   
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  Health research based on a “social capital” thesis has led other researchers to 
conclude that religion provides social support and a cohesive world view.  This social 
safety net is seen to have positive effects on health, especially in times of crises 
(Granovetter 1983, Portes 1998).   Research shows that resource availability also 
increases because of social ties, so that church attendees have better psychosocial 
health.  Religion and religious social support supposedly nurture individuals and 
increase their self-esteem and sense of mastery (Appels et al. 1996).  Thus, researchers 
claim that religion and social capital are highly correlated and only one measure 
should be included in the model.  Yet, others suggest no suitable correlate has been 
found and current studies do not completely explain the relationship between religion 
and health (Dupre et al. 2006).  McDonough et al. (1999) suggest that the strength of 
findings vary by age, gender, and race.  Thus, my study introduces demographic 
controls while posing religion against measures of social cohesion, social support, and 
health behavior as suggested by current literature, as well as adding additional 
potential correlates to the model.  Correlation matrices were created and the religion 
variables were not collinear with the social capital variables.   
  Using the available variables from the GSS, three measures of religiosity are 
obtained.  Since previous research has acknowledged the importance of measuring 
religious attendance, this measure will be included and measured as a quantitative 
variable with three categories (Dupre et al. 2006).  It is conceptualized as an indicator 
of not only religious behavior (i.e., physically going to religious services) but also as 
an indicator of strength of religious affiliation as presumably, those who attend church 
frequently would have stronger religious commitments than those who rarely attend.  
The GSS asks respondents, “How often do you attend religious services” and allows 
for the following responses, “Never, less than once a year, about once or twice a year, 
several times a year, about once a month, nearly every week, every week, several  
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Frequency Percent
NEVER 331 14.6
LT ONCE A YEAR 202 8.9
ONCE A YEAR 341 15.1
SEVRL TIMES A YR 307 13.5
ONCE A MONTH 155 6.8
2-3X A MONTH 207 9.1
NRLY EVERY WEEK 135 5.9
EVERY WEEK 411 18.1
MORE THN ONCE WK 177 7.8
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
Attend rarely/never
873 38.6
Attend infrequently
802 35.5
Regularly attend 587 25.9
Total 2,263 100.0
times a week.”  The original distribution of this variable can be seen in Table 7. For 
clarity, the variable Attend has been regrouped into three categories that are evident in 
Table 8.  These categories are “attend regularly (at least once a week),” “attend 
infrequently (less than once a week but more than a once per year),” and “attend rarely 
or never (once per year or less).”  As church attendance is a behavior encouraged by 
religious conservative doctrine, “attend regularly” will be used as the reference level.   
 
Table 7: Original Distribution of Attend (How Often Respondent Attends Religious 
Services) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Recoded Distribution of Attend (How Often Respondent Attends Religious 
Services) 
 
 
 
  
 
  A major contribution of this research is the analysis of the connection between 
ideology and health outcomes.  In particular, this study focuses on the role religious 
conservatives have played in pushing forward a conservative ideology.  Thus, a 
measure of the fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent’s religion was also  
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Frequency Percent
Liberal 611 27.0
Moderate 901 39.8
Fundamentalist 751 33.2
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
STRONG 837 37.0
NOT VERY STRONG 947 41.9
SOMEWHAT STRONG 223 9.9
NO RELIGION 255 11.3
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
Not religious 255 11.3
Not strongly religious 1,171 51.7
Strongly Religious 837 37.0
Total 2,263 100.0
included in the study.  The variable Fund (stated in the GSS as 
“Fundamentalism/Liberalism of Respondent's Religion”) was retained in its original 
three category form, of “fundamentalist,” “moderate,” and “liberal.”  
“Fundamentalist,” the category most likely to espouse the ideology and thus have 
good health, will be used for reference.   
 
Table 9: Distribution of Fund (How Fundamentalist is Respondent Currently?) 
 
 
 
 
  As a supplemental measure of strength of religious belief, the variable Reliten 
was included in the analysis.  The question asks for a self-analysis of the strength of a 
respondent’s religious adherence, rated on a three category scale from strong to not 
religious.  This scale was left in its original form with “strongly religious” used for 
reference.  By using three different measures to conceptualize religiosity, I hope to 
capture the complicated dynamics of ideology and religious belief.  
 
Table 10: Original Distribution of Reliten (Strength of Religious Affiliation) 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Recoded Distribution of Reliten (Strength of Religious Affiliation) 
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  Finally, a composite measure of religiosity was created as a scale from 0 (not 
strongly religious) to 6 (strongly religious) (See Figure 3).  By combining all measures 
of religious adherence in this study, this scale can provide a better understanding of 
the cohesiveness of respondents’ views on religion.  For example, respondents who 
received a score of 6 on the composite scale consistently marked highly religious 
responses.    
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of Religious Summated Scale, All Years 
 
 
Perceptions of Society  
  Research shows that a diverse social network can improve social mobility at 
large while providing a sense of security and support at a personal level (Granovetter 
1973, 1983, Stack 1974, Portes 1998).  Yet the development of broad networks can be 
hindered by negative perceptions of the surrounding environment and people, 
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Fair Frequency Percent
TAKE ADVANTAGE 1,001 44.2
FAIR 1,262 55.8
Total 2,263 100.0
Trust
CAN TRUST 898 39.7
CANNOT TRUST 1,365 60.3
Total 2,263 100.0
Helpful
HELPFUL 1,061 46.9
LOOKOUT FOR SELF 1,202 53.1
Total 2,263 100.0
followed by reluctance to get involved in the surrounding community.  This study 
attempts to measure the importance of perceptions of society on health outcomes by 
using responses to the following GSS questions: “Do you think most people would try 
to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?” (Fair) 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in life?” (Trust)  “Would you say that most of the time people try to be 
helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” (Helpful) (Davis et 
al. 2005).  Table 12 highlights the frequency distribution for each variable. For each of 
these binary variables, the response group suggesting positive perceptions of society 
was used as the reference level.  For example, the response categories for Fair are 
“Try to be helpful,” “Just look out for themselves,” with the former used as the 
reference level.  Likewise for Trust and Fair, whose response categories were “Would 
take advantage of you;” “would try to be fair,” and “people can be trusted;” “you can't 
be too careful in life” respectively, the former was used as the reference level.  
  
Table 12: Distribution of Fair (People Fair or Try to Take Advantage), Trust (Can 
People be Trusted), and Helpful (People Helpful or Looking Out for Selves) 
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  Kawachi et al. have used the binary indicators Fair, Trust, and Helpful to 
measure social cohesion and its connection to both income inequality and mortality 
among 39 U.S. states.   They found that these variables were useful measures of a 
“belief in the goodwill and benign intent of others [that] facilitates collective action 
and mutual cooperation and therefore adds to the stock of a community’s social 
capital” (Kawachi et al. 1997).  Theoretical literature on social capital suggests that of 
the three indicators of social cohesion found in the GSS, social mistrust and perceived 
lack of fairness are expected to be the strongest predictors of poor health and may give 
insight into how people perceive the world around them.  Similar to the composite 
measures for economic and religious ideology, a scale for social ideology was also 
computed.  The distribution of responses, ranging from 0 (perception of low social 
cohesion) to 3 (perception of high social cohesion) can be see in Figure 4.  Category 3 
was used as the reference category.    
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Figure 4: Distribution of Social Cohesion Summated Scale, All Years 
  
  These perceptions of social cohesion variables may also show the degree to 
which religious conservative and social traditionalist ideologies have been intrinsically 
accepted into respondents’ belief systems.  The religious right has built its political 
standing on fighting the perceived decline in family, community, and traditional 
values.   Indeed, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) itself explicitly states the importance and intrinsic value of the 
nuclear family raising children.  Robert Putnam’s popular best-seller Bowling Alone 
(2000) highlighted the importance of maintaining civil society as the current changes 
in family values and work structure have precipitated a decline in community cohesion 
and civic engagement thereby increasing crime, fragmentation, and anomie.  Thus, a 
relationship between respondents who adhere to free-market ideology or religious 
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conservatism and those who perceive their surrounding environment to be healthy 
would not come as a surprise.  This is because these respondents may believe that their 
adherence to social traditionalist ideals has improved their health, the health of their 
family, and thereby the health of the community.  
  Finally, I intended to analyze civic engagement by including a measure of the 
number of groups and/or associations of which respondents were an active member.   
This variable is typically included in social capital research as a measure of how 
perceptions of society influence personal interaction with the community.  Some 
suggest that it connects respondents’ perceptions of the local environment and how 
this perception affects the degree to which they are willing to get involved.  This 
involvement is often seen as the basis for “civil society,” or the positive civic 
engagement of local residents.  Putnam (1992; 2000) suggests that such local 
involvement is essential to well-functioning communities.  Unfortunately, the data do 
not exist for the years included in the study but future research should include such 
measures if possible.   
 
Ruling Ideology 
  The overlap among religious, social, and economic ideologies is also an 
important nuance that can add insight to understanding how beliefs affect all aspects 
of life including health outcomes.  Despite measurement limitations, I included a 
measure of ruling ideology in the data analysis for theoretical reasons.  In this study, 
ruling ideology is considered as a combination of the contemporary particular 
ideologies: economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism.  
It is expected that there are other components to a ruling ideology that will go 
unmeasured in this study, but that these three components are essential building blocks 
of the current ruling ideology.  Thus, a scale for ruling ideology has been created by  
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summing existing measures of economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and 
social traditionalism.  It is important to note that this measurement method assumes 
that all variables in the scale are perfectly substitutable for each other.  Weighting 
certain particular ideologies was considered in order to mitigate this potential 
limitation, but it was decided that the above review of the literature did not provide 
conclusive evidence that any one particular ideology contributed more to the overall 
ruling ideology than another.  Thus, an unweighted simple summated scale was 
maintained for this study.  Figure 5 highlights that responses range from 0 (complete 
non-adherence to the ruling ideology) to 14 (complete adherence to the ruling 
ideology).  The extremes of the scale were grouped in order to create a three-level 
quantitative variable.  The third category (complete adherence to the ruling ideology) 
was used as the reference group.   
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Ruling Ideology Summated Scale, All Years 
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Material Position 
  Despite the rise in interest in the psychosocial hypothesis in the past decade, 
some researchers still argue that the importance of material position, employment, and 
education trumps the significance all other covariates (Rogot 1992, Lynch et al. 2000, 
Schnittker 2004, Mirowsky and Ross 2003, Smith and Kington 1997).  A focus only 
on perceptions of inequality ignores the fact that humans live in a material world 
where mental thought cannot be artificially separated from physical needs.  
Individuals lacking material assets may not only suffer psychosocial consequences 
such as alienation and low self-worth but may do so without basic material supports 
(Davidson et al. 2005).  Thus, the neo-materialist perspective offers a more holistic 
view of material and social realities and garners support through evidence of high 
correlations between material variables and demographics.   It is essential to include 
variables such as Income, Employment, and Education, but further research must be 
conducted to understand their measurement and interaction with socio-demographic 
controls such as age, race/ethnicity, and gender (Schnittker 2004, McDonough et al. 
1999, Smith and Kington 1997).   
  In this research, the variable Income measures the respondents’ answers to the 
question, “In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall 
last year, before taxes, that is?” (Davis et al. 2005). The responses, adjusted for 
inflation fell within the range “under $1000” to “$75,000+” for 1993-1996 and 
between “under $1000” and “$110,000+” for 2004.  These ranges were divided into 
quartiles with the highest quartile consistently selected as the reference group.  For 
1993-1996, the quartiles cut-offs were as follows: under $1000-$17,499 (Quartile 1), 
$17,500-$29,999 (Quartile 2), $30,000-$49,000 (Quartile 3), and $50,000-$75,000+ 
(Quartile 4).  After adjusting for inflation, the quartiles for 2004 were: less than 
$22,499 (Quartile 1), $22,500-$39,999 (Quartile 2), $40,000-$74,999 (Quartile 3),  
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Frequency Percent
Poorest Quartile 544 24.0
Second Quartile 466 20.6
Third Quartile 621 27.5
Wealthiest Quartile 632 27.9
Total 2,263 100.0
Frequency Percent
Less than 12 Years of  372 16.4
12 Years of  701 31.0
More than 12 Years  1,190 52.6
Total 2,263 100.0
$75,000+ (Quartile 4).  When measured for all years combined, the rate of inflation 
between years prohibited the creation of a scale based on absolute wage cut-offs.  
Thus, the income variable was divided by quartiles to provide information of the 
relative income levels of respondents (See Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Recoded Distribution of Income, All Years 
 
 
  
 
  
 The  variable  Education was also included in the study.  The literature suggests 
there is a significant difference between individuals who complete high school and 
those who do not (Schnittker 2004, Mirowsky and Ross 2003).  Thus, education level 
was grouped into three categories as shown in Table 14: “less than 12 years of 
education,” “12 years of education (high school graduate),” and “more than 12 years 
of education.”  “More than 12 years of education” was used as the reference group 
because it is predicted that respondents with more education will be healthier.  
Sociological literature supports this decision, as education is seen to have many social, 
material, and physical benefits.    
 
Table 14: Recoded Distribution of Education, All Years 
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Frequency Percent
Working (Part or Full) 1,504 66.4
Not Working (Temp or Unemp) 124 5.5
Reason not to work (retired, 
school, keeping house)
599 26.5
Other 36 1.6
Total 2,263 100.0
  Employment status was the most difficult variable to work with out of the 
three material indicators.  There are many reasons why a respondent may not be 
employed full or part-time, which could potentially confound the interpretation of the 
category.  Some reasons are temporary while others begin as short-term and then 
stretch indefinitely.  Indeed, Ehrenreich (2005) documented white-collar workers, 
unemployed for over a year, who perceive themselves as “in transition” or just “job 
searching.”  They do not consider themselves “unemployed” and certainly this 
perception could bias their response to employment questions on the GSS.   To be as 
succinct as possible without obscuring important information, employment status was 
grouped as “working part or full time,” “not working (temporarily or unemployed/laid 
off),” “reason not to work (retired, in school, keeping house),” and “other (not 
specified by GSS),” with “working” used as the reference group (See Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Recoded Distribution of Employment, All Years 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  One limitation of these material variables is the lack of a measure of wealth or 
total assets (Smith and Kington 1997).   A wealth variable would offer a much more 
inclusive and complete way to measure material deprivation at the individual or 
household level.  Research has suggested a link between asset wealth and geography 
as urban dwellers are more likely to be “absolutely” poor.  Rural dwellers are more 
likely than urbanites to have non-liquid assets such as houses and thus gain a higher  
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degree of economic security in day-to-day life.  Yet, in the case of a crisis or sudden 
downturn in economic standing, the rural poor often face significant challenges in 
converting these assets to cash (Weber et al. 2005).   Beyond its implications for 
material well-being, asset wealth can also be seen as an indicator of an individual’s 
sense of security and stability within a community.  
  
Socio-Demographic Controls 
  A number of common socio-demographic controls were included in this study 
in order to test the significance of the included variables based on theoretical 
hypotheses.   Such controls (with the reference group noted by *) include Sex (male, 
female*), Race (white*, black, other), Age (18-39*, 40-59, 60-74, 74+), Homepop 
(number of residents in home: 1,2-4*, 5+), Region (south, all other regions*), 
XNORCSIZ (rural, suburban*, urban) and Marital status (married*, formerly married, 
never married).  The actual questions from the GSS, frequency distributions, and 
recoding of the socio-demographic controls can be found in Appendix A.  Zimmer et 
al. (2000) found that respondents typically compare their own health to that of their 
age-mates, thus ranking their own health higher than would be expected.  To account 
for the curvilinearity expected in self-assessments of health, age was also measured as 
a quadratic (Appels et al 1996).   Typically marriage is seen to have a protective effect 
on health, particularly that of the husband.  McDonough et al.’s (1999) findings 
support this thesis except when the wife has greater earnings than the husband.  These 
results suggest there is a detrimental affect on husband’s health with a perceived lack 
of status because of lower spousal earnings.  This nuance is not included in the model 
tested below because of its complexity, but it is an important caveat to previous 
findings on marriage and health.    
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  I originally created dummy variables for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+ member households, 
predicting that health would worsen with increased household size.  Yet, in bivariate 
analysis, health status was lowest for 1 person households, then 5+ with 2-4 person 
households fairing about equally.  Thus, revision of my measurement was necessary 
and household size has been grouped into three categories following the above 
findings.  Region was dichotomized based on examples of similar health studies 
(Mossey and Shapiro 1982).  Geographic proximity to large towns is often studied as 
metro vs. non-metro.  Yet, in order to measure trends mentioned in the literature about 
the rural poor and urban underclass, I collapsed XNORCSIZ into three categories using 
“suburban areas” as the reference group (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990, Lichter and 
Jensen 2001, Weber et al. 2005, Schiller 2004, Yinger 2002, Wilson 1996).  
Unfortunately, the measure XNORCSIZ was not available for the 2004 data. 
 
Health Behaviors 
  Currently, public policy is geared towards an individualistic approach of the 
health and well-being of Americans.  Programs are created to target individual health 
behaviors that also run counter to normative behavior as delineated by the ruling 
ideology.  Such risky behaviors include smoking, excessive drinking, improper diet, 
lack of exercise, and casual sex.  Conservatives suggest that if these individual deviant 
behaviors could be changed, the health of Americans would greatly improve.  
Certainly, these behaviors affect health on an individual level, but do they remain 
significant across society when ideological, material, social, and demographic controls 
are added to the equation? 
  Measures of smoking and drinking were available for 1993 and 1994 but not 
for 1996 and 2004.  A scale of smoking was created to determine if the respondent 
currently smoked, had ever smoked, or had never smoked.  Likewise, the variable  
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Drink is a composite variable containing three categories: “never drink alcohol,” 
“drink alcohol in moderation,” and “drink alcohol excessively/to get drunk.”  The 
original distribution of these health behavior variables and their reorganization into a 
scale variable can be found in Appendix B. Variables that measured how many 
cigarettes smoked per day and how many drinks consumed per day would have been 
even more useful indicators of the extent to which respondents overindulge in such 
behaviors.  Unfortunately, the GSS does not contain such measures, nor does it record 
information on Body Mass Index, frequency of exercise, or dietary patterns.  In 
addition to the limited variables available, the infrequency of use of the subset of 
questions on health behaviors, the relatively small population to which it was 
administered, and its incomplete set of measurements pose additional limitations.  
Thus, findings on these variables should be regarded as indicators of trends and not as 
a basis for policy recommendations.    
 
THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE 
  Since the dependent variable “self-reported health” has four non-continuous 
categories that are ordered, ordinary linear regression is not appropriate for this model.  
In particular, the assumption that the residual errors are normally distributed is 
erroneous if the variable is categorical. As mentioned previously, ordinal regression 
was originally identified as having the potential to give the clearest understanding of 
the differences between dependent variable categories but was unusable due to the 
small response size for one category.  Thus, the dependent variable Health was 
dichotomized into two groups, “poor health” and “good health” (See Figure 1, Table 
2) and a two-step logistic regression procedure was used to test several regression 
models in order to determine which variables were significant in predicting poor 
health.    
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  Logistic regression measures the natural log of the odds that the dependent 
variable is equal to one.  This can also be expressed as the natural log of the ratio of 
the probability that the dependent variable equals one divided by the probability it 
equals zero.  Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate parameters for the 
model.  This technique measures all possible sets of values for the parameters and 
chooses the one that maximizes the likelihood of the model fitting the data.  To 
compare the fit of two different models, a ratio must be formed.  Instead of employing 
an F-test, a ratio of the mean square due to regression and the mean square due to 
residuals that is used in linear regression, a chi-square test can be used to compare the 
two likelihoods (Dielman 2005:383-388).  
  The first step of this analysis used binary logistic regression to evaluate the 
direction of the coefficients and the strength of the odds ratios.  This step helped to 
determine the strongest variable to represent each particular ideology in the second 
step.  This study did not suppose that all variables included for each measure of a 
particular ideology would be equally useful or significant.  In part, this study seeks to 
identify the variables that were the strongest indicators of each particular ideology.   
The coefficients (contained in Appendix C) should be interpreted as the relative 
magnitude and direction of the relationship between levels of dummy variables.  A 
positive coefficient and significant Wald test suggests that the level present has higher 
log odds of the outcome variable than the reference level (Morgan and Teachman 
1988).   
  The odds ratio is also calculated by the SPSS statistical software program.  
This measure uses two values of X that are exactly one unit apart and takes the ratio of 
the odds.  This study primarily uses dummy variables to measure different levels of 
categorical variables.  When using dummy coding, a log odds ratio can be generated 
through the ratio of the difference between membership in the “present” category and  
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membership in the “reference” category.  The odds ratio suggests the likelihood of an 
event occurring, in this case the likelihood of being in the “present’ category versus 
the “reference” category, net of other variables in the model.  Odds ratio values greater 
than 1.0 indicate an increased likelihood in the event occurring (DeMaris 1995). 
  Since the majority of variables in this study were defined categorically, a 
significant chi-square statistic suggests that at least one of the betas in the model is 
non-zero but says nothing about the significance of categories of any particular 
variable.  Variables were entered both individually and as blocks to better understand 
each one’s strength in predictive power via analysis of the chi-square statistic.   
  The second step used the chi-square test and the decrease in -2log likelihood 
statistic to indicate improvement in fit to the data from the basic model to the additive 
model.  Demographic controls (including Age, Sex, Marital Status, Race, Region, and 
Household Size) were used as a base model against which material (Income, 
Employment, and Education) and ideological indicators were measured.   This method 
allows for the evaluation of the strength of ideology above and beyond material and 
demographic effects.  This method forms a rigorous test because for ideological 
indicators to be significant they must override the undeniable strength of material and 
demographic controls as documented by Rogot (1992), Lynch et al. (2000), Mirowsky 
and Ross (2003), Schnittker (2004), and Smith and Kington (1997).  A constant 
number of cases were maintained for all models run in the same year.  This allowed 
for comparison of the reduction in -2 log likelihood between models in the same year 
while also evaluating the concurrent loss in degrees of freedom (Brooks and Manza 
2004).   
  A key reason for using this best-fit technique is that it provides comparisons 
across years as well as within years.  In order to do so, the same variables were 
included in the demographic, material, and ideological models across all years.  This  
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led to the exclusion of several variables mentioned earlier.  For example, the measure 
of rural-urban residence was not available for 2004 and so was excluded from the fit 
statistic analysis.  However, it was included in the initial binary logistic regression 
analysis and was not found to be a significant predictor of self-reported health.  
Likewise, this thesis intended to test the epidemiological argument that health 
behaviors are the key element in determining health outcomes, by including a model 
containing smoking and drinking prevalence.  Unfortunately, these health behavior 
measures were not obtained by the GSS in all years, limiting this analysis to only 1993 
and 1994.   Yet, this reason alone did not justify that these variables should be 
excluded from the fit statistic analysis suggested by Brooks and Manza (2004).  
Because these variables had so few cases (n=173, 1994) including them in the second 
fit statistics test would have reduced the n and degrees of freedom so much as to 
compromise the integrity of the model.  Moreover, when the preliminary binary 
logistic regression was run, health behaviors were consistently highly insignificant for 
1993 and 1994.  Not only did this finding fail to support the common epidemiological 
hypothesis that health behaviors serve as a mechanism of transmission between socio-
economic status and health and consequently, as key predictors of health outcomes but 
also it provided further impetuous for removing health behaviors from the fit statistic 
test.   Health behaviors were excluded from the fit statistics test with reasonable 
certainty that they were not significant predictors of self-reported health, and the fit 
statistics model was run with a common denominator N from all other variables. 
   Overall, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of ideology on 
health.  Along the way, other research has suggested key intervening variables that 
may also influence health and hide the impact of ideology.  These variables have been 
included in the model in order to produce the most complete understanding of the 
determinants health that is possible.  Yet, propositions on material indicators or health  
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behaviors have not been postulated because the literature review has already suggested 
the influence and direction these intervening variables will have on health outcomes.  
Since the crux of this study rests on how ideology and not material wealth or health 
behaviors affect self-reported health, the following chapters will primarily focus on 
the relationship between ideology and self-reported health. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS 
 
  This chapter will review the essential findings from the data analysis 
conducted using the variables delineated in the previous chapter.  First, some 
descriptive statistics about self-reported health and various indicators will be explored.  
These relationships give us a better understanding of the direction and strength of the 
relationship but do not provide causal indications.  After reviewing the key 
propositions of this study, the second section of this chapter discusses the results of 
the binary logistic regression analysis for each year independently and for all years 
combined.   
 
BIVARIATE ANAYSIS 
  The descriptive statistics of most variables in this study reveal a gradient in 
health status.  Perhaps the most pronounced of these gradients is seen in a cross-
tabulation of income and health.  When all the years studied are aggregated, 
approximately 90% of those in the top income quartile report having good health 
while only 62% of those in the poorest quartile report good health.  Table 16 reveals 
that the likelihood of reporting poor health gets smaller with each increase in income 
quartile thereby following the expected gradient.  The highly significant chi-square 
statistic suggests that the differences between quartiles are statistically significant.  
This cross-tab suggests that the poorest Americans have worse health than even the 
next poorest group above them, a finding which is consistent with health and 
inequality trends reported by Marmot (2004), Kawachi (1997), and Wilkinson (2005, 
2006).   
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Income Good Health Poor Health
Poorest Quartile 61.70% 38.30%
Second Quartile 76.40% 23.60%
Third Quartile 84.30% 15.70%
Richest Quartile 89.90% 10.10%
Chi-Sq 156.362***
Educ Good Health Poor Health
Less than 12 54.40% 45.60%
12 76.20% 23.80%
More than 12 87.70% 12.30%
Chi-Sq 193.866***
Table 16: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Income, All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
  The measure of educational attainment shows a similar trend across all years 
studied with 88% of those with more than 12 years of education reporting good health 
while only 54% of those with less than 12 years of education do so.   Table 17 
highlights the highly significant chi-square statistic, which suggests that the 
differences between levels of educational attainment are very important indicators of 
health.  The bivariate relationship between health and education suggests that 
education affects more than an accumulation of school-specific knowledge.  Education 
also represents the institutionalization of social networks and normative worldviews 
and health behaviors.   
 
Table 17: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Education All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
  Finally, significant emphasis was given to the challenges of understanding 
comparison groups in the independent variable discussion.  This is particularly 
important when evaluating the relative deprivation hypothesis in relation to age.  The 
bivarate analysis shows that, as expected, as respondents age their self-reported health  
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Age Good Health Poor Health
18-39 83.80% 16.20%
40-59 79.50% 20.50%
60-74 68.00% 32.00%
75+ 58.50% 41.50%
Chi-Sq 67.797***
status declines.  Over all years analyzed, 41.5% of respondents in the oldest age group 
(75+) report poor health compared with 16% of those in the youngest age cohort (18-
39) (See Table 18).  A larger difference in self-reported poor health was expected, 
which may provide evidence that a relative deprivation bias exists.   
 
Table 18: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Age, All Years 
 
 
 
 
  
Ideological Variables 
  The ideological variables Eqwlth and Helpnot are positively associated with a 
higher probability of poor health.  Over all the years combined, 28.4% of respondents 
believing that the government should redistribute wealth have poor health while only 
14.8% of respondents with economic libertarian beliefs report poor health.  Table 19 
suggests that a similar trend exists for respondents who believe the government should 
help the poor versus people who believe individuals and private businesses should 
take care of that responsibility.  The chi-square statistics are highly significant for both 
economic ideological variables providing further impetus to include them in the binary 
logistic regression analysis. 
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Eqwlth Good Health Poor Health
Should 71.60% 28.40%
Neutral 79.50% 20.50%
Shouldn't 85.20% 14.80%
Chi-Sq 32.065***
Helpnot
Should 72.50% 27.50%
Neutral 78.60% 21.40%
Shouldn't 83.50% 16.50%
Chi-Sq 25.342***
Table 19: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Eqwlth, Helpnot, All Years 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 6 highlights the cross-tab of Health and the Economic Composite scale.  
As mentioned previously, this measure is a simple summated scale of the economic 
indicators Eqwlth and Helpnot.  According to the statistics revealed in the cross-tab, 
33% of respondents who consistently reported that the government should be involved 
in social issues had poor health while only 15% of respondents who consistently 
reported that the government should not be involved in such affairs self-reported poor 
health.   There is a clear gradient since the differences between categories are highly 
significant with a chi-square statistic of 44.219.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Economic Composite, All Years  
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Attend Good Health Poor Health
Never 77.10% 22.90%
Infrequently 78.90% 21.10%
Regular 80.70% 19.30%
Chi-Sq 2.84
Fund
Moderate 80.70% 19.30%
Liberal 80.20% 19.80%
Fundamentalist 75.00% 25.00%
Chi-Sq 9.075**
Reliten
Not Religious 82.90% 17.10%
Not Strongly Religious 77.50% 22.50%
Strong 79.10% 20.90%
Chi-Sq 3.781
  The relationship between religiosity and health is significantly weaker since 
only the measure of fundamentalism of the respondents’ religion maintains a 
significant chi-square across all years of the study.  Despite the lack of significance, 
evidence of a gradient or general trend in favor of my propositions is still present.  The 
indicator of religious attendance shows the expected pattern since only 19% of regular 
attendees report poor health compared to 23% of respondents who never attend.   This 
trend generally remains for the measure of strength of religious beliefs since 21% of 
religious respondents report poor health while 22.5% of respondents who are not 
strongly religious report poor health.  However, Table 20 suggests that the predicted 
trend does not hold for all levels of the variable because respondents who are not 
religious are also the least likely to report poor health.  Only 17% of non-religious 
people reported poor health and a much higher percentage were predicted by the 
propositions of this thesis. 
 
Table 20: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Attend, Fund, Reliten, All Years 
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  Cross-tabulations were also conducted for the religious composite variable and 
self-reported health.   The religious composite variable is a simple summated scale of 
the three individual religious variables and may give an indication of the overall 
consistency of reported religiosity.  However, there was no clear gradient, and the chi-
square statistic was not significant when measured across all years of observation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Religious Composite, All Years 
  
  The third particular ideological belief measured in this study is the perception 
of social cohesion.  As predicted, Table 21 shows that a negative community 
perception was clearly related to perceived poor health.  For all years, 25% of 
respondents who indicated they did not trust people in general reported poor health, 
compared to 15% of those who reported they felt they could trust people.  Likewise, 
26% of respondents who felt most people would try to take advantage of them if they 
could, reported poor health, while 18% of those who felt most people would be fair 
reported poor health.  Although the chi-square statistic for Trust and Fair was highly  
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Helpful Good Health Poor Health
Not Helpful 77.1% 22.9%
Helpful 80.4% 19.6%
Chi-Sq 3.669
Trust
Not Trusted 74.7% 25.3%
Trusted 84.7% 15.3%
Chi-Sq 32.309***
Fair
Not Fair 74.20% 25.80%
Fair 82.20% 17.80%
Chi-Sq 21.426***
significant, the chi-square statistic for Helpful never reached significance when all the 
years of the study were aggregated.  These findings provide initial evidence for the 
proposition that perceptions of the surrounding environment matter because people 
with negative community perceptions report poorer health.  In addition, the variables 
Trust and Fair, as indicators of social cohesion, are more closely associated with a 
higher probability of poor health than is the variable Helpful, as was predicted in the 
literature review. 
  
Table 21: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Helpful, Trust, Fair, All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Cross-tabulations were also conducted for the social cohesion composite 
variable.  This variable is a simple summated scale of the variables Helpful, Trust, and 
Fair and may provide a better understanding of the consistency of social ideological 
responses.  A highly significant (Chi-square = 28.849) gradient is present in the 
composite scale.  According to Figure 8, people who have negative perceptions of 
society are more likely to report poor health than respondents who have a positive 
perception of society.   
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Figure 8:  Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Social Composite, All Years 
  
  The final summated scale was created to compose a test measure of ruling 
ideology.   Respondents who consistently reported answers that did not correspond 
with the particular dominant ideologies explained in Chapter 2 were collapsed into the 
category “None.”   Figure 9 clearly shows a health gradient for ruling ideology since 
respondents who consistently fail to espouse the dominant particular ideologies in 
their responses are more likely to report poor health than their more consistently 
ideological counterparts.  Over all years, 27% of respondents who reported no 
affiliation with the dominant particular ideologies claimed poor health while 16% of 
respondents consistently responding affirmatively to the particular dominant 
ideologies reported poor health.    The high significance of the chi-square (18.497) 
indicates that this variable may be an important predictor of poor health and should be 
included in the logistic regression model. 
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Figure 9:  Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Ruling Ideology, All Years 
 
Health Behaviors 
  The link between health behaviors and health outcomes seems irrefutable.  
Certainly, engaging a behavior that has proven detrimental effects on humans should 
negatively affect that person’s health.  However, the bivariate trends for two 
commonly used health behaviors, drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes, show 
moderate to no significance for 1993 and 1994.  Moreover, smoking was expected to 
be the more significant of the two variables; however, it is not significant in either 
year.  The general pattern of smoking is to be expected as those who smoke report the 
highest percent of poor health (29%), followed by those who used to smoke (25%), 
and then lastly by those who never smoked (19%) (See Table 22, 1993).  
  The patterns for alcohol consumption are more surprising and suggest opposite 
trends from what was predicted based on the values espoused by the rhetoric of the 
dominant religious ideology.  For both years studied, respondents who never drink 
alcohol are much more likely to report poor health than those who abstain completely  
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Drink Good Health Poor Health Good Health Poor Health
Never Drink 67.0% 33.0% 65.4% 34.6%
Drink 80.5% 19.5% 82.4% 17.6%
Have Been Drunk 83.0% 17.0% 83.0% 17.0%
Chi-Sq 9.241** 6.213*
Smoke
Never Smoked 81.2% 18.8% 78.2% 21.8%
Smoked 71.1% 28.9% 75.4% 24.6%
Did/Ever Smoke 75.0% 25.0% 78.9% 21.1%
Chi-Sq 3.806 0.206
1993 1994
or even those who report being drunk.  In addition, people who never drink were much 
more likely to report poor health than even those who smoke(d).  Two-tailed Pearson 
correlations were run to detect collinearity.  Collinearity was found between drinking 
and age and drinking and employment status. 
 
Table 22: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Health Behaviors, 1993, 1994 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Surprising Results 
  Some of the bivariate and cross-tabulation results were surprising.  For 
example, research has suggested a protective effect on health through marriage 
(McDonough 1999, Hirschl et al. 2003), yet descriptive statistics suggest that those in 
the “Never Married” category have the best health, followed by those in the “Married” 
category, and then the “Formerly Married” category.  These results are highly 
significant, as evidenced by the chi-square statistic in Table 23.  Correlation between 
marital status and age was found to be small and insignificant for this model.  An 
interaction term was also formed and found to be insignificant in this model.   
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Emp Good Health Poor Health
Working 85.80% 14.20%
Not Working 70.90% 29.10%
Reason Not to Work 65.60% 34.40%
Other 27.00% 73.00%
Chi-Sq 171.537***
Married Good Health Poor Health
Married 80.70% 19.30%
Formerly Married 72.20% 27.80%
Never Married 82.40% 17.60%
Chi-Sq 22.754***
Table 23: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Married, All Years 
 
 
 
 
  Second, the measure of employment follows the predicted trend that those who 
are working full-time report poor health less than their part-time counterparts.  
Likewise, these two groups have significantly lower rates of poor health than any 
other category.  Yet, what is surprising about this variable is that 62.5% of 
respondents in the “other” category, undefined by the GSS, report poor health across 
all years (See Table 24).  In 1993, 83% of respondents in this undefined category 
reported poor health.  The GSS follows up on this category by asking whether the 
respondent has ever held a job for more than one year and the majority of respondents 
have. Clearly, this category needs further explanation and exploration to better 
understand why so many respondents in the “other” category perceive themselves to 
have poor health.  
 
Table 24: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Employment, All Years 
 
 
 
 
  
  A third surprising result of the bivariate analyses is that there is no statistically 
significant difference between males and females for poor health.  From the literature, 
females would be expected to have better health since they tend to live longer.  In  
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Sex Good Health Poor Health
Male 77.90% 22.10%
Female 79.30% 20.70%
Chi-Sq 0.641
Race Good Health Poor Health
White 80.2% 19.8%
Black 71.2% 28.8%
Other 70.1% 29.9%
Chi-Sq 15.759***
addition, there is no significant difference reported between races, as evidenced in 
Table 26.  This is a surprising result considering the amount of research documenting 
the relationship between race and poor health, often via mediating factors such as 
income or access to health care.   
 
Table 25: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Sex, All Years 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Cross-tab of Self-Reported Health and Race, All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
Test for Collinearity 
  Before the logistic regression was run, correlations between all variables were 
computed.  As expected, collinearity was present between the composite variables and 
the respective variables used in their creation.  For example, the scale measuring the 
degree of economic libertarian ideology was collinear with both economic ideology 
variables, suggesting the role the government should play in solving problems and 
equalizing wealth in America.  Because of these significant correlations, the composite 
variables will not be included in the initial logistic regression analyses but will be 
tested on their own model afterwards.  In addition, although there was no collinear 
relationship found between the scale for Ruling Ideology and the variables that  
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composed it, a high correlation between this composite variable and the economic 
ideology variables suggests that it may be wise to exclude it from the overall analysis 
and place it in the secondary analysis of only the composite variable.  Finally, the only 
variables that were collinear out of all potentially included variables were the religious 
ideology variables Attend and Reliten.  Thus, only one will be analyzed in the final 
model.  Initially it was surprising to find no collinearity between education, 
employment, and income because of the suggested overlap of these three variables in 
the literature.  Yet, in a large enough data set, these indicators are measuring distinct 
material processes, and collinearity is not necessarily present.   In analyzing 
correlation matrices, pair-wise relationships between all indicator variables were 
evaluated but more complex relationships were not.  One limitation to this method of 
determining correlations is the possibility that three-way collinear relationships may 
be present but undetected.  In the future, statistical techniques should be developed 
and employed that will measure complex relationships that may be present in the data 
(Dielman 2005:162). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
  The two-step logistic regression procedure delineated in Chapter 4 was used 
for this analysis.  A unique set of respondents is measured in each year analyzed 
because the GSS is not a longitudinal data set.  Thus, a binary logistic regression was 
first run separately for each year in order to highlight key relationships between health 
and independent predictors.  Through this regression sequence, consistency and 
strength of individual variables could be determined, and statistics such as odds ratios 
and significant differences between variable levels were created (See Appendix C).  
After general trends within each year and across the four years were noted, logistic  
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regression was run on data from all four years in order to gain a broad picture of the 
decade stretching from the mid 1990s to 2004.   
  Next, a technique used by Brooks and Manza (2004) for evaluating the fit of 
the logistic regression models was employed to determine the best fit for this study.   
In this method, demographic controls were used as a base against which other 
variables and sets of variables were measured.  First, material indicators were added to 
the model and the fit was evaluated against the base model.  Subsequently, different 
combinations of ideological variables were entered and their improvement of fit was 
measured against the model containing demographic and material indicators.  This 
design provides a very stringent test for ideological variables since they must improve 
the fit of the model above and beyond the documented power of material indicators.   
  This chapter will briefly highlight significant indicators for each model.  Then 
the propositions presented in chapter two will be used to outline key findings using the 
fit statistic analysis highlighted in Brooks and Manza’s 2004 article.  As a quick 
review, the key propositions are: 
 
Proposition 1: Respondents who believe in an economic system other than economic 
libertarianism will have poorer self-reported health than those who believe in a neo-
liberal, free-market system. 
 
Proposition 2: Respondents who do not espouse religious conservative beliefs and/or 
accompanying normative behaviors will have poorer self-reported health than those 
who do. 
 
Proposition 3: Respondents who do not have a positive perception of community 
cohesion will have poorer self-reported health than those who do.    
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Proposition 4:  Respondents whose responses do not reflect the ruling ideology 
measured as a composite of economic libertarianism, religious conservatism, and 
social traditionalism, will have poorer self-reported health than those who do. 
 
1993 Results 
  Binary logistic regression analysis revealed some overwhelmingly powerful 
variables such as Income.  In 1993, those in the lowest income quartile were over 
seven times more likely to report poor health than those in the highest quartile, while 
those with incomes in the second lowest income quartile were four times more likely 
to be ill than the wealthiest group.  These preliminary findings persisted when Income 
and other material variables were included in the fit statistic analysis. 
  Table 27 reveals the results of Brooks and Manza’s (2004) test for best fit 
within the 1993 sample.  Demographic controls were used as a base model against 
which material indicators were measured.  Material indicators reduced the -2 log-
likelihood statistic significantly while only losing eight degrees of freedom.  For 1993, 
the ideological variables taken together do not show an improvement over the material 
model because the chi-square statistic is insignificant.  Models 4, 5, and 6 look at each 
particular ideological influence separately in order to better understand its relative 
strength.  For the 1993 sample, it appears that all three sets of ideological measures 
have about equal predictive power, although the social trust variables are slightly 
stronger than the other two sets.  Despite the relative strength of the social trust 
variables, none of the three sets of ideological indicators maintained their significance 
at the .05 level.  Models 7, 8, and 9 measured specific indicators based on their 
continued significance when running an iterative logistic regression model to weed out 
insignificant indicators.  Frequency of religious service attendance, the measure of  
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Models for 1993 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 358.959 355
DemC + Material 327.016 347 31.943 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ideology 313.991 334 13.025 13 No
DemC + Mat + Econ 323.221 343 3.795 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig 321.748 341 5.268 6 No
DemC + Mat + Soc 322.452 344 4.564 3 No
DemC + Mat + Eqwlth 323.431 345 3.585 2 No
DemC + Mat + Attend 323.376 345 3.64 2 No
DemC + Mat + Trust 323.371 346 3.645 1 0.10
social trust, and the degree to which people believed the government should be 
involved in equalizing the wealth distribution, were chosen; however none 
significantly reduced the -2 log-likelihood in Table 27.  Since the cut-off for this 
research is .05, none of the particular ideological propositions were supported using 
the 1993 data, but one could infer that the near significance of at least one of the 
indicators warrants these propositions more attention in future research on ideology.   
 
Table 27: Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logistic Regression Models, 1993 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region. 
 
  After evaluating the fit statistics for the logistic regression models, a final set 
of regression models consisting of composite variables were evaluated.  This set of 
regressions tested variables for the consistency of the responses via a scale of 
ideological variables.  Thus, four scales were tested: economic libertarian, religious 
conservative, social traditionalist, and an overall measure of ruling ideology.  None of 
these composite scales offered a significant improvement over the model including 
demographic controls and material indicators (See Appendix D).  However, Ruling 
Ideology was significant at the .01 level suggesting that those with a neutral view of 
economic libertarianism were three times more likely to report good health than  
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respondents with strongly libertarian beliefs.  This result lends support to the fourth 
proposition.  These scales were constructed with the hope of providing an indication 
of the affect of particular and ruling ideologies; however, measurement error and 
invalidity was suspected from the outset. 
 
1994 Results 
  The subsets of questions used in this analysis were asked of significantly more 
respondents in 1994 (N = 506) than in 1993 (N = 367).  Again, in contrast to the 1993 
data where Income was highly significant and Employment moderately significant, the 
1994 sample suggests the reverse.  Respondents in the lowest income quartile were 2.3 
times more likely to report poor health than those in the highest quartile.  This was a 
significant reduction in probability from the 1993 sample where those in the lowest 
quartile were over six times more likely to report poor health.  For the 1994 sample, 
significant differences were acknowledged between each level of Employment and the 
reference group “Working part or full time.”  Of particular importance was the odds 
ratio of the “other” group, which suggested that respondents in this category were 4.5 
times more likely to be ill than those who were employed.  The final material variable, 
Education, played a more significant role in the 1994 sample than in the 1993 sample.  
In 1994, respondents who had not graduated from high-school were twice as likely to 
report poor health then those working on an advanced (college) degree.  Perhaps, as 
Schnittker (2004) suggested, the role of education was overshadowed by the relative 
strength of income in 1993.    
  In order to determine which model has the greatest reduction in -2 log-
likelihood while losing the least degrees of freedom, logistic regression results were 
placed into a best fit statistic table.  Table 28 reveals that adding material indicators to 
the demographic control model again significantly reduced the -2 log-likelihood  
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Models for 1994 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 664.131 494
DemC + Material 595.195 486 68.936 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ideology 571.5 473 23.695 13 0.05
DemC + Mat + Econ 589.837 482 5.358 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig 580.084 480 15.111 6 0.05
DemC + Mat + Soc 590.986 483 4.209 3 No
DemC + Mat + Eqwlth 590.197 484 4.998 2 0.10
DemC + Mat + Attend 589.034 484 6.161 2 0.05
DemC + Mat + Trust 591.867 485 3.328 1 0.10
statistic while only using eight extra degrees of freedom.  In contrast to the results 
from 1993 (Table 27), adding all the ideological variables improved the model 
through a significant reduction in -2 log-likelihood.   
  The model testing religious ideology shows a significant reduction in -2 log-
likelihood, while only using two additional degrees of freedom.  Furthermore, the 
individual indicator of particular religious ideology, Attend, was significant at the .05 
level.  These findings lend general evidence towards the support of Proposition 2 and 
highlight the importance of religious attendance for measuring religious ideology.   No 
other particular ideological group showed a significant improvement over the material 
and demographic model.  However, when the strongest ideological variables for each 
group were identified via step one binary logistic regression (See Appendix C), the 
measure of economic and social ideology were significant at the .10 level.  Thus, all 
ideological variables showed an improvement over the fit of just the demographic 
control and material indicators model; however, only one variable was significant at 
the .05 level 
 
Table 28: Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logistic Regression Models, 1994 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region. 
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  Composite scales were used to analyze the consistency of respondents’ 
choices.  None of the composite measures were significant at the .05 level (See 
Appendix D).  However, the religious composite scale was nearly significant at p=.10, 
and respondents who were weakly religious were over 2.5 times more likely to report 
poor health.  Although a general gradient towards more religiosity and better health 
could be seen in the odds ratios, the first category of “not religious” did not follow this 
trend. Although not significant, those who were not religious were less likely to report 
poor health.  This surprising statistic may be a result of an extreme view of one’s self 
and the world.  Despite the moderate support for Proposition 2, evidence to support 
Proposition 4 on ruling ideology was lacking.  The summated scale for Ruling 
Ideology was not significant, even at the .10 level of significance.   
    
1996 Results 
   In 1996, the GSS collected data on the specific subsets of variables in this 
analysis for more individuals than any other year studied.  The 1996 sample contained 
almost three times as many responses (N=927) as did the 1993 or 2004 sample and 
almost twice as many as the 1994 sample.  Again, the material variables were 
extremely strong, reducing the -2 log-likelihood 126.008 points from that of the base 
demographic control model.  In particular, a strong gradient in education was present 
since those with the least education were four times more likely to report poor health 
than those with the most education.   
  Table 29 reveals that adding in all the ideological variables simultaneously 
reduced the -2 log-likelihood further but at a greater loss in degrees of freedom.  Thus, 
the ideological model was not a significant improvement over the demographic 
controls and material indicators model.  Moreover, none of the particular ideologies 
were significant at the .05 level when all potential indicator variables were included as  
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Models for 1996 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 906.278 915
DemC + Material 780.27 907 126.008 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ideology 766.903 894 13.367 13 No
DemC + Mat + Econ 773.312 903 6.958 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig 776.413 901 3.857 6 No
DemC + Mat + Soc 776.26 904 4.01 3 No
DemC + Mat + Helpnot 773.396 905 6.874 2 0.05
DemC + Mat + Fund 778.966 905 1.304 2 No
DemC + Mat + Fair 776.325 906 3.945 1 0.05
a measure.  This is similar to the findings from 1993 where none of the particular 
ideology models consisting of multiple indicator variables were significant. However, 
when single indicators were entered into the model, support can be found for two of 
the three propositions of this study.  Surprisingly, these variables and the particular 
ideology they supported were quite different from the 1994 sample.  Table 29 
highlights the significance of the economic libertarian measure Helpnot and the social 
cohesion measure Fair.  These indicators significantly reduced the -2 log-likelihood 
from the model containing demographic controls and material variables without 
sacrificing too many degrees of freedom.  
  Using binary logistic regression, the odds ratios for these significant variables 
were determined.  The greatest difference in levels was seen in Helpnot, where 
respondents who believed that the government should help the poor were almost twice 
as likely to have reported poor health then respondents that thought the government 
should not be as involved in social problems.  The odds ratio was less dramatic for 
Fair since respondents who thought that one couldn’t be too careful when dealing 
with other people were slightly more likely to report poor health (odds ratio = 1.4). 
 
Table 29:  Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logistic Regression Models, 1996 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region.  
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  Furthermore, composite scales representing each particular ideology were 
compared to the base demographic control model.  Similar to the results of the 1994 
sample, none of the models containing composite scales showed a significant 
improvement over the model containing only the demographic controls and material 
variables (See Appendix D).  Similar to the 1994 results, only the religious composite 
scale reached near significance at p=.10.  Again, proposition four was not supported 
by the data since Ruling Ideology never gained significance in the model.   
 
2004 Results 
  The findings for 2004 highlight the consistent strength of the material 
indicators.  For example, Education, highly significant at p=.001, showed a strong 
health gradient.  Respondents with less than 12 years of education were over eight 
times more likely to be ill while those with 12 years of education were nearly three 
times more likely to report poor health than respondents with more than 12 years.  
These differences were highly significant at the .001 and .05 level (See Appendix C).  
  According to Table 30, the model containing the overall measure of ideology 
was not a significant improvement over the model containing the demographic 
controls and material indicators.  Similarly, none of the particular ideological variables 
significantly reduced the -2 log-likelihood at the .05 level, although the measure of 
social ideology was significant at the .10 level.  When these particular ideologies were 
deconstructed via logistic regression to reveal the strongest variable three more 
variables were added to the fit statistic table.  Only the measure of economic 
libertarianism Helpnot yielded a significant improvement over the demographic 
controls and material indicators model.   These results suggest that the ideological 
measure of whether the government or private individuals and businesses should help 
with the country’s problems is an important predictor of health.   Those who support  
118 
Models for 2004 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 253.798 278
DemC + Material 193.074 270 60.724 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ideology 177.107 257 15.967 13 No
DemC + Mat + Econ 190.752 266 2.322 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig 186.282 264 6.792 6 No
DemC + Mat + Soc 186.113 267 6.961 3 0.10
DemC + Mat + Helpnot 186.329 268 6.745 2 0.05
DemC + Mat + Attend 189.472 268 3.602 2 No
DemC + Mat + Trust 192.126 269 0.948 1 No
government involvement in America’s social problems were almost five times more 
likely to be ill than those whose responses were consistent with the economic 
libertarian ideology.  In addition to the significant difference between interventionists 
and anti-interventionists, a significant (p=.009) difference between neutral respondents 
and anti-interventionists is also evident (See Appendix C).    
 
 
Table 30: Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logistic Regression Models, 2004 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region. 
  Using the composite measures to reevaluate the four propositions presented in 
Chapter Two, moderate support can be found for Propositions 1 and 2.   The 
composite scales of economic libertarianism and social conservatism were significant 
at the .10 level (See Appendix D).  In 2004, respondents with neutral responses, as 
opposed to responses suggesting the government was too involved in economic 
affairs, were over four times more likely to report poor health.  Also, similar to the 
composite results of 1994 and 1996, low religiosity was significantly related to poor 
health (odds ratio = 9.9), but the lowest religiosity category was not significantly 
related.  Although the significance cutoff for this study is .05, this near significance 
suggests that theses variables should be analyzed further.  Finally, Proposition 4 was 
not supported since Ruling Ideology was not significant at the .05 level of  
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significance.   Despite the differences in the significance of particular variables 
across the years 1993 through 2004, general trends can be identified.  In particular, 
moderate support for two of the three propositions can be found in most years. The 
reduction in -2 log-likelihood for the specific variables measuring economic 
libertarianism and social perceptions was the most consistent. These variables have a 
significant association with health outcomes despite the power and robustness of the 
material factors.  The final chapter will discuss the importance of these general trends, 
their implications, and suggested directions for future health research. 
 
Cumulative Regression Results 
  After noting the particular trends for each year individually, all years were 
combined into a cumulative (1993-2004) dataset representing 2279 respondents.  
Because income had been adjusted for inflation between the 1996 sample and the 2004 
sample, no single measure of income across all years existed.  Instead of reverting to 
the adjusted income for 2004 to 1996 dollars and then recalculating quartiles for the 
newly combined income scale, the income quartiles for both variables were combined.  
Thus, although a response of number 1 in 1993-1996 does not have the same quartile 
cut-off as in 2004, the relative comparison of income groups is maintained.  For the 
combined model, there are no absolute income cut-off points, and income can only be 
seen as a relative measure of income.  Thus, respondents answering 1 in either the 
1993 or 2004 data have less income than respondents answering 2, 3, or 4.  As this 
study is measuring relative and not absolute deprivation, this combination of income 
quartiles without recalculating the data makes sense.  
  Not surprisingly, the material factors offered the strongest predictive power of 
poor health in the fit statistic model.  This finding is congruent with the socio-
economic literature that suggests SES is a fundamental cause of poor health (Phelan  
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and Link 2004).  Binary logistic regression revealed that the poorest respondents are 
2.5 times more likely to report poor health than the wealthiest respondents. 
Employment was also highly significant overall (p value of Wald Statistic = .000) and 
for the categories “reason not to work vs. working” and “other” vs. “working.”  The 
odds ratio for these levels of employment elucidates the importance of this variable 
since those who listed “other” are nearly ten times more likely to report poor health 
than respondents who are working, while those with a “reason not to work” are 2.1 
times more likely to have poor health.  Surprisingly, those who are not working have 
the lowest odds ratio of the three categories and are 1.9 times more likely to be in poor 
health than employed respondents.  Education was the final material variable analyzed 
and was highly significant over all and for all levels.  As predicted by the literature, a 
strong gradient is visible (Schnittker 2004, Mirowsky and Ross 2003).  Those with 
less than a high-school degree are three times more likely to be ill than those with at 
least twelve years of school.  Similarly, those with a high-school degree are almost 
twice as likely to be in poor health then those with more than twelve years of 
education.  
  The second step of creating a best fit table to analyze the reduction in -2 log-
likelihood yielded some surprising results for the ideological indicators.  As expected, 
the reduction in -2 log-likelihood was highly significant with the addition of the 
material indicators.  Furthermore, there was a large decrease in -2 log-likelihood when 
the ideological variables were added to the material indicators and the base model of 
demographic controls (See Table 31).  When comparing models 4, 5, and 6 it is clear 
that the social indicators, taken together, hold substantial predictive power.  The social 
variables reduce the -2 log-likelihood the most and the chi-square is highly significant.  
The religious variables are also important indicators of self-reported health; however, 
the ideology variables only reach near-significance at the .10 level.   
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  The significance of the social and religious indicators remains when the 
analysis is taken to the level of individual variables.  The social cohesion indicators, 
Fair and Trust, are highly significant at the .005 level.  The results lend support to 
Kawachi et al.’s (1997) earlier findings that perceptions of society ultimately affect 
health outcomes.  Averaging cumulative data from 1986 through 1990, they found that 
social mistrust (accounting for 58% of the variance in total mortality) is associated 
with all-cause mortality and specific illnesses such as heart-disease and malignant 
cancers (Kawachi et al. 1992:1494).   Similarly, this study found that people who lack 
trust in those around them and think that generally others would try to take advantage 
of them are more likely to be ill than those who had positive perceptions of the 
surrounding society.  These findings lend support to my third proposition that an 
individual’s positive perceptions of society have a direct relationship with his or her 
poor health.     
  The individual measure of religious ideology, Attend, was significant at the .05 
level and provided evidence to support proposition two. When looking at the direction 
of the coefficients, it is clear that religious conservatism also plays a role in predicting 
health outcomes since fundamentalists are less likely to report poor health than liberals 
(See Appendix C).  However, the significance of ideological indicators did not hold 
across the board because Eqwlth was only nearly significant at the .10 level.  Although 
not significantly improving the fit of the model over demographic and material 
indicators, these findings are still important.  Looking at the coefficients, it is clear 
that respondents who believed that the government should intervene to help 
redistribute wealth were slightly more likely to report poor health than those with an 
economic libertarian position on the matter.   
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Models for All Years -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 2222.636 2267
DemC + Material 1978.569 2259 244.067 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ideology 1942.186 2246 36.383 13 0.005
DemC + Mat + Econ 1970.229 2255 8.34 4 0.10
DemC + Mat + Relig 1962.679 2253 15.89 6 0.025
DemC + Mat + Soc 1963.746 2256 14.823 3 0.005
DemC + Mat + Eqwlth 1973.602 2257 4.967 2 0.10
Dem C + Mat + Attend 1971.211 2257 7.358 2 0.05
DemC + Mat + Fair 1967.746 2258 10.823 1 0.005
DemC + Mat + Trust 1969.946 2258 8.623 1 0.005
Table 31:  Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logistic Regression Models, All Years 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region. 
 
  The final set of logistic regressions was run on the composite measures of 
economic, religious, social, and ruling ideology.  Two of the three scales measuring 
particular ideologies showed a significant improvement in fit over the model 
containing only the demographic controls and material indicators.  In particular, the 
social composite variable was highly significant at the .01 level and the economic 
composite variable was significant at the .025 level (See Appendix D).  Consistent 
with expectations derived from the literature, the social composite variable shows a 
gradient since those with moderate views of society have better health than the most 
negative respondents but worse health than those who have the best perception of 
society.  Respondents with very negative perceptions of society were significantly 
(p=.001) more likely to report poor health than those who positively perceived their 
surroundings.  Although not significant at the .05 level, the religious composite scale 
was nearly significant and should be analyzed further. It is surprising, given the trend 
of the religious scale to be nearly significant when the other composite scales were not 
significant, that this scale was not more significant when aggregated over all the years.  
The other two scales saw a great improvement in their chi-square significance level;  
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however, the religious composite model remained nearly significant relatively 
constantly.  Despite this, respondents in the second least religious group were almost 
twice as likely to perceive themselves to be in poor health then the most religious 
respondents.  In contrast to the fit statistics for all other years, the composite scale for 
ruling ideology was significant (chi-square statistic = .03) when all years were 
aggregated.  This is a surprising change from previous trends and must be looked at 
more closely. 
  Despite support found for the three proposed propositions in the cumulative 
file, the strength of the material variables (seen by their enormous chi-square statistics) 
overshadowed the importance of other psychosocial indicators.  Thus, as Schnittker 
(2004) has suggested, the association between such variables and health outcomes is 
often thought of as explained by the robust relationship between income and health.  
Although the ideological variables were not as strong as the material predictors, they 
still showed a significant improvement in the model of best fit and may be valuable in 
terms of suggesting directions for new research.  As stated earlier, measurement 
validity is extremely important and the moderate significance of variables such as 
religious ideology indicates that further efforts should focus on solidifying 
measurement validity on similar indicators of this field.    
  The final chapter in this study will further analyze the findings presented 
above.  In particular it will present a broad picture of which propositions are supported 
and which are not.  These results will be discussed in light of the historical rise of 
economic liberalism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism.  It is important 
to touch on the issue of comparison groups and how these variations may have 
affected the data analysis.  In addition, any limitations or suggestions for future 
research will be reviewed.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
  The overarching purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between 
ideological beliefs and individual self-reported health in America between the years 
1993 and 2004.  Three particular ideological beliefs -- economic libertarianism, 
religious conservatism, and social traditionalism -- were deemed both influential 
during this era and measurable using the General Social Survey.  Since the overlap of 
these ideologies suggests the presence of a ruling ideology, an additive scale of these 
particular ideologies was also composed and included in the analysis.  Four 
propositions were developed based on literature review and preliminary data analysis, 
and were subsequently evaluated through logistic regression procedures.   
  In order to understand the relative strength of these ideological variables, 
material indicators, demographic controls, and health behaviors were included in the 
basic logistic regression model.  The addition of these indicators allows for an 
evaluation of several competing epidemiological theories.  In sum, this study attempts 
to uncover determinants of health from psychosocial, material, behavioral, and 
ascribed spheres of influence.  The findings of this study will help future researchers 
better understand the diverse factors that influence perceptions of health by 
Americans.  
  The final chapter revisits the four propositions outlined in Chapter Two and 
pairs them with the findings from Chapter Five.  The implications of the supported 
and unsupported propositions are investigated further, and the connection between 
ruling ideology and perceptions of health is analyzed in light of current sociological 
theory.  After discussing the value of this and similar research, the chapter concludes  
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the study by noting important limitations and offering suggestions for future research 
directions. 
 
Evaluating the Propositions  
  Unveiled in the previous chapter, the results of this study show moderate 
support for three out of my four propositions.  Table 32 consolidates the findings of 
Chapter 5 based on a .05 and .10 level of significance.  It is evident that moderate 
support is garnered for Proposition 1, namely that respondents who believe in an 
economic system other than economic libertarianism will have poorer self-reported 
health than those who believe in a neo-liberal, free-market system.  After taking into 
consideration demographic controls and material indicators, respondents who 
expressed libertarian economic views are less likely to report poor health.  This 
finding holds true across all years except for 1993.  Possibly, these findings allude to 
the increasing influence of libertarian economic ideology as the Republican 
Revolution swept America.  In 1993, before the Contract with America, the 
Republican takeover of Congress, and the national welfare reform legislation adopted 
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), respondents were no more likely to report poor health if they were 
economic libertarians than if they were not.  Both the Contract with America and 
PRWORA, in their emphasis on the role of individuals in their own destiny and 
adherence to the ideals of free-market competition, clearly mapped to the dominant 
economic paradigm of the era.  These major shifts in American policy and discourse 
paved the way for increasingly libertarian positions over the years being studied.  
Thus, it is not particularly surprising that the economic ideology variables are not 
significant in 1993 but increase in significance from 1994 onward.   
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1993 1994 1996 2004 All Years
Proposition 1: Econ No 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.10
Proposition 2: Relig No 0.05 No No 0.05
Proposition 3: Social 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05
Proposition 4: Ruling Id No 0.05 No No 0.05
Table 32:  Support Found for Hypotheses at .05 and .10 Levels of Significance 
 
 
 
 
  Little support for the second proposition, that respondents who do not espouse 
religious conservative beliefs and/or accompanying normative behaviors will have 
poorer self-reported health than those who do, is found using the individual best fit 
model.  This measure only becomes significant when measured in 1994 and across all 
years.  This indicator is also relevant under two other circumstances.  First, the 
material indicators and demographic controls hold much sway in the analysis.  
Without the inclusion of these overpowering variables, religiosity gains in 
significance.  Although one goal of this study is to compare the relative strength of 
indicators between ideological, material, demographic, and health behavior models, it 
is also important to note the absolute importance of the variables.  The ideological 
variables, including religiosity, contribute to the model even if they are sometimes 
overpowered by the material indicators.   
  The second situation that necessitates further evaluation is the significance of 
religiosity when looked at as a scaled variable.   Table 33 reveals that the composite 
scale of religiosity was nearly significant for three out of five years studied.  This 
finding suggests that measuring degree of religious belief on a broader scale using all 
religious indicators allows for a more nuanced picture of the strength of belief than 
when only using a three category scale.  One obvious problem with the religious 
indicators chosen for the best fit analysis is with the question asking respondents about 
the fundamentalism or liberalism of their religious beliefs.  This question poses a false 
comparison in that fundamentalism is not the opposite of liberalism.  Conservative  
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1993 1994 1996 2004 All Years
Proposition 1: Econ No No No 0.10 0.05
Proposition 2: Relig No 0.10 No 0.10 0.10
Proposition 3: Social No No No No 0.05
Proposition 4: Ruling Id 0.10 No No No 0.05
respondents may not want to call themselves “fundamentalist” because of the 
pejorative nature of that term, but do attend church at least once a week and consider 
their religious beliefs quite strong.  Using a composite scale is a valid way of 
measuring religiosity and allows for more lee-way to counter potential interpretive 
bias. 
 
Table 33:  Support Found for Hypotheses at the .05 and .10 Levels of Significance 
Using the Composite Scales. 
 
 
 
  
 
  The third proposition stating that respondents who do not have a positive 
perception of community cohesion will have poorer self-reported health than those 
who do, found moderate support using the individual level indicators.  In one of the 
four years studied and in the overall analysis of all years, social indicators maintained 
significance at the .05 level, despite the inclusion of material indicators, and 
demographic controls (See Table 32).  However, when the social indicators were not 
significant at the .05 level, as was the case in 1993, 1994 and 2004, they were 
significant at the .10 level.  Although this level of significance fails to meet the 
stringent requirements of this study, the variable’s near-significance suggests that it is 
a consistently important, if not extremely strong, predictor of self-reported health.  
This inference is bolstered by the findings of Kawachi et al. (1997).  It is surprising 
then that when using a composite scale of indicators the social perceptions variable 
was not significant, except when measured for all years.  This may be a result of the 
consistently strong insignificance of the variable Helpnot, which measured a  
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respondent’s perception about the helpfulness of people around them.   This variable 
did not follow the trends of the other social variables and sometimes respondents who 
had a negative perception of society around them had better health (although never at 
a significant level) than those who thought people were generally helpful (see 
Appendix C).  This contradictory finding suggests a measurement or questionnaire 
error with the variable.  Therefore, including it in the composite scale may have 
diminished the effect of the other more significant social capital variables.   
   Despite the theoretically predicted presence of a ruling ideology based on the 
three dominant particular ideologies, the final proposition about the effect of ruling 
ideology on health outcomes only became significant at the .05 level when measured 
across all years (See Table 33).  Proposition 4 states that respondents whose responses 
do not reflect the ruling ideology measured as a composite of economic 
libertarianism, religious conservatism, and social traditionalism, will have poorer 
self-reported health than those who do.  However, this variable may suffer from 
some of the measurement error mentioned previously because the ruling ideology 
composite summated scale includes the variables measuring the fundamentalism of 
religious belief and perception of helpfulness, which may contain errors.  Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, the composite scale is suspected to be an incomplete 
measure of ruling ideology because of the limited variables available in the GSS.   
Therefore, the lack of consistently strong and positive findings for Proposition 4 do 
not rule out the importance of ruling ideology and its influence on health, but they do 
suggest that the scale should undergo further refinement.  In particular, a more specific 
dataset with the purpose of measuring economic, religious, and social self-perceptions 
may offer a more accurate picture of the influence of ruling ideology on health than 
does the scale constructed from the variables available in the GSS.   
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  In summary, using the individual indicators, Propositions 1 and 3 found 
moderate support while Proposition 2 only became relevant when using a broader 
scale-variable.  Although support for the propositions is not consistently strong 
throughout all models and all years, it is possible to conclude that the particular 
ideological variables do matter in respect to self-reported health.  Proposition 4 found 
little support when using a composite scale; however, limitations that may have 
confounded these findings have been discussed.  These results encourage further 
discussion on the implications of these supported and unsupported propositions.   
 
Interpretation and Implications of Findings  
   The findings of this study imply that particular ideologies do affect the way 
individuals perceive their health status.  Literature reviewed in Chapter 3 revealed a 
divide over how ideology may affect individual health, whether through health choices 
and behaviors, worldview, or material success.  Current epidemiological research 
debates the value of understanding socioeconomic (SES) position as a fundamental or 
proximate cause of health.  Some researchers suggest that SES is a correlate of health 
behavior and that these lifestyle choices directly influence health status (Phelan et al. 
2004).  Others suggest that inequality in SES produces biophysical responses such as 
stress and anxiety that physically affect the well-being of the body (Marmot 2004, Roy 
2004, Phelan et al. 2004, Adler et al. 1999).  A third perspective is that those with 
better SES have more material wealth and can pay for a better standard of living than 
lower classes (Carpiano 2006, Schnittker 2004, Mirowsky and Ross 2003).  Although 
this study does not measure socioeconomic standing, ideology can replace SES in the 
above equations.  With this substitution, three key paths of transmission from ideology 
to health outcomes are proposed.  The first is that ideology promotes normative 
prescriptions for behaviors that are good for their health, such as reduced smoking and  
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binge drinking.  Second, perhaps ideology provides a cohesive worldview and 
acceptance into a community, thus reducing stress of being outside the norm.  Third, 
those who adhere to the ruling ideology stand to gain more material wealth by being 
within and not opposed to the system.   
  The logistic regression models conducted on more than a decade of data 
provides evidence of two of the three pathways as viable mechanisms of transmission.  
The findings indicate that there are both a direct cause-effect relationship between 
social factors and disease and an intermediate role played by proximate risk factors.  
Since the ideological variables are significant, I can conclude that peoples’ perceptions 
of society and their role within it affect their views on their own well-being.  Yet, the 
significance of the material indicators in the above data analysis also suggests that 
intervening variables affects health.  However, not all intervening mechanisms 
proposed in the literature were found to be significant predictors of health in the above 
data analysis.  For example, health behaviors were not found to be key determinants of 
health net of socio-demographic controls.   
  Another implication of the findings requires revisiting sociological theory.  A 
significant body of literature exists predicting or documenting the negative and 
coercive effects of ideology on individuals.  In particular, Marxists critique ideology 
for its corrupting and manipulative power on the masses through false consciousness.  
Under this theoretical paradigm, lower classes subscribe to particular and ruling 
ideologies despite the potential lack of personal and class benefits involved.  Indeed, 
sometimes the policies implemented under certain ideologies have serious negative 
consequences for the economic, social, or personal well-being of those who have 
internalized them.  Despite this predicted effect of ideology, this study reveals that 
respondents who subscribe to the ideological paradigms are better off than those who 
do not.  These findings may contribute to a revision of current sociological theory.  
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  Several explanations of this surprising finding are possible.  Perhaps false 
consciousness is a theoretical idea that has no empirical basis.  If false consciousness 
is based on a materialist paradigm, a lack of material well-being would serve as an 
indicator of the presence of the negative aspect of the phenomenon.  However, as 
Weber, Marmot, Wilkinson and others suggest, life seems to be more than material 
relations.  Empirical research concludes that social relations play an important role in 
individual well-being (Kawachi et al. 1997, Hayward et al. 2000, Adler et al. 1999).  
Therefore, the exploitation of the lower classes is mitigated by the social benefits of 
having a cohesive worldview provided through intersecting particular ideologies.   
  On the other hand, despite the surprising findings of this study, false 
consciousness may still exist.  Possibly, its effects are obscured by the lack of clarity 
surrounding the idea comparison groups.  Chapter 3 reveals that on an international 
scale, the U.S. does not exhibit the lowest national mortality rates despite having the 
highest per capita income.   If Americans compared themselves to foreigners, 
particularly those in countries with socialist health systems, they may realize the 
deleterious health effects of adhering to the current dominant ideologies.  However, 
when compared to other individuals under the same economic and political system, 
the influence of false consciousness is unnoticeable.  The use of a comparison group 
outside the system may help to reveal the potential presence and influence of false 
consciousness. 
 
Value of this Research 
  Significant research has been undertaken on the relationship between health 
and social inequality (Marmot 2004, Kawachi et al. 1997, Wilkinson 2006).  Likewise, 
researchers have suggested links between material indicators and health outcomes 
(Rogot 1992, Lynch et al. 2000, Schnittker 2004, Smith and Kington 1997), as well as  
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between health behaviors and health outcomes (Phelan et al. 2004).  A sufficiently 
large body of research documenting the robust nature of self-reported health also 
exists (Mossey and Shapiro 1982, Idler and Benyamini 1997).  However, few studies 
have analyzed the relationship between ideology (either particular or ruling) and self-
reported health, taking into account the possible intervening effects of material 
indicators, demographic controls, and health behaviors.  This study has set out to 
better understand how internalized ideological perceptions of economics, religion, and 
social values affect perceptions of health and ultimately health outcomes and 
hopefully will serve as a base for future empirical initiatives looking at the influence 
of ideology on well-being. 
  In addition to this primary goal, I have invested significant effort into rooting 
the variable measurements in sociological and epidemiological literature.  Possible 
limitations surrounding self-reported health, the measure of fundamentalism, and the 
measure of helpfulness have already been identified and will be reviewed in the next 
section.  Moreover, qualifications on the measurement of ruling ideology have been 
mentioned previously, and better specification using a different survey instrument has 
been called for.  Thus, I hope that the way these factors have been conceptualized and 
tested and the potential limitations and qualifications noted will lead to future research 
on refining measurements and variable validity. 
 
Qualifications and Limitations of the Study 
  Qualifications for specific variables in the analysis have been reviewed at 
length when the variable was introduced.  The majority of this discussion can be found 
in Chapter Four on methodology.  Since this study has been transparent about its 
potential limitations from the outset, only a brief summary is necessary here.    
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  Although a measure of ruling ideology was included for theoretical reasons in 
this data analysis, it was originally identified as potentially unreliable due to the 
construction of its measurement.  From the outset it was not assumed to be a reliable 
indicator of ruling ideology and I suggested that future research should seek to refine 
its measurement.  Also, the indicators of helpfulness (social ideology) and 
fundamentalism (religious ideology) were called into question.  Perceived helpfulness 
was consistently highly insignificant and had a coefficient that was opposite of the 
other social ideological variables, while the question on fundamentalism proposed a 
false comparison between the unnecessarily pejorative term “fundamentalism” and 
“liberalism.”  Conservatism, not fundamentalism, is considered to be the opposite of 
liberalism.    
  The literature on self-reported health, the dependent variable, reveals several 
known limitations.  First, the lack of research on cultural interpretations of health 
status constricts the bounds of interpretation for respondents primarily identifying with 
a culture other than American.  American residency, a requirement for this study, does 
not necessitate American culture assimilation, especially among recent immigrants 
and members of ethnic enclaves (Portes and Manning; Portes and Zhou in Grusky 
2001:568-579; 597-608).  A second limitation for self-reported health and thereby this 
study in general is the lack of research surrounding comparison groups.  
Contemporary research offers conflicting accounts on the topic of comparison groups.  
Some social scientists suggest that individuals compare their well-being to members 
of higher socioeconomic classes (Wilkinson 1997, Davidson et al. 2006).  The relative 
deprivation hypothesis expresses the opposite impression of comparison groups.  
Robert Merton propones that an individual’s concentration (reinforced by the media) 
on "the most extreme sufferers tends to fix them as a reference group against which 
even other sufferers can compare themselves favorably" (Calhoun 2002:387, Idler and  
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Benyamini 1997).  A third viewpoint is that individuals usually compare themselves to 
members of their own age group regardless of economic status (Zimmer et al. 2000), 
while others suggest that individuals simply compare themselves to people “perceived 
as being comparable to themselves” whether in terms of race, class, gender, age or 
other characteristics (Calhoun 2002:387, Veblen in Ritzer 2000:335).  The magnitude 
of the confusion over comparison groups highlighted in this analysis will hopefully 
spur future research in the area.    
 
 Future Research 
  Given the purpose of this study, its conclusions, and the limitations noted 
above, several suggestions for future research will be presented.  In particular, variable 
refinement in the areas of self-reported health, religiosity, ideology, and ruling 
ideology is needed.  Although the GSS offers a basic rubric with which one can 
measure personal ideology, these findings suggest that further research should employ 
more detailed measures of ideology to further understand how it affects personal well-
being.  For example, more specific questions on economic ideology would have made 
the interpretations of the findings more authoritative.  Additionally, the presence of 
variables such as wealth, health insurance, and Body Mass Index in the dataset would 
have precipitated a more reliable test of relevant material indicators and health 
behaviors specifically noted in the literature.  Questions on personal health variables 
should be asked of a large enough sample to provide the degrees of freedom needed 
for a broad study of society.  The inclusion of these indicators in future research will 
contribute to building an empirical database of potential covariates.   
  Indeed, the paucity of previous studies empirically testing measures of 
contemporary ruling ideology leaves many unknowns in determining the relationship 
and pathways between ideology and health status.  In comparison, significant research  
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has been conducted on the mechanisms of transmission between ideology and health.  
Adler and Ostrove review this literature and create a model of potential pathways by 
which SES influences health (See Appendix E).  Social scientists should strive to 
explore more potential pathways from ideology to health through empirical research 
so that a similar model can be created out of a meta-analysis of the effects of ideology.  
To avoid the limitations Adler and Ostrove mention, researchers should be careful to 
fully explore the possibility of bidirectionality of causality, feedback loops, and 
interaction effects.  As part of the call for a commitment to further research in the area 
of ideology, more attention should also be given to reworking the measure of ruling 
ideology created in the study by including other theoretically important variables.   
  Secondly, as discussed above, the contradicting results of comparison group 
analysis has led to confusion in interpreting health outcomes.  A larger body of 
research needs to develop around comparison groups, testing the relative deprivation 
hypothesis and formulating new hypotheses, so as to find some general trends in 
comparison groups.  These findings might alter the construction of future models 
testing ideology because of the potential interactions between age, race, class, and 
perceptions of comparison groups.  Finally, further research should use time-series 
models to determine the direction of causality and also the importance of feedback 
loops.  For example, a bidirectional relationship between perceived health status and 
level of personal care almost certainly exists.  This and similar relationships can be 
analyzed further to learn more about the strength of each respective direction and the 
fundamental starting point.  In sum, the study of particular and ruling ideologies has 
important consequences for health in America.  Further refinements in survey 
instruments, measures, statistical techniques, and models will help to shed more light 
on the initial findings and trends presented in this analysis.   
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Frequency Percent
Married (1) 1,205 53.2
Formerly Married (Widowed (2), 
Divorced (3), Seperated (4)) 610 27.0
Not married (5) 448 19.8
Total 2,263 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Marital Status, All Years
Frequency Percent
MALE 1,054 46.6
FEMALE 1,209 53.4
Total 2,263 100.0
Original Distribution of Sex of Respondent, All Years
Frequency Percent
WHITE 1,897 83.8
BLACK 280 12.4
OTHER 86 3.8
Total 2,263 100.0
Original Distribution of Race of Respondent, All Years
Frequency Percent
MARRIED 1,205 53.2
WIDOWED 174 7.7
DIVORCED 356 15.7
SEPARATED 80 3.5
NEVER MARRIED 448 19.8
Total 2,263 100.0
Original Distribution of Marital Status, All Years
APPENDIX A 
Demographic Questions from the General Social Survey 
Marital Status: 
“Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Race: 
“What race do you consider yourself?” 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex: 
Interviewer coded respondent’s sex 
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Frequency Percent
18-39 1,014 44.8
40-59 809 35.7
60-74 321 14.2
75+ 119 5.3
Total 2,263 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Age, All Years
Frequency Percent
All Regions 1,648 72.8
South 615 27.2
Total 2,263 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Region of Interview, All Years
Frequency Percent
NEW ENGLAND 111 4.9
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 281 12.4
E. NOR. CENTRAL 410 18.1
W. NOR. CENTRAL 178 7.9
SOUTH ATLANTIC 444 19.6
E. SOU. CENTRAL 172 7.6
W. SOU. CENTRAL 187 8.3
MOUNTAIN 156 6.9
PACIFIC 325 14.4
Total 2,263 100.0
Original Distribution of Region of Interview, All Years
Age: 
Date of birth has been recoded into actual age and is a continuous variable (See 
Appendix E: Age Distributions of the General Social Survey for detailed responses) 
(Davis et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region: 
Interviewer records Region of Interview (See Statistical Abstract of the General Social 
Survey for a list of states within each region) (Davis et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
138 
Frequency Percent
Suburb (control) - XNorc values 4-7 858 43.1
Rural - XNorc values -0-3 489 24.6
Urban - XNorc values 8,9 642 32.3
Total 1,989 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Rural-Urban Measure, 1993, 1994, 1996
Frequency Percent
CITY GT 250000 313 15.7
CITY,50-250000 329 16.5
SUBURB, LRG CITY 420 21.1
SUBURB, MED CITY 297 15.0
UNINC,LRG CITY 60 3.0
UNINC,MED CITY 81 4.1
CITY,10-49999 139 7.0
TOWN GT 2500 146 7.3
SMALLER AREAS 162 8.1
OPEN COUNTRY 42 2.1
Total 1,989 100.0
Original Distribution of Rural-Urban Measure, 1993, 1994, 1996
 
NORC Size of Place: 
Interviewer records NORC Size of Place (See Appendix T of the General Social Survey 
for more information) (Davis et al. 2005). 
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Frequency Percent
2-4 Persons in Household 1,531 67.7
1 Person in Household 508 22.4
5+ Persons in Household 224 9.9
Total 2,263 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Number of Persons in Household, All Years
Frequency Percent
1 508 22.4
2 798 35.3
3 361 16.0
4 372 16.4
5 141 6.2
6 55 2.4
7 23 1.0
8 50 . 2
9 10 . 0
Total 2,263 100.0
Original Distribution of Number of Persons in Household, All Years
Number of Household Members: 
Interviewer records household size and composition (See Appendix D of the General 
Social Survey for more information about this variable) (Davis et al. 2005). 
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Frequency Percent
Never drink 161 29.8
Drink 232 43.0
Have gotten Drunk 147 27.2
Total 540 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Alcohol History, 1993-1994
Frequency Percent
YES 379 70.2
NO 161 29.8
Total 540 100.0
Original Distribution of "Ever Drink Alcoholic Beverages?" 1993-1994
Frequency Percent
YES 147 38.8
NO 232 61.2
Total 379 100.0
Original Distribution of "Ever Drink too Much?", 1993-1994
APPENDIX B 
Health Behavior Questions from the General Social Survey 
 
Drink: 
“Do you ever have occasion to use any alcoholic beverages such as liquor, wine, or 
been or are you a total abstainer?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drunk: 
“Do you sometimes drink more than you think you should?” 
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Frequency Percent
Never Smoked 259 48.0
Smoke 147 27.2
Did Smoke/Ever Smoked 134 24.8
Total 540 100.0
Recoded Distribution of Smoking History, All Years
Frequency Percent
YES 147 27.2
NO 393 72.8
Total 540 100.0
Original Distribution of Whether Respondent Smokes, 1993-1994
Frequency Percent
YES 134 34.2
NO 258 65.8
Total 392 100.0
Original Distribution of Whether Respondent Has Ever Smoked, 1993-
Smoke: 
“Do you smoke?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EvSmoke: 
“Have you ever smoked regularly?” 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 1.019* 0.618 0.700 0.798
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.539 0.394 0.652 0.657
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help -0.266 -0.306 -0.099 -0.069
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help -0.051 -0.299 -0.174 -0.23
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist 0.038 0.178 -0.130 -0.031
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.229 -0.142 -0.408 -0.448
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.445 0.330 0.222 0.226
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend 0.366 0.425 0.720 0.753
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious -0.543 -0.697 -0.117 -0.287
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious -0.226 -0.098 0.156 0.21
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful 0.091 0.026 0.221 0.304
Fair
Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take 
advantage -0.319 0.008 0.253 0.135
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted .935** 0.45 0.408 0.439
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 2.21*** 2.203*** 2.214***
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 1.653** 1.526** 1.623**
40-74.9 vs. 75+ 1.462** 1.489** 1.553**
Employ Not working vs. Working 0.517 0.669 0.687
Reason not to work vs. Working 0.280 -0.116 -0.197
Other vs. Working 1.191 1.186
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 0.413 0.275 0.312
12 vs. More than 12 0.078 0.003 0.046
Marital Formely married vs. Married 0.334 0.36
Never married vs. Married 0.004 0.012
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 -0.062 0.01
60-75 vs. 18-39 -0.687 -0.374
75+ vs. 18-39 -0.791 -0.101
AgeSq AgeSq 0.000 0
Sex Male vs. Female 0.419 0.487
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993
APPENDIX C 
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2004, All Years  
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Race Black vs. White -0.546 -0.749
Other vs. White 0.553 0.296
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons 0.048 0.027
5+ vs. 2-4 persons 0.284 0.289
Region South vs. All others -0.876* -.843*
XNORC Rural vs. Suburb -0.625
Urban vs. Suburb -0.239
Drink Drink vs. Never drink -0.492
Have gotten drunk vs. Never drink -0.877
Smoke Smoke vs. Never smoke 0.485
Did/ever smoke/d vs. Never smoke 0.158
Constant -2.129*** -3.673*** -5.075*** -4.486***
 Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993 (cont.)
 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 1.121*** 0.823* 0.78* -0.57
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.596* 0.460 0.500 -0.610
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.056 -0.122 -0.079 0.589
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help -0.071 -0.145 -0.109 1.227
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist 0.085 0.097 0.166 -0.095
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.436 -0.373 -0.510 -0.652
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.526 0.494 0.572 0.844
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend -0.246 -0.037 0.083 0.413
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious -1.239** -1.052* -1.040 0.361
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious -0.104 0.069 0.146 0.622
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful 0.016 0.073 0.161 -0.166
Fair Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take advantage  0.140 0.026 0.001 0.033
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted 0.456 0.313 0.301 1.169
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 0.697* 0.945* 0.774
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 0.457 0.585 -0.207
40-74.9 vs. 75+ 0.088 0.180 -1.146
Employ Not working vs. Working 0.891* 0.973* -0.865
Reason not to work vs. Working 1*** 1.138*** 1.776*
Other vs. Working 1.423* 1.885* 0.236
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 0.869** 0.836** 0.944
12 vs. More than 12 0.140 0.094 -0.053
Marital Formely married vs. Married -0.096 0.703
Never married vs. Married -0.613 0.794
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 0.049 0.18
60-75 vs. 18-39 -0.730 -1.968
75+ vs. 18-39 -1.771 -3.31
AgeSq AgeSq 0.000 0.001
Sex Male vs. Female 0.440 0.97
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1994
 
  
145 
Race Black vs. White 0.370 0.043
Other vs. White 0.589 0.407
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons -0.435 0.013
5+ vs. 2-4 persons 0.04
0.114
Region South vs. All others 0.028 0.261
XNORC Rural vs. Suburb 0.596
Urban vs. Suburb 0.138
Drink Drink vs. Never drink 0.008
Have gotten drunk vs. Never drink -1.002
Smoke Smoke vs. Never smoke -0.196
Did/ever smoke/d vs. Never smoke 0.007
Constant -2.158*** -3.002*** -4.219*** -5.461***
Chi-Sq 43.722*** 108.305*** 137.869*** 56.122*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037
df 13 21 33 39
-2Log likelihood 665.477 600.895 571.330 128.538
N 506 506 506 173ª
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1994 (cont.)
 
*p<.01 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
ª Note that this model uses significantly fewer cases. 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 0.275 -0.041 0.077
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.035 -0.076 0.027
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help .663** 0.481* 0.565*
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.190 0.124 0.194
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist -0.100 -0.062 -0.116
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.311 -0.203 -0.237
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.110 0.179 0.172
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend -0.001 0.235 0.212
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious -0.543 -0.306 -0.249
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious -0.095 0.032 0.091
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful -0.235 -0.038 -0.042
Fair Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take advantage  0.462* 0.330 0.346
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted 0.302 -0.011 0.030
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 0.567* 0.971**
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 0.499 0.678*
40-74.9 vs. 75+ 0.042 0.131
Employ Not working vs. Working -0.007 -0.150
Reason not to work vs. Working 0.749*** 0.823***
Other vs. Working 3.357*** 3.243***
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 1.433*** 1.33***
12 vs. More than 12 0.762*** 0.72***
Marital Formely married vs. Married -0.409
Never married vs. Married -0.406
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 -0.726
60-75 vs. 18-39 0.254
75+ vs. 18-39 0.267
AgeSq AgeSq 0.000
Sex Male vs. Female 0.414*
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1996
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Race Black vs. White 0.127
Other vs. White 0.432
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons 0.136
5+ vs. 2-4 persons -0.109
Region South vs. All others -0.138
XNORC Rural vs. Suburb
Urban vs. Suburb
Constant -1.795*** -2.822*** -2.7***
Chi-Sq 37.266*** 156.532*** 181.529***
0.000 0.000 0.000
df 13 21 33
-2Log likelihood 911.166 791.900 766.903
N 927 927 927
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1996 (cont.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.01 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 0.480 -0.205 -0.217
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.403 -0.113 -0.102
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help 1.566** 0.922 0.882
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help 1.252** 1.07* 1.431*
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist -0.962 -1.015 -0.769
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.075 0.155 0.219
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.190 -0.100 -0.054
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend 0.457 0.373 0.430
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious 0.799 1.279 1.441
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious 0.591 0.713 0.944
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful -0.886* -0.717 -0.438
Fair Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take advantage  0.508 0.551 0.709
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted 0.815* 0.673 0.175
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 0.700 1.271
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 0.455 0.915
40-74.9 vs. 75+ 0.318 0.389
Employ Not working vs. Working 1.935** 2.489***
Reason not to work vs. Working 0.826** 0.629
Other vs. Working 2.995* 3.682*
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 1.959*** 1.754***
12 vs. More than 12 0.985* 1.136*
Marital Formely married vs. Married -1.257
Never married vs. Married -0.481
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 -1.682
60-75 vs. 18-39 -4.832**
75+ vs. 18-39 -5.210
AgeSq AgeSq 0.001**
Sex Male vs. Female 0.592
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 2004
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Race Black vs. White 1.67*
Other vs. White 0.822
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons -0.339
5+ vs. 2-4 persons -0.374
Region South vs. All others -0.877
Constant -3.454*** -4.447*** -6.526***
Chi-Sq 33.628*** 71.705*** 96.934***
0.000 0.000 0.000
df 13 21 33
-2Log likelihood 240.412 202.335 177.107
N 290 290 290
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 2004 (cont.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.01 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 0.627*** 0.254 0.322
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.300* 0.118 0.188
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.417** 0.197 0.256
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.182 0.051 0.099
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist -0.052 0.021 -0.022
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.307* -0.209 -0.268
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.316 0.305 0.315
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend 0.041 0.222 0.286
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious -0.664 -0.544* -0.392
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious -0.055 0.077 0.135
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful -0.155 -0.066 -0.034
Fair Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take advantage  0.222 0.211 0.290*
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted 0.496*** 0.203 0.262
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 0.883*** 1.143***
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 0.636*** 0.750***
40-74.9 vs. 75+ 0.292 0.366*
Employ Not working vs. Working 0.615** 0.612**
Reason not to work vs. Working 0.755*** 0.671***
Other vs. Working 2.284*** 2.264***
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 1.095*** 0.979***
12 vs. More than 12 0.510*** 0.462***
Marital Formely married vs. Married -0.223
Never married vs. Married -0.384
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 0.223*
60-75 vs. 18-39 -0.331
75+ vs. 18-39 -0.744
AgeSq AgeSq 0.000*
Sex Male vs. Female 0.391
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993-2004
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Race Black vs. White 0.176
Other vs. White 0.498
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons 0.181
5+ vs. 2-4 persons 0.129
Region South vs. All others -0.327*
Constant -2.108*** -3.071*** -3.968***
Chi-Sq 89.323*** 331.640*** 385.318***
0.000 0.000 0.000
df 13 21 33
-2Log likelihood 2238.181 1995.649 1942.186
N 2279 2279 2279
Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993-2004 (cont.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.01 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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Variable Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EqWlth
Gov. should reduce income differences vs. Gov. 
shouldn't 0.322
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't 0.188
Helpnot Gov. should do more vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.256
Neutral vs. Gov. shouldn't help 0.099
Fund Liberal vs.Fundamentalist -0.022
Moderate vs.Fundamentalist -0.268
Attend Never attend vs. Regularly attend 0.315
Infrequently attend vs. Regularly attend 0.286
Reliten Not religious vs. Strongly religious -0.392
Not strongly religious vs. Strongly religious 0.135
Helpful Just look out for self vs.Try to be helpful -0.034
Fair Can't be too careful vs. Wouldn't take advantage  0.290*
Trust Can't be too careful vs. Most can be trusted 0.262
Income Less than $22.5 vs. 75+ 1.238*** 1.143***
22.5-39.9 vs. 75+ 0.848*** 0.750***
40-74.9 vs. 75+ .405* 0.366*
Employ Not working vs. Working 0.608** 0.612**
Reason not to work vs. Working 0.650*** 0.671***
Other vs. Working 2.129*** 2.264***
Educ Less than 12 vs. More than 12 1.187*** 0.979***
12 vs. More than 12 0.558*** 0.462***
Marital Formely married vs. Married .357* -0.184 -0.223
Never married vs. Married 0.098 -0.398* -0.384
Age 40-59 vs. 18-39 -0.138 0.171 0.223*
60-75 vs. 18-39 -0.155 -0.382 -0.331
75+ vs. 18-39 -0.422 -0.747 -0.744
AgeSq AgeSq .000** 0 0.000*
Sex Male vs. Female 0.182 .379** 0.391
Fit Statistic Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993-2004
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Race Black vs. White .622*** .429* 0.176
Other vs. White .753** .551* 0.498
Hompop 1 vs. 2-4 persons -0.036 0.129 0.181
5+ vs. 2-4 persons 0.197 0.079 0.129
Region South vs. All others -0.083 -.267* -0.327*
Constant -2.329*** -3.272*** -3.968***
Chi-Sq 104.869*** 348.935*** 385.318***
0.000 0.000 0.000
df 12 20 33
-2Log likelihood 2222.636 1978.569 1942.186
N 2279 2279 2279
Fit Statistic Logistic Regression Models with Coefficients for 1993-2004 (cont.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.01 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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Models for 1993 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 358.959 355
DemC + Material 327.016 347 31.943 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ruling ID 322.038 345 4.978 2 0.10
DemC + Mat + Econ Comp 324.521 343 2.495 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig Comp 324.991 341 2.025 6 No
DemC + Mat + Soc Comp 322.006 344 5.01 3 No
 Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logisitic Regression Models with Composite Scales, 1993 
Models for 1994 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 664.131 494
DemC + Material 595.195 486 68.936 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ruling ID 590.89 484 4.305 2 No
DemC + Mat + Econ Comp 589.594 482 5.601 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig Comp 583.676 480 11.519 6 0.10
DemC + Mat + Soc Comp 590.052 483 5.143 3 No
Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logisitic Regression Models with Composite Scales, 1994 
Models for 1996 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 906.278 915
DemC + Material 780.27 907 126.008 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ruling ID 779.183 905 1.087 2 No
DemC + Mat + Econ Comp 772.592 903 7.678 4 No
DemC + Mat + Relig Comp 772.102 901 8.168 6 No
DemC + Mat + Soc Comp 776.537 904 3.733 3 No
Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logisitic Regression Models with Composite Scales, 1996 
APPENDIX D 
Fit Statistics for Composite Models 
 
Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Poor Health and “0” for Good Health. 
a Demographics include Marital status, Age, Age
2, Sex, Race, Number of persons in the household, and 
Region. 
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Models for 2004 -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 253.798 278
DemC + Material 193.074 270 60.724 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ruling ID 192.346 268 0.728 2 No
DemC + Mat + Econ Comp 184.977 266 8.097 4 0.10
DemC + Mat + Relig Comp 180.743 264 12.331 6 0.10
DemC + Mat + Soc Comp 191.476 267 1.598 3 No
Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logisitic Regression Models with Composite Scales, 2004 
Models for All Years -2 Log-Likelihood d.f. Reduction in LL Reduction in d.f. Chi-Sq Sig
Demographic Controlsª 2222.636 2267
DemC + Material 1978.569 2259 244.067 8 0.005
DemC + Mat + Ruling ID 1971.264 2257 7.305 2 0.03
DemC + Mat + Econ Comp 1966.759 2255 11.81 4 0.025
DemC + Mat + Relig Comp 1967.615 2253 10.954 6 0.10
DemC + Mat + Soc Comp 1965.818 2256 12.751 3 0.01
Fit Statistics for Evaluating Logisitic Regression Models with Composite Scales, All Years
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APPENDIX E 
Model of the Pathways by Which SES Influences Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Adler, Nancy E. and Joan M. Ostrove. 1999. "Socioeconomic Status 
and Health:  What We Know and What We Don't." Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 896:12. 
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